FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY

1970

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Mortgaging the Old Homestead . . . . . *Lord Ritchie-Calder* 207
The Congressional Presence in Foreign Relations . *Jacob K. Javits* 221
France and Germany: Less Divergent Outlooks? . *Alfred Grosser* 235
U. S. MILITARY POLICY
Limits to Intervention
Graham Allison, Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky 245
When and How to Use SALT . . . . . *Jeremy J. Stone* 262
Dilemmas of the Arms Traffic . . . . . *Geoffrey Kemp* 274
The Church in Latin America . . . . . *Thomas G. Sanders* 285
Greece Under the Colonels . . . . . *C. L. Sulzberger* 300
Cuba Revisited after Ten Years of Castro . . . . . *Viator* 312
Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom? . . . . . *Don Peretz* 322
China, Russia and the United States . . . . . *Sir Robert Scott* 334
Japanese Culture and the Business Boom . *Howard F. Van Zandt* 344
Brain Drain or Overflow? . . . . . *George B. Baldwin* 358
Recent Books on International Relations . . . . . *John G. Stoessinger* 373
Source Material . . . . . *Donald Wasson* 393

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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

LORD RITCHIE-CALDER OF BALMASHANNAR, former Professor of International Relations, Edinburgh University; member of several missions and committees of the United Nations on scientific matters; author of "Living with the Atom," "The Evolution of the Machine," "Man and the Cosmos" and other works * * * *JACOB K. JAVITS,* United States Senator from New York * * * *ALFRED GROSSER,* Professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Paris; Director of the graduate program, National Foundation of Political Science; author of "The Federal Republic of Germany," "French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle" and other works * * * *GRAHAM T. ALLISON,* Assistant Professor of Government, Kennedy Institute of Politics, Harvard University; special assistant to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arms Control, 1965 * * * *ERNEST R. MAY,* Professor of History, Harvard University, and Dean of Harvard College; author of "The World War and American Isolation," "The American Image," "American Imperialism" and other works * * * *ADAM YARMOLINSKY,* Professor of Law, Harvard University; former special assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 1961–64; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1965–66 * * * *JEREMY J. STONE,* International Affairs Scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations; author of "Containing the Arms Race" and "Strategic Persuasion" * * * *GEOFFREY KEMP,* Research Associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; formerly Research Associate at the Institute for Strategic Studies, London; author of "Arms and Security: the Egypt-Israel Case" and co-author of "Arms to Developing Countries 1945–65" * * * *THOMAS G. SANDERS,* Associate of the American Universities Field Staff; formerly Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Brown University * * * *C. L. SULZBERGER,* writer of the syndicated column, "Foreign Affairs," for *The New York Times*; author of several books of which the latest is "A Long Row of Candles" * * * *VIATOR,* Anonymous * * * *DON PERETZ,* Director, Southwest Asian and North African Program, State University of New York at Binghamton; author of "Israel and the Palestine Arabs," "The Middle East Today" and other works * * * *SIR ROBERT SCOTT,* Permanent Secretary, British Ministry of Defense, 1961–63; Commandant of the Imperial Defense College 1960–61; Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, 1955–59; Assistant Under Secretary of State, 1950–53; member of the British Consular Service in China, 1927–1950 * * * *HOWARD F. VAN ZANDT,* Vice President, ITT Far East and Pacific, Inc.; Director, Nippon Electric Co. Ltd. and other concerns in Japan; Governor, American Chamber of Commerce, Tokyo * * * *GEORGE B. BALDWIN,* Economic Adviser on Projects of the World Bank, since 1962; member of the Harvard Advisory Group in Iran, 1958–61; formerly on the faculties of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Vanderbilt University; author of "Planning and Development in Iran."

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 48 JANUARY 1970 No. 2

MORTGAGING THE OLD HOMESTEAD

By Lord Ritchie-Calder

PAST civilizations are buried in the graveyards of their own mistakes, but as each died of its greed, its carelessness or its effeteness another took its place. That was because such civilizations took their character from a locality or region. Today ours is a global civilization; it is not bounded by the Tigris and the Euphrates nor even the Hellespont and the Indus; it is the whole world. Its planet has shrunk to a neighborhood round which a man-made satellite can patrol sixteen times a day, riding the gravitational fences of Man's family estate. It is a community so interdependent that our mistakes are exaggerated on a world scale.

For the first time in history, Man has the power of veto over the evolution of his own species through a nuclear holocaust. The overkill is enough to wipe out every man, woman and child on earth, together with our fellow lodgers, the animals, the birds and the insects, and to reduce our planet to a radioactive wilderness. Or the Doomsday Machine could be replaced by the Doomsday Bug. By gene-manipulation and man-made mutations, it is possible to produce, or generate, a disease against which there would be no natural immunity; by "generate" is meant that even if the perpetrators inoculated themselves protectively, the disease in spreading round the world could assume a virulence of its own and involve them too. When a British bacteriologist died of the bug he had invented, a distinguished scientist said, "Thank God he didn't sneeze; he could have started a pandemic against which there would have been no immunity."

Modern Man can outboast the Ancients, who in the arrogance of their material achievements built pyramids as the gravestones of their civilizations. We can blast our pyramids into space to orbit through all eternity round a planet which perished by our neglect.

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A hundred years ago Claude Bernard, the famous French physiologist, enjoined his colleagues, "True science teaches us to doubt and in ignorance to refrain." What he meant was that the scientist must proceed from one tested foothold to the next (like going into a mine-field with a mine-detector). Today we are using the biosphere, the living space, as an experimental laboratory. When the mad scientist of fiction blows himself and his laboratory skyhigh, that is all right, but when scientists and decision-makers act out of ignorance and pretend that it is knowledge, they are putting the whole world in hazard. Anyway, science at best is not wisdom; it is knowledge, while wisdom is knowledge tempered with judgment. Because of overspecialization, most scientists are disabled from exercising judgments beyond their own sphere.

A classic example was the atomic bomb. It was the Physicists' Bomb. When the device exploded at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945, and made a notch-mark in history from which Man's future would be dated, the safe-breakers had cracked the lock of the nucleus before the locksmiths knew how it worked. (The evidence of this is the billions of dollars which have been spent since 1945 on gargantuan machines to study the fundamental particles, the components of the nucleus; and they still do not know how they interrelate.)

Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who concurred with President Truman's decision to drop the bomb on Hiroshima, later said: "We knew nothing whatever at that time about the genetic effects of an atomic explosion. I knew nothing about fall-out and all the rest of what emerged after Hiroshima. As far as I know, President Truman and Winston Churchill knew nothing of those things either, nor did Sir John Anderson who coördinated research on our side. Whether the scientists directly concerned knew or guessed, I do not know. But if they did, then so far as I am aware, they said nothing of it to those who had to make the decision."[1]

That sounds absurd, since as long before as 1927, H. J. Muller had been awarded the Nobel Prize for his evidence of the genetic effects of radiation. But it is true that in the whole documentation of the British effort, before it merged in the Manhattan Project, there is only one reference to genetic effects—a Medical

[1] "Twilight of Empire," by Clement Attlee with Francis Williams. New York: Barnes, 1961, p. 74.

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Research Council minute which was not connected with the bomb they were intending to make; it concerned the possibility that the Germans might, short of the bomb, produce radioactive isotopes as a form of biological warfare. In the Franck Report, the most statesmanlike document ever produced by scientists, with its percipience of the military and political consequences of unilateral use of the bomb (presented to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson even before the test bomb exploded), no reference is made to the biological effects, although one would have supposed that to have been a very powerful argument. The explanation, of course, was that it was the Physicists' Bomb and military security restricted information and discussion to the bomb-makers, which excluded the biologists.

The same kind of breakdown in interdisciplinary consultation was manifest in the subsequent testing of fission and fusion bombs. Categorical assurances were given that the fallout would be confined to the testing area, but the Japanese fishing-boat *Lucky Dragon* was "dusted" well outside the predicted range. Then we got the story of radiostrontium. Radiostrontium is an analogue of calcium. Therefore in bone-formation an atom of natural strontium can take the place of calcium and the radioactive version can do likewise. Radiostrontium did not exist in the world before 1945; it is a man-made element. Today every young person, anywhere in the world, whose bones were forming during the massive bomb-testing in the atmosphere, carries this brandmark of the Atomic Age. The radiostrontium in their bones is medically insignificant, but, if the test ban (belated recognition) had not prevented the escalation of atmospheric testing, it might have been.

Every young person everywhere was affected, and why? Because those responsible for H-bomb testing miscalculated. They assumed that the upthrust of the H-bomb would punch a hole in the stratosphere and that the gaseous radioactivity would dissipate itself. One of those gases was radioactive krypton, which quickly decays into radiostrontium, which is a particulate. The technicians had been wrongly briefed about the nature of the troposphere, the climatic ceiling which would, they maintained, prevent the fall-back. But between the equatorial troposphere and the polar troposphere there is a gap, and the radiostrontium came back through this fanlight into the climatic jet-streams. It was swept all round the world to come to earth as radioactive

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rain, to be deposited on foodcrops and pastures, to be ingested by animals and to get into milk and into babies and children and adolescents whose growing bones were hungry for calcium or its equivalent strontium, in this case radioactive. Incidentally, radiostrontium was known to the biologists before it "hit the headlines." They had found it in the skin burns of animals exposed on the Nevada testing ranges and they knew its sinister nature as a "bone-seeker." But the authorities clapped security on their work, classified it as "Operation Sunshine" and cynically called the units of radiostrontium "Sunshine Units"—an instance not of ignorance but of deliberate non-communication.

One beneficial effect of the alarm caused by all this has been that the atoms industry is, bar none, the safest in the world for those working in it. Precautions, now universal, were built into the code of practice from the beginning. Indeed it can be admitted that the safety margins in health and in working conditions are perhaps excessive in the light of experience, but no one would dare to modify them. There can, however, be accidents in which the public assumes the risk. At Windscale, the British atomic center in Cumberland, a reactor burned out. Radioactive fumes escaped from the stacks in spite of the filters. They drifted over the country. Milk was dumped into the sea because radioactive iodine had covered the dairy pastures.

There is the problem of atomic waste disposal, which persists in the peaceful uses as well as in the making of nuclear explosives. Low energy wastes, carefully monitored, can be safely disposed of. Trash, irradiated metals and laboratory waste can be embedded in concrete and dumped in the ocean deeps—although this practice raises some misgivings. But high-level wastes, some with elements the radioactivity of which can persist for *hundreds of thousands* of years, present prodigious difficulties. There must be "burial grounds" (or euphemistically "farms"), the biggest of which is at Hanford, Washington. It encloses a stretch of the Columbia River in a tract covering 650 square miles, where no one is allowed to live or to trespass.

There, in the twentieth century Giza, it has cost more, much more, to bury live atoms than it cost to entomb the sun-god Kings of Egypt. The capital outlay runs into hundreds of millions of dollars and the maintenance of the U.S. sepulchres is over $6 million a year. (Add to that the buried waste of the U.S.S.R., Britain, Canada, France and China, and one can see what it costs

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to bury live atoms.) And they are very much alive. At Hanford they are kept in million-gallon carbon-steel tanks. Their radioactive vitality keeps the accompanying acids boiling like a witches' cauldron. A cooling system has to be maintained continuously. The vapors from the self-boiling tanks have to be condensed and "scrubbed" (radioactive atoms removed); otherwise a radioactive miasma would escape from the vents. The tanks will not endure as long as the pyramids and certainly not for the hundreds of thousands of years of the long-lived atoms. The acids and the atomic ferments erode the toughest metal, so the tanks have to be periodically decanted. Another method is to entomb them in disused salt mines. Another is to embed them in ceramics, lock them up in glass beads. Another is what is known as "hydraulic fraction": a hole is drilled into a shale formation (below the subsoil water); liquid is piped down under pressure and causes the shale to split laterally. Hence the atoms in liquid cement can be injected under enormous pressure and spread into the fissures to set like a radioactive sandwich. This overcomes the worry of earthquakes since the materials will remain secure even in faulting.

This accumulating waste from fission plants will persist until the promise, still far from fulfilled, of peaceful thermonuclear power comes about. With the multiplication of power reactors, the wastes will increase. It is calculated that by the year 2000, the number of six-ton nuclear "hearses" in transit to "burial grounds" at any given time on the highways of the United States will be well over 3,000 and the amount of radioactive products will be about a billion curies, which is a mighty lot of curies to be roaming around a populated country.

The alarming possibilities were well illustrated by the incident at Palomares, on the coast of Spain, when there occurred a collision of a refueling aircraft with a U.S. nuclear bomber on "live" mission. The bombs were scattered. There was no explosion, but radioactive materials broke loose and the contaminated beaches and farm soil had to be scooped up and taken to the United States for burial.

Imagine what would have happened if the *Torrey Canyon,* the giant tanker which was wrecked off the Scilly Isles, had been nuclear-powered. Some experts make comforting noises and say that the reactors would have "closed down," but the *Torrey Canyon* was a wreck and the Palomares incident showed what

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happens when radioactive materials break loose. All those oil-polluted beaches of southwest England and the coasts of Brittany would have had to be scooped up for nuclear burial.

II

The *Torrey Canyon* is a nightmarish example of progress for its own sake. The bigger the tanker the cheaper the freightage, which is supposed to be progress. This ship was built at Newport, Virginia, in 1959 for the Union Oil Corporation; it was a giant for the time—810 feet long and 104 feet beam—but, five years later, that was not big enough. She was taken to Japan to be "stretched." The ship was cut in half amidship and a mid-body section inserted. With a new bow, this made her 954 feet long, and her beam was extended 21 feet. She could carry 850,000 barrels of oil, twice her original capacity.

Built for Union Oil, she was "owned" by the Barracuda Tanker Corporation, the head office of which is a filing cabinet in Hamilton, Bermuda. She was registered under the Liberian flag of convenience and her captain and crew were Italians, recruited in Genoa. Just to complicate the international tangle, she was under charter to the British Petroleum Tanker Company to bring 118,000 tons of crude oil from Kuwait to Milford Haven in Wales, via the Cape of Good Hope. Approaching Lands End, the Italian captain was informed that if he did not reach Milford Haven by 11 p.m. Saturday night, he would miss highwater and would not be able to enter the harbor for another five days, which would have annoyed his employers. He took a shortcut, setting course between Seven Stones rocks and the Scilly Isles, and he finished up on Pollard Rock, in an area where no ship of that size should ever have been.

Her ruptured tanks began to vomit oil and great slicks spread over the sea in the direction of the Cornish holiday beaches. A Dutch tug made a dash for the stranded ship, gambling on the salvage money. (Where the salvaged ship could have been taken one cannot imagine, since no place would offer harborage to a leaking tanker). After delays and a death in the futile salvage effort, the British Government moved in with the navy, the air force and, on the beaches, the army. They tried to set fire to the floating oil which, of course, would not volatilize. They covered the slicks with detergents (supplied at a price by the oil companies), and then the bombers moved in to try to cut open the

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deck and, with incendiaries, to set fire to the remaining oil in the tanks. Finally the ship foundered and divers confirmed that the oil had been effectively consumed.

Nevertheless the result was havoc. All measures had had to be improvised. Twelve thousand tons of detergent went into the sea. Later marine biologists found that the cure had been worse than the complaint. The oil was disastrous for seabirds, but marine organic life was destroyed by the detergents. By arduous physical efforts, with bulldozers and flame-throwers and, again, more detergents, the beaches were cleaned up for the holiday-makers. Northerly winds swept the oil slicks down Channel to the French coast with even more serious consequences, particularly to the valuable shellfish industry. With even bigger tankers being launched, this affair is a portentous warning.

Two years after *Torrey Canyon* an offshore oil rig erupted in the Santa Barbara Channel. The disaster to wildlife in this area, which has island nature reserves and is on the migratory route of whales, seals and seabirds, was a repetition of the *Torrey Canyon* oil-spill. And the owner of the lethal oil rig was Union Oil.

III

Another piece of stupidity shows how much we are at the mercy of ignorant men pretending to be knowledgeable. During the International Geophysical Year, 1957–58, the Van Allen Belt was discovered. This is an area of magnetic phenomena. Immediately it was decided to explode a hydrogen bomb in the Belt to see whether an artificial aurora could be produced. The colorful draperies and luminous skirts of the aurora borealis are caused by the drawing in of cosmic particles through the rare gases of the upper atmosphere—ionization it is called; it is like passing electrons through the vacuum tubes of our familiar florescent lighting. The name Rainbow Bomb was given it in anticipation of the display it was expected to produce. Every eminent scientist in the field of cosmology, radio-astronomy or physics of the atmosphere protested at this irresponsible tampering with a system which we did not understand. And typical of the casual attitude toward this kind of thing, the Prime Minister of the day, answering protests in the House of Commons that called on him to intervene with the Americans, asked what all the fuss was about. After all, they hadn't known that the Van

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Allen Belt even existed a year before. This was the cosmic equivalent of Chamberlain's remark about Czechoslovakia, at the time of Munich, about that distant country of which we knew so little. They exploded the bomb. They got their pyrotechnics and we still do not know the cost we may have to pay for this artificial magnetic disturbance.

In the same way we can look with misgivings on those tracks —the white tails of the jets, which are introducing into our climatic system new factors, the effects of which are immensurable. Formation of rain clouds depends upon water vapor having a nucleus on which to form. That is how artificial precipitation is introduced—the so-called rain-making. So the jets, criss-crossing the weather system, playing noughts and crosses with it, can produce a man-made change.

In the longer term we can foresee even more drastic effects from Man's unthinking operations. At the United Nations' Science and Technology Conference in Geneva in 1963 we took stock of the effects of industrialization on our total environment thus far. The atmosphere is not only the air which humans, animals and plants breathe; it is also the envelope which protects living things from harmful radiation from the sun and outer space. It is also the medium of climate, the winds and the rain. Those are inseparable from the hydrosphere—the oceans, covering seven-tenths of the globe, with their currents and extraordinary rates of evaporation; the biosphere, with its trees and their transpiration; and, in terms of human activities, the minerals mined from the lithosphere, the rock crust. Millions of years ago the sun encouraged the growth of the primeval forests, which became our coal, and the plant growth of the seas, which became our oil. Those fossil fuels, locked away for æons of time, are extracted by man and put back into the atmosphere from the chimney stacks and the exhaust pipes of modern engineering. About 6 billion tons of carbon are mixed with the atmosphere annually. During the past century, in the process of industrialization, with its release of carbon by the burning of fossil fuels, more than 400 billion tons of carbon have been artificially introduced into the atmosphere. The concentration in the air we breathe has been increased by approximately 10 percent, and if all the known reserves of coal and oil were burnt, the concentration would be ten times greater.

This is something more than a public health problem, more

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than a question of what goes into the lungs of an individual, more than a question of smog. The carbon cycle in nature is a self-adjusting mechanism. Carbon dioxide is, of course, indispensable for plants and is, therefore, a source of life, but there is a balance which is maintained by excess carbon being absorbed by the seas. The excess is now taxing this absorption and it can seriously disturb the heat balance of the earth because of what is known as the "greenhouse effect." A greenhouse lets in the sun's rays but retains the heat. Carbon dioxide, as a transparent diffusion, does likewise. It keeps the heat at the surface of the earth and in excess modifies the climate.

It has been estimated that, at the present rate of increase (6 billion tons a year), the mean annual temperature all over the world might increase by 3.6 degrees centigrade in the next forty to fifty years. The experts may argue about the time factor and even about the effects, but certain things are apparent, not only in the industrialized northern hemisphere but in the southern hemisphere also. The north-polar ice-cap is thinning and shrinking. The seas, with their blanket of carbon dioxide, are changing their temperature, with the result that marine plant life is increasing and is transpiring more carbon dioxide. As a result of the combination, fish are migrating, changing even their latitudes. On land the snow line is retreating and glaciers are melting. In Scandinavia, land which was perennially under snow and ice is thawing, and arrowheads of over 1,000 years ago, when the black soils were last exposed, have been found. The melting of sea ice will not affect the sea level, because the volume of floating ice is the same as the water it displaces, but the melting of ice caps or glaciers, in which the water is locked up, will introduce additional water to the sea and raise the level. Rivers originating in glaciers and permanent snow fields will increase their flow; and if ice dams, such as those in the Himalayas, break, the results in flooding may be catastrophic. In this process the patterns of rainfall will change, with increased precipitation in some areas and the possibility of aridity in now fertile regions. One would be well-advised not to take ninety-nine year leases on properties at present sea level.

IV

At that same conference, there was a sobering reminder of mistakes which can be writ large, from the very best intentions.

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In the Indus Valley in West Pakistan, the population is increasing at the rate of ten more mouths to be fed every five minutes. In that same five minutes in that same place, an acre of land is being lost through water-logging and salinity. This is the largest irrigated region in the world. Twenty-three million acres are artificially watered by canals. The Indus and its tributaries, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej, created the alluvial plains of the Punjab and the Sind. In the nineteenth century, the British began a big program of farm development in lands which were fertile but had low rainfall. Barrages and distribution canals were constructed. One thing which, for economy's sake, was not done was to line the canals. In the early days, this genuinely did not matter. The water was being spread from the Indus into a thirsty plain and if it soaked in so much the better. The system also depended on what is called "inland delta drainage," that is to say, the water spreads out like a delta and then drains itself back into the river. After independence, Pakistan, with external aid, started vigorously to extend the Indus irrigation. The experts all said the soil was good and would produce abundantly once it got the distributed water. There were plenty of experts, but they all overlooked one thing—the hydrological imperatives. The incline from Lahore to the Ram of Kutch—700 miles—is a foot a mile, a quite inadequate drainage gradient. So as more and more barrages and more and more lateral canals were built, the water was not draining back into the Indus. Some 40 percent of the water in the unlined canals seeped underground, and in a network of 40,000 miles of canals that is a lot of water. The result was that the watertable rose. Low-lying areas became waterlogged, drowning the roots of the crops. In other areas the water crept upwards, leaching salts which accumulated in the surface layers, poisoning the crops. At the same time the irrigation régime, which used just 1½ inches of water a year in the fields, did not sluice out those salts but added, through evaporation, its own salts. The result was tragically spectacular. In flying over large tracts of this area one would imagine that it was an Arctic landscape because the white crust of salt glistens like snow.

The situation was deteriorating so rapidly that President Ayub appealed in person to President Kennedy, who sent out a high-powered mission which encompassed twenty disciplines. This was backed by the computers at Harvard. The answers were

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pretty grim. It would take twenty years and $2 billion to repair the damage—more than it cost to create the installations that did the damage. It would mean using vertical drainage to bring up the water and use it for irrigation, and also to sluice out the salt in the surface soil. If those twenty scientific disciplines had been brought together in the first instance it would not have happened.

One more instance of the far-flung consequences of men's localized mistakes: No insecticides or pesticides have ever been allowed into the continent of Antarctica. Yet they have been found in the fauna along the northern coasts. They have come almost certainly from the Northern Hemisphere, carried from the rivers of the farm-states into the currents sweeping south. In November 1969, the U.S. Government decided to "phase out" the use of DDT.

Pollution is a crime compounded of ignorance and avarice. The great achievements of *Homo sapiens* become the disaster-ridden blunders of Unthinking Man—poisoned rivers and dead lakes, polluted with the effluents of industries which give something called "prosperity" at the expense of posterity. Rivers are treated like sewers and lakes like cesspools. These natural systems—and they are living systems—have struggled hard. The benevolent micro-organisms which cope with reasonable amounts of organic matter have been destroyed by mineral detergents. Witness our foaming streams. Lake Erie did its best to provide the oxygen to neutralize the pickling acids of the great steel works. But it could not contend. It lost its oxygen in the battle. Its once rich commercial fishing industry died and its revitalizing microorganic life gave place to anaerobic organisms which do not need oxygen but give off foul smells, the mortuary smells of dead water. As one Erie industrialist retorted, "It's not our effluent; it's those damned dead fish."

We have had the Freedom from Hunger Campaign; presently we shall need a Freedom from Thirst Campaign. If the International Hydrological Decade does not bring us to our senses we will face a desperate situation. Of course it is bound up with the increasing population but also with the extravagances of the technologies which claim that they are serving that population. There is a competition between the water needs of the land which has to feed the increasing population and the domestic and industrial needs of that population. The theoretical minimum to sustain living standards is about 300 gallons a day per person.

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This is the approximate amount of water needed to produce grain for 2½ pounds of bread, but a diet of 2 pounds of bread and 1 pound of beef would require about 2,500 gallons. And that is nothing compared with the gluttonous requirements of steel-making, paper-making and the chemical industry.

Water—just H_2O—is as indispensable as food. To die of hunger one needs more than fifteen days. To die of thirst one needs only three. Yet we are squandering, polluting and destroying water. In Los Angeles and neighboring Southern California, a thousand times more water is being consumed than is being precipitated in the locality. They have preëmpted the water of neighboring states. They are piping it from Northern California and there is a plan to pipe it all the way from Canada's North-West Territories, from the Mackenzie and the Liard which flow northwards to the Arctic Ocean, to turn them back into deserts.

V

Always and everywhere we come back to the problem of population—more people to make more mistakes, more people to be the victims of the mistakes of others, more people to suffer Hell upon Earth. It is appalling to hear people complacently talking about the population explosion as though it belonged to the future, or world hunger as though it were threatening, when hundreds of millions can testify that it is already here—swear it with panting breath.

We know to the exact countdown second when the nuclear explosion took place—5:30 a.m., July 16, 1945, when the first device went off in the desert of Alamogordo, New Mexico. The fuse of the population explosion had been lit ten years earlier—February 1935. On that day a girl called Hildegarde was dying of generalized septicaemia. She had pricked her finger with a sewing needle and the infection had run amok. The doctors could not save her. Her desperate father injected a red dye into her body. Her father was Gerhard Domagk. The red dye was prontosil which he, a pharmaceutical chemist, had produced and had successfully used on mice lethally infected with streptococci, but never before on a human. Prontosil was the first of the sulfa drugs—chemotherapeutics, which could attack the germ with the living body. Thus was prepared the way for the rediscovery of penicillin—rediscovery because although Fleming had discovered it in 1928, it had been ignored because neither he nor any-

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body else had seen its supreme virtue of attacking germs with the living body. That is the operative phrase, for while medical science and the medical profession had used antiseptics for surface wounds and sores, they were always labeled "Poison, not to be taken internally." The sulfa drugs had shown that it was possible to attack specific germs within the living body and had changed this attitude. So when Chain and Florey looked again at Fleming's penicillin in 1938, they were seeing it in the light of the experience of the sulphas.

A new era of disease-fighting had begun—the sulfas, the antibiotics, DDT insecticides. Doctors could now attack a whole range of invisible enemies. They could master the old killer diseases. They proved it during the war, and when the war ended there were not only stockpiles of the drugs, there were tooled up factories to produce them. So to prevent the spread of the deadly epidemics which follow wars, the supplies were made available to the war-ravaged countries with their displaced persons, and then to the developing countries. Their indigenous infections and contagions and insect-borne diseases were checked.

Almost symbolically, the first great clinical use of prontosil had been in dealing with puerperal sepsis, childbed fever. It had spectacularly saved mothers' lives in Queen Charlotte's Hospital, London. Now its successors took up the story. Fewer mothers died in childbirth, to live and have more babies. Fewer infants died, fewer toddlers, fewer adolescents. They lived to marry and have children. Older people were not killed off by, for instance, malaria. The average life-span increased.

Professor Kingsley Davis of the University of California at Berkeley, the authority on urban development, has presented a hair-raising picture from his survey of the world's cities. He has shown that 38 percent of the world's population is already living in what are defined as urban places. Over one-fifth of the world's population is living in cities of 100,000 or more. And over one-tenth of the world's population is now living in cities of a million or more inhabitants. In 1968, 375 million people were living in million-and-over cities. The proportions are changing so quickly that on present trends it would take only 16 years for half the world's population to be living in cities and only fifty-five years for it to reach 100 percent.

Within the lifetime of a child born today, Kingsley Davis

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foresees, on present trends of population-increase, 15 billion people to be fed and housed—nearly five times as many as now. The whole human species would be living in cities of a million-and-over inhabitants, and—wait for it!—the biggest city would have 1.3 billion inhabitants. That means 186 times as many as there are in Greater London.

For years the Greek architect Doxiadis has been warning us about such prospects. In his Ecumenopolis—World City—one urban area like confluent ulcers would ooze into the next. The East Side of World City would have as its High Street the Eurasian Highway stretching from Glasgow to Bangkok, with the Channel Tunnel as its subway and a built-up area all the way. On the West Side of World City, divided not by the tracks but by the Atlantic, the pattern is already emerging, or rather, merging. Americans already talk about Boswash, the urban development of a built-up area stretching from Boston to Washington; and on the West Coast, apart from Los Angeles, sprawling into the desert, the realtors are already slurring one city into another all along the Pacific Coast from the Mexican Border to San Francisco. We don't need a crystal ball to foresee what Davis and Doxiadis are predicting; we can already see it through smog-covered spectacles; a blind man can smell what is coming.

The danger of prediction is that experts and men of affairs are likely to plan for the predicted trends and confirm these trends. "Prognosis" is something different from "prediction." An intelligent doctor having diagnosed your symptoms and examined your condition does not say (except in novelettes), "You have six months to live." An intelligent doctor says, "Frankly, your condition is serious. Unless you do so-and-so, and I do so-and-so, it is bound to deteriorate." The operative phrase is "do so-and-so." We don't have to plan for trends; if they are socially undesirable our duty is to plan away from them; to treat the symptoms before they become malignant.

We have to do this on the local, the national and the international scale, through intergovernmental action, because there are no frontiers in present-day pollution and destruction of the biosphere. Mankind shares a common habitat. We have mortgaged the old homestead and nature is liable to foreclose.

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THE CONGRESSIONAL PRESENCE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

By Jacob K. Javits

IN the field of foreign policy the constitutional powers delegated under Articles I and II to the Congress are keyed to the phrase "advise and consent." However, in America's greatest moments of external crisis the emphasis has been on "consent." The exercise of the right to advise has, on many occasions, been less than welcome to the executive recipient of Senatorial recommendations.

No sooner had President Washington launched the nation's first Administration than he found the advice of the Congress so abusive that he strode from the Senate chamber swearing "never to return to this place." And Secretary of State John Hay summed up his bitter experiences at the hands of the legislative body in the late nineteenth century by observing: "A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the arena. No one can say just how or when the final blow will fall. But one thing is certain—it will never leave the arena alive."

Much has changed in the intervening period. A "strong presidency" has evolved into a national institution welcomed in this century by most Americans. That welcome is a response to the quickened pace of communications and the apparent need for the country to act immediately and with decisiveness in the ever recurring crises of contemporary foreign policy.

The American people began to learn in Theodore Roosevelt's day to focus their attention on the White House as the seat of national power and policy in foreign affairs. The potential for this attitude to flourish has of course always existed in the constitutional powers granted to the President. His role as Commander in Chief and his mandate to "conduct the foreign policy of the United States" have from the beginning carried the possibility for an assumption of authority and an exercise of power that exceeds the principle of the equal but separate powers of the three branches of government.

Only in this century, however, has that Presidential potential grown to such dramatic proportions that it threatens to precipitate a crisis in constitutional relationships. For the right to ad-

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vise as well as to consent implies a two-way relationship. The constitution-makers in Philadelphia, on the basis of their own experience with the British Crown, wished to assure a reciprocal and consultative function affecting the Legislative and Executive Branches. Yet a few short years later, the problems of the second half of the twentieth century were foreshadowed in the reaction of President Washington to the Senate in his first and only visit there.

Other Presidents since have given evidence of agreement with our country's first Chief Executive. The failure of President Wilson to include Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee in his deliberations on the Treaty of Versailles led, finally, to the destruction of the League of Nations and in some degree perhaps to the outbreak of the Second World War. Senator Lodge's antipathy to the Treaty may or may not have been changed by a Wilsonian overture. The question of motivation is not critical. The point is that the Senate was not asked to advise and, tragically, it did not consent. In the years that followed we protected ourselves from what Churchill described later as "the gathering storm" by insulating ourselves with the illusion of "normalcy." Today, those of us who exercise high executive and legislative power can no longer rely on such an illusion. The most ill-informed citizen knows that any new storm carries with it the threat of nuclear war.

II

Television so charges responses that a recent book is entitled "The Living Room War." In sharply defined focus the horrors of the present war are brought in living color to bemuse the evening hours of "an audience" of millions. There is justified unease in the hearts of the American people. The President who is chosen to lead us and the Senators and Congressmen chosen to represent the people must reflect an awareness of that unease and must act to eliminate, where possible, the reasons for its being. Today, Viet Nam is the essence and the symbol of that unease.

President Nixon himself recently remarked on his awareness that his own views of the Viet Nam situation are at odds with what he called the country's "leadership communities." The most important segment of that leadership community, in terms of its power to act and to restrain, is within the United States Senate. If the country is to extract itself from the morass of Viet

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Nam, then the President and the Senate must act in common and not in dissension and struggle. It is time now for the Congress to reassess its own role in terms of what it has and has not done and what it should do in the future to assure the free debate that is indispensable to our ultimate decision—the product of free institutions. That debate must seek the national interest ahead of partisan advantage. Every element of foreign policy must be totally debated, and the "loyal opposition" is under special obligation to see that this occurs.

It is highly questionable whether the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and even UNRRA could have taken place without the leadership exercised in the Senate by Senator Vandenberg's Foreign Relations Committee and the acceptance of that leadership by the country at large. Dean Acheson, in his recent memoirs dealing with his years as Secretary of State, presents in pungent fashion his own account of the relationship between the State Department and the Vandenberg Committee. While the tone of Dean Acheson's recollections differs sharply from the attitudes expressed in Senator Vandenberg's memoirs, they are in full agreement on the essential factors that dominated that key period in postwar policy-making. The Presidential power was exercised in close consultation with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. That committee, in turn, helped to amend and shape policy so that it could in good conscience be supported by the Congress before the country at large.

Today, debates about the Viet Nam war, the defense budget and domestic priorities are bringing about an even more powerful role for the Congress in foreign affairs. We have all seen this happening and most view it as a healthy sign; the probing, the questioning, the suggesting, the delving into national security requirements with the same scrutiny which the Congress always has given to domestic affairs have met with general approval. Yet, in themselves, these do not add up to a new role for the Congress in foreign policy. They represent but a beginning of a new assertiveness and a new activism by the Congress, the basis of which has always existed in terms of constitutional authority. The Congress over the last ten years has not asserted this authority because of the preëmption of the role by the Executive Branch and because the Congress tended, albeit all too willingly, to bow to the allegedly superior secret information of the President.

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A major function of the Congress with respect to the great issues of foreign policy and national security is that of shaping as well as articulating public opinion. In a democracy such as ours, governmental action is possible only within parameters defined by public attitudes and opinions. In the major Senate foreign-policy debates of the very recent past—Viet Nam and ABM—we have learned that the development and public presentation of new information and interpretations bearing on the great issues is a vital Congressional function as well as a potent instrumentality in asserting legislative prerogatives and responsibilities.

There certainly was vigorous debate within the Executive Branch concerning the ABM issue, but it was, perforce and properly, a debate conducted *in camera* and it was before a jury structurally oriented heavily toward the military viewpoint. The countervailing views of distinguished scientists, outside experts and qualified public men were brought to bear on the question only as a result of Congressional initiative. The same has been true to a lesser extent with respect to the Viet Nam war.

Until the recent Congressional challenges, the Administration has enjoyed an overwhelming predominance in the field of national security information and interpretation. We have learned and will put to good use, I am convinced, the practicality as well as the necessity of meeting the Executive on roughly equal terms with respect to relevant information and interpretation.

A salutary by-product has been the evolving capacity of the Congress to handle, rather than be intimidated and manipulated by, the problem of "classified" information upon which Administration decision-makers rely so heavily. In the course of hearings on the ABM it became apparent that classified information is sometimes made available on a highly selective basis by Administration witnesses. Diligent and imaginative probing often uncovers additional classified information which supports opposite conclusions. Moreover, we have learned that intensive Congressional scrutiny of so-called classified information can lead to the declassification, with Administration concurrence, of relevant information which has remained classified more for the sake of bureaucratic convenience than for legitimate national-security reasons.

It is the discovery and development of alternative viewpoints about "secret" information which make the greater use of closed-

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door sessions of the Senate and House a potential instrument of greater Congressional effectiveness in foreign policy. Attendance invariably is high at secret, closed-door sessions at which the full range of classified information can be presented and submitted to critical cross-examination by proponents and opponents of a particular measure.

Of perhaps even greater usefulness is the technique evolved during the Viet Nam and ABM debates of bringing differing interpretations and recommendations dramatically but responsibly to the public's attention. An alternative case, differing from that presented by the Administration, has been articulated with great effectiveness before Congressional committees both by Senators and by distinguished public witnesses whose knowledge, judgment and experience carry great weight. I believe that this is a technique which the President and his senior Cabinet advisers should welcome. It can materially enhance the quality of decision-making and the efficacy of policy implementation, to the President's advantage, for the nation ultimately will judge the President on performance rather than on rhetoric. Moreover, in our system as contrasted to the parliamentary system, major revision of Administration-sponsored legislation does not represent the threat and the challenge to the government which similar action would do to the British Government, for instance.

III

The road to greater Congressional participation in foreign policy is marked by the choice of key issues for public examination. We have not yet addressed all the basic foreign and national security issues other than Viet Nam and the Anti-Ballistic Missile system. Because of this concentration of effort, two misimpressions are developing: first, that we in the Congress only criticize and have little that is positive to offer; and second, that we tend to oppose most of the Administration's present foreign and security policy. Neither is true. Unfortunately, our criticisms may continue to be mistaken for a broadside on the present U.S. role in the world until we forge a new concept of Congressional-Executive relations on foreign policy and a new more relevant foreign policy.

The catalyst for defining the new relationship has been and is obviously Viet Nam. The war there brings us face to face with a policy dilemma in the separation of powers under the Con-

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stitution. The war is being carried out under the President's powers as Commander in Chief. There was no declaration of war by Congress. Only a Sense-of-the-Congress Resolution backs him; and that is terminable by resolution of both Houses. Who, then, shall decide when substantively there is to be war? This dilemma, and the uncertainty it creates about the responsibility for war, points up the need to find a new "check and balance" in the Congressional role in foreign policy—a "check and balance" that is adaptable to modern "undeclared" war.

The Congress has yet to question effectively the powers of the Commander in Chief to dispose American forces overseas as he sees fit. President Eisenhower in 1958 landed Marines in Lebanon. President Johnson in 1965 poured 20,000 U.S. troops into Santo Domingo. Both assertions of military power came without declarations of war. We were considerably more fortunate in each case than we have been in Viet Nam, for the Executive's objective was achieved both times without the horrifying material and human costs we are paying in the present conflict. It is my judgment that as unfortunate as is the Viet Nam conflict, it would be even more so if Congress had declared war. The Viet Nam action issues from executive decision; it is not a commitment of the national honor.

If the Congress had declared war, a tremendous complex of international agreements, a whole area of international law would have been invoked in such fashion as to unloose unforeseeable consequences. Public opinion might very well have required the bombing of Haiphong harbor and probably a land invasion of North Viet Nam. There are those who assert that our Viet Nam involvement should have been offered to the Congress in the context of a proposed declaration of war and that, if faced with such a prospect, we would not have become involved in the conflict as we did. I, for one, am glad that no such declaration was sought or given. The power to declare war is an ultimate Congressional power to commit the nation. The power not to declare war is a legitimate check on foreign policy.

Members of the Senate were among the first to sound the call for a reassessment of America's commitment in Viet Nam. As sentiment against the conduct and the nature of the war rose in intensity, the Senate itself provided the principal forum for the expression of views ranging from dissent to the presentation of alternative action. Whatever the merits of the individual posi-

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tions assumed by my colleagues throughout these last difficult years, it is my view that political scientists will record the role of this Senatorial opposition as one of the high points in the history of the Senate as a great deliberative body.

No matter what the ultimate outcome in Viet Nam, a somber warning note has been struck. Not only has policy been brought into question, but the institutions of policy-making themselves. When a policy loses public support and proves non-viable, and when, nevertheless, the institutions of government either support or do not change that policy, the validity of the institutions as well as the policy is called into question. An individual President may fall in the wake of adverse public opinion, but if we are to preserve the fabric of our society, we must assure ourselves that the *institutions* of the Presidency and the Senate retain their viability. Under the stresses of the Viet Nam war this relationship has been subject to strains unparalled within the last century.

The United States Senate, notwithstanding objections voiced within its chambers to the course of American policy in Viet Nam, was so used during the Johnson Administration as to find itself a Presidential echo rather than an independent voice. As Commander in Chief, President Johnson was in absolute control of all information relating to the course of the war. That control was a key factor in the overwhelming adoption of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. When confronted with the Commander in Chief's assessment that American troops are under attack by a foreign enemy, few Senators will take it upon themselves to refuse to support an effective response. To do so would be against the national interest as it has been understood since the inception of the Republic.

But today there are many who think that the Congress was misinformed or inadequately informed as to what actually occurred in August of 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. A mutual distrust between the President and his principal legislative advisers in the area of foreign affairs has grown steadily. Senators today are inclined to cast a jaundiced eye on Presidential assessments, and, unfortunately, even on assertions of fact. This distrust of the exercise of the executive power can lead to a reassertion of Congressional authority and, hopefully, renewed coöperation between the President and the Senate—or it can push us toward a stalemate of wills.

Mr. Nixon's assumption of the Presidency provided us with

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the opportunity to extricate ourselves from the Viet Nam conflict. In the months since he took office he has not yet given adequate evidence of responding to a mandate that he himself acknowledges to get us out of the war. He told the nation in May: "I do not criticize those who disagree with me on the conduct of our peace negotiations. And I do not ask unlimited patience from a people whose hopes for peace have too often been raised and then cruelly dashed over the past four years." And yet his immediate response to the October Moratorium offered no fresh evidence of response to the dissent on Capitol Hill. The President, in his November 3 address, made no mention of any Congressional policy role in his plan to end the Viet Nam war; yet if we are at last to free ourselves of Saigon's "veto" on the Vietnamization of the war, the Congress will have to stand with the President in the decision. The enormous pressures being exerted on the President by those involved in the war or who favor its prosecution are not conducive to patience with criticism, no matter how constructive it is in its intent or application.

Nevertheless, we in Congress—even of the President's own party—must continue to criticize when necessary in order to fulfill our mandated role. It has been suggested by Representative Jonathan Bingham in the pages of this review that increased Congressional surveillance of military expenditure is not only a necessity today but gives promise of being an even weightier factor in future sessions of the Congress. The increasing complexities and expenses of weapons systems are too often causative factors in the evolution of policy. It is the case of the cart before the horse, and some of us at least have been awakened to the need for putting them back into proper position. But military spending and weapons systems are only one element in the shaping of foreign policy.

While we in Congress must continue to permit the Executive to determine the direction of that policy, we must insist more forcefully that he provide his reasoning and justification so as to discern where day-to-day actions, unglamorous in detail but substantive in effect, may carry the country. We must also exercise vigilance to assure that foreign policy is not being made for us in the Defense Department, the intelligence agencies or elsewhere by such faits accomplis as contingency plans, the deployment of forces or the location of bases, which deprive us effectively of our voice in foreign policy. It is here that the Congress

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can act as both a restraining and as an informing influence, and, where appropriate, as an affirmative partner with the Executive.

Of course, the first prerequisite for the best functioning of our constitutional system in foreign policy is a knowledgeable and sensitive President who wants to coöperate with the Congress in foreign policy. This is perhaps the best assurance that the Congress will do its part and that the coöperation will work.

In any case, the Congress must fulfill the full dimension of its constitutional role. In order to reassert its proper place, we must consider enlarging some of its capabilities. The Executive Branch has at its disposal the largest and best equipped staff in the world. If Congress is to fulfill its responsibilities adequately, it, too, needs a staff—larger and of better quality than exists today. In an age when we spend billions on atomic arsenals we must allocate resources to those endeavors which will hopefully make those arsenals obsolete.

IV

There is, fortunately, an element of foreign policy in which Congress has continued to play a leading role throughout what we have come to think of as an era of executive dominance.

Section VIII of Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign nations" and to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises." The powers and responsibilities of the Congress in this field have grown in importance throughout the postwar period and I look to a similar growth in the decade of the 1970s.

There has been a vast increase in international trade, and investment problems will loom as large as trade problems in the 1970s. Continuing international monetary problems have sharply challenged the very foundations of our international monetary system, which is based on gold. The year 1970 may see significant changes. The problems of an inward- or outward-looking Common Market and the expansion of this economic grouping also loom large, as do those of better integrating the powerful Japanese economy into the Western system. The world's North-South standard-of-living gap is a problem of such magnitude that its bridging cannot be conceived of in terms of presently existing institutions and developmental assistance programs. These problems dictate the need for a more coördinated approach to the issues of foreign economic policy within the Congress and the

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Administration as well as between Congress, the Administration and international organizations. The time may come when it will be necessary to create a new department of cabinet rank to handle the issues of foreign trade and aid, technology and U.S. private investment; there will be a parallel need for new committees within both Houses of the Congress to deal with the new legislation and new approaches that will be required.

The future will be built on what we are doing now, and here again the Congress is in the forefront. In the very near future, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the Congress, of which I am the ranking Minority member, will open hearings on a wide range of trade issues facing this nation. It should be recalled that similar hearings were a prelude to the Kennedy Administration's introduction of the Trade Expansion Act in the early 1960s—the truly historic legislation which formed the cornerstone of our trade policy during this decade. Hopefully, these hearings will again lead the way into the 1970s.

The Joint Economic Committee has also pioneered in other crucial areas which will be of increasing importance in the years ahead. Certainly its groundbreaking hearings regarding the economy of Mainland China did much to correct myths and misinformation which had accumulated during the emotional McCarthy years in the 1950s and to stimulate new and more realistic thinking. It is clear that our relations with Mainland China must evolve over the years in a way so as to increase commerce and cultural and educational interchanges. The ideological and military-oriented approach of the Defense and Commerce Departments relates not to the future but to the receding past. The State Department shows signs of going the other way, however.

Congressional innovation must extend to economic détente with Eastern Europe. The recent Senate passage of the Export Expansion and Regulations Act—even over some Administration opposition—is a first step in our agenda for the 1970s. Paralleling the vital search for a modus vivendi in the field of strategic weaponry, we should undertake a search for positive moves in the fields of monetary affairs, aid and trade, general economic relations and the coördination of developmental assistance efforts. We should very much hope that over the next decade the Soviet Union would consider joining established international trade and financial agencies such as GATT, the IMF, IDA and the IBRD, and regional trade and financial organizations.

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If these and other foreign-policy objectives are to be achieved, a dialogue between the Executive and Legislative Branches must occur in such style as to ensure meaningful responses on the part of each. Many years ago, as an undergraduate at New York University, I debated in the negative a resolution moving the adoption of a parliamentary form of government for the United States. NYU won the debate, but experience has since moved me somewhat closer to the position of my opponents from CCNY. Although the parliamentary form as practiced in other countries would introduce into the American society an element of instability we can ill afford—outweighing the value of its flexibility and sensitivity—there are elements within the parliamentary system we might in practice adopt.

In the Executive Branch only the President is elected; the Secretaries of State and Defense, the agency and department heads are responsible to him. Every Congressman has a specific constituency to which he is responsible and responsive. The Congress must reassert itself in the formation of foreign policy so as to avoid the bitterness of future Viet Nams in which its constituents suddenly find themselves reluctant participants.

Perhaps we could initiate the practice of interpellations—where at "closed-door" Senate sessions members of the President's Cabinet might find it possible to appear and to be as responsive to questions from the floor as Cabinet members are obliged to be in such sessions in the House of Commons, and as they are when testifying before Congressional committees. Such a parliamentary interchange would help participants counsel each other about information which otherwise would have to be taken on faith.

In any event, hard questions must be asked of the executive agencies. Since the early days of the Presidency, executive privilege has been asserted by the Executive Branch. Presidents from Washington to Nixon have each, on occasion, refused to provide the Congress with information deemed privileged by the President. That information is often requisite to intelligent assessment of a given policy issue. But its denial to the Congress by the President is hallowed by long and effective precedent.

Increased surveillance of executive defense and planning agreements overseas is required of the Congress. Too few Americans are aware that the treaty-making process has eroded to a point where the "executive agreement" has tended to eliminate

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the Senate's concurrence as a component of national arrangements with foreign powers. In 1968, 57 treaties were concluded and 226 executive agreements were made in the name of the United States Government. Those executive agreements, no matter what their purpose, abrogate in effect the Senate's rights and obligations. We must, at the very least, subject them to a more intense scrutiny than we have in the past. Secret agreements between the Executive Branch and foreign powers have become all too frequent in recent history, as the Senate Subcommittee on Military Security and Commitments Abroad is finding in its current investigations.

In 1968 we learned that our highest military authorities had assured General Franco of a continuing American military presence on Spanish territory, as part of the bases agreement. Even more recently it was disclosed that in 1965 the Thai Government and the American Military Mission in Thailand signed a "contingency military plan." That arrangement, ostensibly agreed to under the SEATO umbrella, pledged assistance of an order that should have come only with Congressional authorization. Recently, Secretary of State Rogers, in a statement before the Foreign Relations Committee, diluted the effect of that agreement. But seven years ago we were told by Secretary of State Rusk that Thailand was "vital to the national interest of the United States and to world peace."

We must assure ourselves in the future of a continuity of national attitudes in foreign relations rather than the breaks that inevitably come when arrangements are made without adequate constitutional authority. There is a case for executive agreements, but they should be reconciled to the Senate's power to advise and consent—that is, the Senate must be made privy to them.

The whole Senate will probably have to sit with increasing frequency with the "doors closed" in secret session. There have been three occasions in this session of the Senate—twice on the ABM, once on military spending—when we have taken such action. To date, however, this procedure has been infrequent enough to warrant headlines when it occurred. I suggest it should become part and parcel of the process by which we advise and consent. Only then can we exercise full moral suasion on the President to take us into his confidence sufficiently to comprehend some of the policies initiated in the White House. Such secrecy is often held to be repugnant to the democratic process.

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But in our time it may well be one of the tools which can assist its survival.

"Meaningful consultation," a phrase used by Senator Ervin in the recent debate on the National Commitments Resolution, is a key to the changing role Congress must play in foreign relations. The nearly 5,000 international agreements reached by the Executive since 1946 have done much to shape the nature of America's position in the world. We must assure ourselves that in the future the American people through their elected representatives will have considerably more to say about the nature of that position.

The National Commitments Resolution places the Senate on record as follows:

> Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore be it Resolved, That (1) a national commitment for the purpose of this resolution means the use of the armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the armed forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the Executive and Legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment.

In order to meet the obligations inherent in that resolution, we must move more closely to a sharing of day-to-day responsibility with the Executive.

Essentially, the constitutional role of the United States Senate in foreign policy is consultative. Our powers are not comparable to those of the Presidency. The one weapon we have, the control and authorization of appropriation—the power of the purse—must necessarily be used with the greatest discretion. It is my view that only in a situation in which the President is completely resistant to the national will, as expressed by an overwhelming vote of the Congress, should this power be brought to bear. For as we call upon the President to respect the rights of the Legislative Branch we must, even in times of stress, respect his. The use of such power in foreign policy through denying appropriations implies a rejection of the American President almost as stunning in its implications as a vote of no confidence under the parliamentary system—which thereby ousts the government. It would, in all probability, make it very difficult thereafter for the

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President to perform the executive function in foreign-policy areas having little or nothing to do with the case in point, *e.g.* the Viet Nam conflict.

We must be aware of the potential for disaster in conflicts between the branches of the Federal Government. It has been a great source of strength and gratification to me and to my colleagues that our efforts—particularly with respect to Viet Nam and the nuclear arms race—have elicited such strong and broad popular support from the people we represent. But, wherever and whenever possible, the Executive and the Legislative Branches must respect each other's rights and sensibilities. This being said, it is essential that we face up to the difficult prospect that some day the President of the United States may interpret his executive powers in foreign affairs in a way that directly conflicts with the way Congress interprets its own obligations. If that day comes, the Congress will have to consider seriously the cut-off of funds for purposes to which the national constituency is opposed.

I hope that day never comes. That is why I feel so strongly that the National Commitments Resolution is a watershed in the American experience. I see this resolution as a concrete response to the desire, perhaps I should say the demand, of the American people that the Senate play its full role in the national security field, especially with respect to national commitments.

I see this resolution as a signal to the Executive Branch that it must adjust itself psychologically and procedurally to a new reality—the reality that the Senate will not again shrink from its responsibilities or yield its constitutional power with respect to national-security issues and the solemn undertaking of national commitments.

If the Executive Branch responds to that signal, the danger of constitutional crisis will pass as have so many other fevers of the American spirit. For more than a century this nation has avoided a governmental stalemate. We must continue to do so. We in the Congress must avoid throwing the gauntlet down before the Executive. But we must also have in return greater respect by the President for the advise-and-consent function of the Congress and specifically of the Senate. For in the remainder of the twentieth century we must live together if we are to live at all.

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FRANCE AND GERMANY: LESS DIVERGENT OUTLOOKS?

By Alfred Grosser

IN Germany as in France, 1969 will be remembered as the year of the break in continuity. The principal break is in each case obvious: the departure of General de Gaulle after eleven years in power and the relegation of the Christian Democrats to the opposition after twenty years in power. But the nature and import of these breaks call for interpretation.

Both resulted, in large measure, from a fairly continuous evolution of the electorate. In the Federal Republic, the figures are quite clear. Although it is true that their participation in the government since December 1966 made the Socialists "respectable," even to petits bourgeois previously frightened by the "Reds," the rise in their share of the vote in 1969 did not represent a big leap forward in comparison to previous advances: they received 28.8 percent of the ballots cast in 1953, 31.8 percent in 1957, 36.2 percent in 1961, 39.3 percent in 1965, and now 42.7 percent. Further advances are possible, too, thanks to the gradual transformation of society: the cities are continuing to grow, as in other industrial countries, and the big cities are inclined to vote Socialist; the generations in which women greatly outnumbered men because of war losses are gradually being superseded by age groups in which men are in a slight majority; and the feminine electorate itself—because social constraints are waning and because the Church's grip on it is weakening—is less bound to the CDU. Moreover, the Catholic Church itself is intervening less and less to procure a "Christian" vote.

In France, the continuous evolution has been of another order. A kind of junction occurred between two curves: the descending curve of General de Gaulle's personal prestige and the ascending curve of organized Gaullism. In the consultative referendum on the Fifth Republic in September 1958, 79.2 percent of those who cast ballots voted yes, while two months later the candidates espousing Gaullism garnered only 20.4 percent of the ballots. In December 1965, the General gained reëlection only with difficulty, while in the parliamentary elections that followed, in March 1967, the Gaullist candidates received 37.7 percent of the vote. They were to obtain 43.6 percent in June 1968.

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In April 1969, only 46.8 percent of the voters responded affirmatively to the question of personal confidence that was put to them in the form of a referendum on regionalization and reform of the Senate. On the first of June, Georges Pompidou harvested 44 percent of the vote. Although he won in the runoff on June 15 (57.6 percent against Poher, whereas the General had only received 54.5 percent against Mitterrand), it was less because he had made progress in the interval than because the number of abstentions and blank ballots was considerable. If the votes are calculated in terms of the totals of registered voters, it turns out that the Gaullist candidates obtained 34.3 percent on June 23, 1968, General de Gaulle 36.7 percent in April 1969, and Georges Pompidou 33.9 percent and 37.2 percent in the successive elections of last June. Charismatic Gaullism and Gaullism as a political grouping had truly become close neighbors.

In both France and Germany, the break with the past was marked by a stabilization of the political system. In the Federal Republic, the defeat of the extreme right-wing NPD (despite its advance from 2 to 4.3 percent of the vote) and the crushing of the extreme Left, which fell from 1.3 to 0.6 percent, confirmed the wish of the German voters to make their votes count and to vote for the parties that are fully committed to parliamentary democracy. Between them, the two big ones (the CDU/CSU and the SPD) have successively collected, since 1949, 60.2 percent of the vote, 74, 82, 81.6 (in 1961, the year of a Liberal upsurge), 86.9 and now 88.8 percent. It may be wondered where the votes went of the 2.5 million young voters who had not yet reached voting age in 1965, particularly since the rebels of the universities were among them. In the event, they voted as reasonably as their elders.

Nevertheless, stabilization that permits the political forces to set up long-term strategies renders absurd, or at least somewhat hollow, a large part of their formulations on the one national problem. Stability will be complete only when its implications are fully recognized and fully accepted. It excludes any calling in question of the frontiers, and it excludes reunification. The régime of the Federal Republic is durable because the division of Germany is durable.

In France, the victory of Georges Pompidou was also that of an institutional system. Disputes over the legitimacy of the régime had been steadily subsiding prior to 1969. The presiden-

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tial election of 1965 had—by the very fact that it was hard-fought and that the opposition participated in it with respectable results—contributed to damping down the conflict. This process was accentuated by the crushing of the revolutionaries through general elections, which were organized after the dissolution of the Assembly and accepted as legitimate by all the parliamentary factions, most particularly the Communists. The circumstances of the General's departure and of the election of his successor, as well as the fact that that successor was Georges Pompidou, affirmed and defined the nature of the régime. In 1964, Pompidou had put it as follows:

> France has now chosen an intermediate system [between the American Presidential and the British Parliamentary systems] in which the Chief of State, who inspires general policy, finds the basis of his authority in universal suffrage, but can only exercise his functions with a government which, to be sure, he selects and appoints, but which, to last, constantly needs the confidence of the Assembly.

The president can dissolve the Assembly, but he can also be censured by the people, either if the response to a referendum tied to a question of confidence is negative, or if the Assembly elected after the dissolution is again hostile to his policies. The president, Pompidou repeated in the course of his first presidential press conference, is the "supreme chief of the executive . . . charged with providing fundamental impulsions and defining essential directions." The régime is surviving its founder.

Yet it contains weaknesses which its German neighbor does not have. In Germany, we now know that the parliamentary opposition can accede to power. As in the United States and Britain, the two big parties are truly rivals and compete for the votes of the same electoral mass, located in the political center. In France, the Union of Democrats for the Republic, the "Gaullists," certainly occupy a position comparable to that of the GOP or the British Conservatives. But though the UDR still has to round out its structure, deepen its roots and achieve greater homogeneity, there is presently no real alternative to the existing majority—because of the existence of the Communist Party.

Short of a sudden alteration in its evolution, the latter will remain what it is: an imposing mass which can block the political game, but cannot animate it or give it direction. The Party is neither revolutionary nor "social-democratized." In May 1968, its aversion to all insurrectional action was marked. At the

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same time it remains wholly the prisoner of its mythology. At bottom, its leaders like tranquility and intellectual comfort, and detest risk and imagination; they will consequently keep on playing the game of the Right-Center, which is assured of staying in power since the non-communist Left is doomed to impotence. Such a situation carries a considerable risk: the legal opposition having little hope of acceding to power, governmental mistakes could give rise to violent opposition outside the parliament, outside the parties and outside the limits of legality.

The Federal Republic, on the other hand, is failing to surmount a difficulty that is much more basic than that of the harmonious functioning of institutions. To be sure, the passing of the CDU into opposition will doubtless check the rise of the extreme Right, whose progress has been largely due to the votes of victims of economic development (peasants, craftsmen, shopkeepers, etc.). But the German political system is, at the same time, more fragile than the French: the French state cannot be threatened by a conflict over its definition as a nation, whereas democracy in the Federal Republic is not secure from a crisis arising out of the German problem.

These differences should not conceal the multiplicity and growing extent of the resemblances. The comparative analyses that could be made only a short time ago are partly out of date. France has become "Germanized" (or "Americanized") in her economic philosophy: she is now, in her turn, thinking in terms of industrial expansion and development rather than in terms of permanence and safekeeping. Germany has been "Frenchified" by a transformation of social and religious thought: social change is emerging as a necessity, whereas it had been only stability that was sought after; and politics have been very largely declericalized as a result of the internal evolution of the churches.

Between the two countries, too, there is a community of certainty and a community of anxiety: certainty, despite the extremist minorities, that pluralistic democracy is better than any other system; anxiety, despite increasing prosperity, about unresolved problems of society and the individual, and about the new necessity imposed by lightning technical progress—the necessity for permanent adaptation, for permanent change, which in turn implies the impossibility of rest or of uncomplicated administration of collective and individual affairs.

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On the domestic scene we thus find both a surprising calm (surprising in relation to the predictions about the German political future twenty years ago, and surprising in relation to so many somber forecasts of the political situation after de Gaulle) and an uneasiness that lies beyond political life. On the international level the similarities are no less great—greater, in fact, than they were at the time of the great friendship between de Gaulle and Adenauer.

II

The most important phenomenon, the most striking discontinuity in external policy, does not arise from the change of majority parties in Germany, but from the change that has come about in France in the relative importance of domestic and foreign policy.

During the presidential campaign of 1969, the content of foreign policy was debated by the two candidates, but a sort of agreement existed as to its nature: it was simply one aspect of general policy, and a rather secondary one at that. Not that Pompidou was unfaithful to General de Gaulle; the latter had already provisionally given up defending, in part, what he had seemed to hold most dear—namely, the idea that external policy was the only real policy, and that the sole object of internal policy was to assure stability and enhance national power, the better to perform in the outside world.

When General de Gaulle gave up power the first time, in January 1946, Bidault did not immediately alter the direction of policy, but suddenly external policy became secondary in importance to internal preoccupations. When General de Gaulle came back in 1958, he accepted a much greater part of the heritage of the Fourth Republic than had been expected and than he ever cared to admit. But national ambition, ambition directed outward, once again became the motive force of the politics of power.

Until 1968. After that, the internal crisis overtook the external goal. The subject of the referendum was significant. The referendum of 1962 had been aimed at assuring the authority of the president—incarnation of the national interest, actor in France's name on the international stage—against those parties and groups which represented division and conflict in economic and social life. In contrast, in April 1969 the "Declaration of General de

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Gaulle, President of the Republic, Presenting the Reasons for the Projected Law Relating to the Creation of Regions and the Renovation of the Senate," a copy of which every French voter received, was the first text by the General which did not contain a single word on France's external role and mission, and not a single allusion to the international situation or international life. No doubt this was one of the causes of his defeat: without France's international status as the priority objective, the Chief of State no longer possessed his customary stature, and no longer retained that distance from daily problems which constituted an essential element of his prestige.

May 1968 had revealed the malaise of French society. The financial crisis of November, brought on both by the strikes and by the poor economic analysis of the Couve de Murville government (it granted huge loans to get production started up again, whereas, in reality, the wholesale wage increases were to have performed this function), weakened France dreadfully and made it impossible for her to continue the struggle to transform the international monetary system. Meanwhile, the invasion of Czechoslovakia had ruled out an Eastern policy. The change of climate effected by the arrival of Richard Nixon in the White House and his visit to Paris did the rest. By the time General de Gaulle left office, not only had the nature of external policy been transformed, but its content had caved in. With the United States in particular, tension evaporated without any great number of new facts coming to light: it was a sort of reconciliation at a distance.

Between Bonn and Paris, there is no longer, then, the fundamental divergence which used to bear on relations with the United States. This is all the more the case in that German-American relations have not for a long time been characterized by the tone of the 1950s. The first turning point came with John Kennedy's accession to power: after the tensions between the young President and the old Chancellor, relations were never again to return to the moralizing and sentimental tone of the preceding decade. The second turning point, much more difficult to fix in time, was the decline of what had been the overriding objective of German external policy. This was neither reunification nor Europe, but security. And ever since the Berlin Airlift of 1948–49, security had lain in alignment with the American protector; in order to have confidence in American protection,

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one had to do everything in one's power to give the United States confidence in its German ally. Little by little, fear diminished; it became apparent that there was much more freedom for manœuvre than had been believed and that General de Gaulle was right in much of what he said, if not in what he did.

The priority given to security had not been based solely on fear. There was also the fact that generalized fear—the cold war—was advantageous for the Federal Republic, which thereby obtained sovereignty and substance in the Western world. But when, from Kennedy to de Gaulle, the policy of détente was the order of the day, it became clearer to Bonn how greatly the East-West conflict had deepened the division of Germany. The watchword had been: "No détente without progress on the German problem." Already under Adenauer and still more under Erhard, which is to say under Schröder, it became: "We must press ahead with détente at the same time as we seek progress on the German problem." With the Kiesinger-Brandt government—and this was a decisive step—it had become: "Détente is so fundamental to subsequent progress on the German problem that we are ready to make unilateral concessions so as to make progress toward a détente, and we agree to the resolution of the German problems coming much later." The SPD/FDP government seems prepared to go even further in this direction.

It is a direction which represents a profound change, for the definition of "progress" on the German problem has evolved very considerably. It began at least as far back as the exchange of letters between Chancellor Kiesinger and Willy Stoph, the head of the government of the GDR; and it has been a question since then of reaching a modus vivendi with the other Germany. Since Kiesinger's governmental declaration of December 1966, which did not mention a territorial change and contented itself with affirming the impossibility of fully recognizing the Polish frontier, there has been no question of recovering the territory east of the Oder-Neisse Line. Nor is there any longer a question of obtaining reunification by a sort of extension of the Federal Republic eastward.

In 1968–69 the new policy was blocked for two different reasons, and one may wonder to what extent they will also operate against the new Brandt government. The first reason is domestic. During the electoral campaign, the CDU—and to an even greater extent the Bavarian CSU of F. J. Strauss—hardened

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their attitudes, partly in order to forestall defections to the NPD and partly to win over right-wing followers of the Liberal Party, which had become favorable to an agreement with the other Germany. Having obtained these two results, what is the CDU going to do in opposition? Fight the coalition in the name of a sort of renovated Adenauerism? Accept the government's initiatives abroad, reserving the right to fight them at home? Is there some hope of winning back votes from the Social Democrats by denouncing them as traitors to the national cause? Much depends, of course, on public opinion. An important indication of how the CDU interprets it is provided by the lists of candidates in the elections of September 28: neither the Christian Democrats nor the Socialists accorded significant spots to the leaders of the organizations of refugees. The president of their confederation, who had switched from the SPD to the CDU, was defeated in his district. As the CDU had neglected to enter his name on the complementary list of the *Land* (state), he did not get into the Bundestag.

The second reason is much more serious: the Czechoslovak tragedy. The Kiesinger-Brandt government drew nearer to Paris as a result of the special need to establish a common policy toward Eastern Europe. The objective was not to isolate the GDR but to make it conspicuous—to conduce to its being the only communist state not to adopt liberalizing reforms, and to make sure of its being the only one to pursue a policy of hatred toward the Federal Republic. The first results were encouraging. But then, in August 1968 the GDR stood out as the guardian of orthodoxy in the "Socialist camp."

Now, more than a year later, can the new coalition pursue a policy toward the East that is not doomed to fail? In any case, we are very close here to the French analysis, which requires that efforts toward this end continue as if positive results could be obtained. In October 1969, Maurice Schumann, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Moscow and there announced a future visit by President Pompidou. A few days before, Brezhnev, in his Berlin speech marking the twentieth anniversary of the GDR, had made clear overtures to the German government then in the process of formation. One of the Soviet intentions is clear: the more contacts they have with Paris and Bonn, the more they can demonstrate to Eastern Europe that the Westerners care little about the tragic situation in Czechoslovakia.

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Apart from this self-justifying objective, is there a real desire on their part to make progress toward solving the German problem? Or do they simply want to take possible concessions from the Brandt government without yielding anything at all in exchange?

Whatever the answer, the Soviet attitude may have the paradoxical consequence of disturbing relations between France and Germany just when Bonn is prepared to pursue the policy advocated by Paris. Indeed, if the U.S.S.R. talks directly with a Federal Republic fully disposed to conversation, Franco-Soviet relations will become less important to the Russian leaders, in as much as they had previously had to count on Paris to put pressure on Bonn. Moreover, the old French fears of a German-Russian entente could come to life again. It is, however, more likely that the community of shared analysis and intentions will win out, and that similar policies will not be directed against one another.

The situation is somewhat the same as regards European policy. The two parties are relatively closer to one another when there isn't a great deal to be done, when it's a question, at most, of unfreezing a difficult financial situation. The French devaluation and then the floating mark shook the structure of the agricultural Common Market. On both sides, however, the desire to get out of the monetary difficulties in Europe on a reasonable basis is certain. And the Social Democrats are closer to the French views concerning common economic policy than the "Erhardians," while President Pompidou is less obsessed than his predecessor by the question of national freedom of decision.

But a new obstacle has arisen since the fall of 1968: Is a common Franco-German policy possible if the Federal Republic's power superiority frightens France? The new coalition in Bonn will help calm these fears. Whereas Strauss continues to insist that the "economic giant" stop being a "political dwarf," Brandt and Schiller understand better the sad reality which the American, British and French reactions revealed at the monetary conference in Bonn in November 1968: because of the weight of the past, which balances that of the billions of dollars in reserves and the millions of tons of steel produced, German strength entails not prestige and influence but solitude. By reason and by conviction, Brandt will not speak the language of power.

Relations between Paris and Bonn will, of course, be disturbed by the rigidities of French policy in continuing the atti-

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tudes of General de Gaulle, and by the infidelities of the Social Democrats—oriented as they are toward Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries—to the Franco-German priority observed for twenty years by the Christian Democrats. But these are peripheral phenomena.

In actual fact, the political realities and objectives of France and of the Federal Republic are much closer now than they were four years ago.[1] By ill luck, however, this lessening of differences comes at a time when the international financial situation is bleak, when the chances of obtaining results in the East are very poor, and when the European building site resembles a pile of debris more than a house that merely needs to have a roof put on it.

An additional piece of bad luck is that the new leaders in Bonn and in Paris are too reasonable to have much imagination—either the creative imagination that discovers new paths or the sentimental imagination that creates public enthusiasm. While the two societies draw closer together, and while their political divergences diminish, their governments will doubtless content themselves with working together to resolve the daily international difficulties, or, at most, with finding durable remedies for them, instead of searching together for transnational solutions that might be applied to those basic problems existing today in all European societies, particularly in France and the Federal Republic.

[1] See Alfred Grosser, "France and Germany: Divergent Outlooks," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1965.

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LIMITS TO INTERVENTION

By Graham Allison, Ernest May and Adam Yarmolinsky

NOT since World War II have Americans been so uncertain about the proper role of the United States in the world. The broad bipartisan consensus that characterized American foreign policy for two decades after the war has been overcome by widespread, bipartisan confusion about the nature of the world, the character of the challenges that policymakers confront, and the proper employment of non-nuclear forces. Viet Nam is not the only cause of this confusion. Changes in American perceptions were evident earlier: as the fear of monolithic communism waned, hope grew that the United States and the Soviet Union could coexist peacefully; and the public showed diminishing interest in providing aid to less developed countries. But the expenditure of blood and treasure in Viet Nam has deepened fundamental doubts throughout our society—from the highest levels of government to college campuses and midwestern farms—as to whether the United States should in any circumstances become involved again in a limited war. A *Time*—Louis Harris Poll in May indicated that only a minority of Americans are willing to see United States troops used to resist overt communist aggression against our allies: in Berlin, 26 percent; in Thailand, 25 percent; and in Japan, 27 percent.

This pervasive uncertainty, confusion and discontent create an opportunity to reformulate the guidelines of American foreign policy and to educate the larger public about the responsibilities of the United States—their extent and their limits. The burden of this job falls primarily on the Nixon Administration, and it is clear that the President and his National Security Council have considered these problems and surveyed various alternative postures. President Nixon's July speech at Guam suggests at least the outline of a tentative doctrine. What remains is to make that doctrine more precise—a task that has apparently been begun within the councils of government. Our purpose here is to suggest ways in which it should be carried forward and considerations which should be taken into account in the process.

Four general observations can be made about the character

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of the problem. First is the ubiquity of the visceral reaction: "No more Viet Nams!" This simplistic formula seems to guide the prescriptions even of some past participants in government. The impulse to avoid a future Viet Nam is as powerful today as was the impulse in the 1930s to avoid another World War I or the impulse after 1945 to avoid another Munich. The temptation to leap from the flagging horse we have been riding to any horse headed in the opposite direction seems compelling.

Second is the difficulty of the problem itself: Much of the traditional rationale for the size and shape of non-nuclear forces proves on examination to be highly questionable. It is not clear that such forces contribute to deterring major non-nuclear conflicts or that such conflicts are sufficiently likely to justify their standing by in readiness. Only military planners, professionally committed to belief in the worst contingencies, today assign significant probability to a sudden Soviet march across the north German plain, a surprise attack by the Red Army on the Mediterranean flank of NATO, or even an unheralded descent by Communist China on Burma or Thailand. Equally, it is unclear what role American non-nuclear forces can play in the kinds of minor wars that do seem probable. Viet Nam hardly encourages the conviction that they are suitable instruments for coping with insurgency in a foreign state. But the obvious alternatives to the traditional rationale do not pass muster either. One cannot say that there are no politico-military reasons for an American military presence of some sort in Europe or the Mediterranean. The ready availability of some U.S. force serves as a deterrent and therefore necessarily as a significant element in defense against possible overt attack on, say, Venezuela or South Korea. It is essential to recognize not only that no simple doctrines are readily to be discovered but that the questions themselves are not easy to understand.

Third is the impossibility of specifying any geographical area where developments are certain to be of such limited interest as never to raise the possibility that the United States should use non-nuclear force. If one could simply write off the less developed countries or Southeast Asia or Africa, the problem might be more manageable. But a reasonably thorough and unblinkered survey of the globe discloses conceivable situations in every area in which any responsible administration might have to consider introducing American forces.

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Finally, there is no evidence that any set of principles can be identified which unambiguously distinguishes cases in which U.S. non-nuclear forces should and should not be used.

In attempting to design desirable, feasible guidelines for future uses of non-nuclear forces one must acknowledge that this issue is highly sensitive to the outcome of Viet Nam and the interpretation given that outcome in the United States. The argument here proceeds on the assumption that the likely settlement will be sufficiently adverse to American interests to assure disagreement both among decision-makers and among informed citizens about the degree to which we have achieved our initial objectives.

Even though there are no unambiguous guidelines, there is a fairly clear checklist of factors that would determine how any President or presidential adviser or even any responsible observer would judge a case of possible intervention. These factors include:

The American sense of commitment. Commitment can be based on formal treaties, letters exchanged between chiefs of state or high government officials, historical ties, past blood shed in defense of common goals, and the like.

The American sense of interest. Since this interest is no longer a function primarily of trading opportunities, territorial ambitions or imperialist pretensions, it is to be measured largely in terms of the sense of danger to the delicate equilibrium between the major world powers. Some situations will inevitably seem more dangerous than others, either because of possible immediate results or because of possible effects on expectations of leaders in either hostile or friendly states. National interest is also a function of substantive domestic concerns, as with the fate of Israel, or the possibility of a black-white confrontation in southern Africa.

The estimated probability of success, at various levels of cost and risk. The most attractive situation to decision-makers—and to the American public—will be one that seems to offer a high probability of success at relatively low risk.

Each of these factors involves judgment on the basis of uncertain estimates. Differences among reasonable men, especially over future dangers in acting or failing to act, are inevitable. Because of these uncertainties, there are large numbers of cases in which it is difficult to predict whether the United States would decide for or against intervention.

The uncertainties surrounding calculations about intervention are overshadowed by a second cluster of factors: the context in which the specific decision is made. This context includes:

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The immediate background. A sudden event like the North Korean attack on South Korea or the collapse of the Dominican government in 1965 poses one kind of problem. A more slowly developing event like the Berlin Blockade or the North Vietnamese intervention in South Viet Nam poses another. A gradually festering situation such as that on the Israeli-Syrian frontier or in present-day Guatemala poses still another.

Comparative perspectives. Situations will vary also in similarity to past situations. The Dominican Republic in 1965 looked like Cuba in 1959. Reactions to, say, a coup in Guatemala could vary, depending on whether the situation was read as another Cuba or another Dominican Republic. A crucial question over the next few years will certainly be whether a situation does or does not look like another Viet Nam.

The historical trend. President Kennedy's decision to increase American advisers in Viet Nam seems inseparable from the sequence of events leading from the Bay of Pigs through Vienna, Laos and Berlin. There was a strong feeling that the line had to be drawn somewhere, even if that meant "the wrong war. . . ."

Congressional and public moods. Congress and the public might take one attitude toward North Korea and another toward, say, Bulgaria—not recently guilty of provocative behavior. Similarly, attitudes toward a situation in Africa could be affected by attitudes of and toward Blacks at home.

II

Conceding all the surrounding uncertainties, one can still distinguish three categories of cases: (1) overt aggression by a major communist power against a U.S. ally; (2) overt aggression by any state against a nation not a U.S. ally (*e.g.* Russia against Finland, China against India, a combination of Arab states against Israel or Jordan); (3) internal violence jeopardizing a friendly state, perhaps aided from outside but not involving significant overt action by foreign ground, air or naval units. (In the first two categories, overt aggression should be understood as comprehending any cases in which organized units of the armed forces of one nation move in significant numbers across the established frontiers of another nation; the term thus includes large-scale infiltration into insurgent-held territory and other situations sometimes described as "proxy war.")

Each category comprehends many kinds of cases. Even with regard to nations covered by the same alliance treaty, the United States does not have identical commitments. Within NATO, for example, we feel a greater sense of national commitment to Britain than to, say, Greece or even to Norway, despite our equal obligation to all. Some non-allies may have stronger moral

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claims than some allies. Israel, for example, certainly stands higher with the American public than Portgual or Paraguay. Persistent internal violence in South Korea would pose policy problems quite different from those presented by similar violence in Pakistan, and violence in Pakistan would wear a different appearance depending on whether outsiders numbered thousands or tens of thousands and whether they were Chinese or Russians. Even so, these categories are not only distinguishable but sufficiently different to admit differing policy guidelines.

The First Category: Overt Aggression Against An Ally. Today the Rio Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, the Southeast Asia Treaty, the ANZUS Pact and mutual defense pacts with Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines commit the United States to the defense of 42 nations. Auxiliary arrangements, such as U.S. patronage of CENTO, have created a number of additional commitments. None of these commitments is in perpetuity. The obligations of the United States under these arrangements are of differing degrees and kinds. Thus the Rio and NATO treaties assert that "an armed attack against any [contracting] State shall be considered an attack against all and, consequently, each of the said contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack," while the Southeast Asia Treaty provides that "aggression by means of armed attack against any of the Parties would endanger [each Party's] own peace and safety" and each Party agrees "to meet the common danger in accordance with [its] constitutional processes." In addition, some have been amplified by unilateral Executive or Congressional declarations. The Southeast Asia Treaty obligation to Thailand was markedly strengthened, for example, by a joint communiqué issued in 1962 by Secretary Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman which stated that the United States regarded Thailand's independence and integrity as "vital to the national interest of the United States;" it held that the American commitment to Thailand under the Southeast Asia Treaty was binding, regardless of whether other signers concurred or not. Statements by Secretary Dulles and a Congressional resolution of January 29, 1955, suggested that our obligation to the Republic of China included the defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

All such commitments deserve thoughtful reëxamination. Given the history of executive-legislative controversy over Viet Nam, some should be reviewed and either reaffirmed or revised

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in consultation with the Senate. With respect to all treaty commitments which the Government chooses to reaffirm, however, it seems appropriate that the President establish and announce a *presumption that the United States will intervene on behalf of an ally which is a victim of overt aggression.* Only by clearly reaffirming those commitments which are judged genuinely vital can the United States make clear that the aftermath of Viet Nam is not to be a withdrawal into a fortress America.

The Second Category: Aggression Against A Non-Ally. The issue becomes more complex in cases of overt aggression against a nation not linked to the United States by a treaty of alliance. There is clearly a very considerable range of such cases in which the United States would not be prepared to intervene. If other governments judge the likelihood of American action by the three criteria of commitment, interest and risk of escalation, none will launch an overt attack on a nation friendly with the United States unless it judges the American commitment weak or the risk to the United States high. The critical question is likely to be one of U.S. interest, and that is likely to turn on whether other major powers are involved, on either side. In cases where no other major power is involved, there should be *a presumption against U.S. intervention.* Where the American response could be undertaken jointly with another major power, the risk of escalation might be reduced. This presumption, as stated, would not prejudice our responding to a United Nations Security Council decision to impose sanctions against an aggressor, up to and including military force.

The Third Category: Internal Disorder. Here more than elsewhere, there may be some ambiguity about what constitutes American military intervention. Various forms of intervention—*e.g.* diplomatic, economic, covert and military—are obviously related. Indeed, in the most visible cases—Laos and Viet Nam—military involvement has occurred in stages—from military aid missions, to arms, to advisers, to helicopters and finally to combat operations. But it is essential to draw a sharp line between official combat operations and the rest. For the admitted expenditure of American blood changes the character of subsequent choices about further investments of men and money. The term "military intervention" is therefore restricted here to cases involving either (1) the presence of American military personnel in sufficient numbers to cast doubt upon their claim to be traditional

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advisers, or (2) combat operations involving U.S. air or naval forces.

Before a decision on such intervention confronts the President, other government officials will have made many decisions and taken many actions that will critically affect his decision to intervene or not. Here, therefore, we must consider not only what presumptions should govern the expectations and behavior of officials, but also what procedures should be followed to place choices before the President.

Though Viet Nam provides no satisfactory and simple rules, it does suggest a number of relevant lessons. First, the effects of intervention are uncertain. Viet Nam suggests how hard it is to judge what makes for stability and instability in the developing world. Second, American power is more limited than many people have assumed. The massive application of our military power has not been able to achieve a military victory. Our best efforts have not been able to establish a stable popular government in Saigon. Third, any non-nuclear intervention in a nuclear world is likely to be a limited commitment; but once blood has been shed, it is extraordinarily difficult, especially as a matter of domestic policy, to cut losses.

These "lessons" seem all the more persuasive because the United States has no commitment to preserve any national régime. In few cases can one find a vital American interest that would be affected by a change of internal régimes. Our forces have a difficult time defeating national guerrillas that a government cannot overcome by itself. The belief that our troops and technology can be relied upon to cope with insurgency problems that national governments are unable to deal with encourages flabbiness in some existing régimes. It is highly uncertain what effect external military intervention will have on subversion, and what effect external efforts to control subversion will have on modernization. Indeed, nothing seems surer than that in some societies internal violence will be necessary for modernization.

These factors complement the overwhelming preference of the American public. Therefore, the Administration should make a serious effort to establish *a strong presumption against intervention in cases of internal disorder and/or subversion, even when there is outside encouragement and aid*. Such a presumption need not be inconsistent with a willingness to supply economic aid, military equipment and even, in some cases, advisers.

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III

Difficulties present themselves in connection with all three of the proposed presumptions. It is arguable, for example, that renewed evidence of U.S. fidelity to treaty obligations could dissuade NATO allies from contributing a "fair share" to their own defense. It could also be argued that the second presumption would encourage the Arabs to attack Israel. The most persuasive counter-arguments, however, are those against a presumption of nonintervention in cases of internal disorder. It can be contended that to establish such a presumption will encourage disgruntled groups in less developed countries to attempt insurgency, and will announce to nations bent on aggression that low-level aggression pays. These objections have bite. But they ignore two further considerations.

First, expectations about American willingness to intervene will be but one factor in the decision of disaffected citizens to rebel, of revolutionaries to fight on, and of régimes like those in Peking or Hanoi to support aggression beyond their frontiers. The factors that determine a choice to pursue revolution and insurgency are overwhelmingly local, and the factors that bear on a government's decision to support insurgency beyond its borders turn on a large number of considerations other than likely U.S. reactions. Indeed, it seems very uncertain what the effect will be on potential aggressors of statements by the United States about its intentions regarding intervention. Second, reduced expectation of U.S. intervention would create incentives for national governments to set their own houses in order, to be more responsive to citizens' interests, and to shore up their own counterinsurgency capabilities. Too often American support of rightist status quo régimes has resulted in restraints upon discontented religious and ethnic minorities, thus making the country more, rather than less, vulnerable to subversion. Although much uncertainty surrounds this entire set of calculations, it seems likely that a presumption against U.S. intervention will encourage insurgency by some small amount. On the other hand, this price is small in comparison with the cost of any alternative.

A different kind of objection focuses on the likely reactions of those within the American bureaucracy who are responsible for national security. If the President attempts to establish a presumption against military intervention, will his advisers and

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agents coöperate? Or will they instead permit or encourage developments which might lead the President to conclude that our vital interests *are* involved? This is not to question the loyalty or responsibility of the national security bureaucracy, but merely to assert that their perspectives and priorities inevitably differ from those of the President. Particularly in the aftermath of Viet Nam, the concern of our foreign-policy establishment that this country do more to enhance its deterrent posture will conflict with the presumptions suggested above. The departments must, of necessity, focus on separate and therefore parochial pieces of problems, while the President must think about the whole. The departments concentrate on their jobs; it is elected officials who must strike the balance between foreign and domestic priorities.

This objection cuts deeply—but less deeply than might at first appear. If a President wanted to create a presumption for or against U.S. military intervention in certain kinds of cases, he could not accomplish it by fiat. But it should not be impossible for him to have his way. Several procedures—largely extensions of those recently put into effect—could help accomplish this objective.

Recognizing the inevitable differences between the perspectives and priorities of the President and his agents, the President's staff could supplement the supervision of cabinet officers over their own bureaucracies by carefully monitoring the work of desk officers, the cables, ambassadors' statements, military advisory activities, etc. Though this effort would meet with strong resistance and objections about undue political interference, behavior will not change without such monitoring and penalties for action contrary to national policy.

A related but distinct requirement is for competitive information, estimates and evaluations. Any single source of information, whether Foreign Service, CIA, military or whatever, is likely to present data biased toward a particular policy outcome. The odds are that multiple sources will offset rather than reinforce one another.

Efforts must also be made to find institutional ways to guarantee competition. A specific instance of this general requirement concerns military analyses, estimates and budgets. No one familiar with the development of U.S. choices in Viet Nam can underestimate the importance of more systematic analysis of proposed uses of American forces, more careful projection of enemy reac-

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tions, and an attempt to consider the consequences if less favorable projections turn out to be right. While the analytic difficulties are substantial, powerful evidence suggests that the application of techniques such as systems analysis could markedly improve both estimates and sensitivities to the consequences if favorable estimates fail. The military services should be pressed to present their proposals and projections in more systematic form, and the President should also have available independent, competing analyses. Program budgets of projected military operations, produced outside the military establishment, could provide the President with a competing angle from which to view alternative uses of military forces.

In cases where the question of non-nuclear military intervention arises, procedures should give the President an adequate map of alternative courses and arguments, as well as an understanding of the troop requirements and budgetary demands that will result in the event of various possible outcomes of a given action. They should chart the hard choices that lie ahead if the outcome is not the preferred one. They should facilitate more independent consideration of each stage of escalation or deëscalation, making the decision-makers aware of new perspectives and new arguments.

What is proposed here is clearly only an extension of procedures already in effect. Existing practices may be adequate to support a policy of absolute noninvolvement in the military problems of other nations. They are probably adequate to support an activist policy of intervention—although perhaps not to deal with its consequences. But they are wholly inadequate to control all the relatively low-level actions that may embroil the United States in a foreign conflict and to provide the information necessary for presidential judgments.

IV

How these three presumptions might be applied can be illustrated by a sensitive current case—that of Thailand. The Southeast Asia Treaty, as interpreted in the Rusk-Thanat communiqué, obligates the United States to come to Thailand's defense in the event of overt attack. The Administration should adhere to this position, pending a review of the commitment by the President in concert with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Such a review might well result in revocation of the Rusk-

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Thanat communiqué. Not all nations in SEATO agree that members can act in the absence of unanimity, and the President and the Senate might conclude that this more restrictive interpretation accords with the text of the treaty and the intentions of its negotiators. (When recommending Senate ratification in 1954, several members of the Foreign Relations Committee made explicit their understanding that any action under the treaty would be collective.) Indeed, considering the fact that the treaty was designed to safeguard arrangements in Southeast Asia which subsequent developments have long since altered, serious review might conceivably result in revision or even renunciation of the treaty.

Even in the former case, Thailand would cease to be assured of protection by the United States, for it seems unlikely that either France or Britain would support SEATO action in Thailand's defense. Thailand would therefore revert to the status of a friendly state not safeguarded by alliance with the United States. The second presumption would then come into play. The President would indicate to the Thais, to the world, and to his own bureaucracy that, while Thailand can probably count on United States support in the event of overt Chinese attack, the Thai government should assume that American forces would not take part in combating an overt North Vietnamese attack so long as neither Chinese nor Soviet troops participated in significant numbers. Fighting North Vietnamese alone, the Thais should expect supplies and equipment; they might receive uniformed advisers; but they would be aided by U.S. combat units only if a combination of European powers or the U.S.S.R. or perhaps Japan indicated willingness to join in genuine collective action.

The foregoing paragraph should make clear the extent to which the presumptions suggested here differ from those now controlling, for at present the organs and agents of the Executive Branch assume U.S. military action to be probable in any case in which communist forces cross the frontier of a non-communist state. What is said above should also illuminate the need for measures to strengthen presidential direction and control of the bureaucracy. For there can be no question that adoption of a presumption against automatic defense of Thailand would arouse anguished and determined resistance. The diplomatic, AID, USIA and CIA missions in Bangkok and other parts of Southeast Asia, the Military Assistance Command in Thailand,

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the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and virtually all Asian hands in Washington would not only attempt to prevent such a change but would, for a long time afterward, make every effort to bring before the President evidence arguing for a return to previous policy. Some might even seek to contrive situations showing him the error of his way.

The same might be true, though not to the same extent, if the third presumption were applied to Thailand. The starting point is different, for the Southeast Asia Treaty does not explicitly commit the United States to defend the Thai government against internal violence. In case of threats "other than armed attack," says Article IV(2) of the treaty, the signatories are obligated only "to consult." Implicitly, any SEATO action must be a result of unanimous agreement. After asserting that American commitments relating to direct aggression do not depend on accord with other SEATO members, the Rusk-Thanat communiqué spoke of "indirect aggression" and implied that America's duty to Thailand resembled its duty to Viet Nam. But, as early as 1966, the Defense Department took steps to limit American involvement in Thailand's counterinsurgency effort. The Nixon Administration has said it will not be bound by American-Thai military contingency plans for dealing with cases short of armed attack. Washington has thus made the first moves toward establishing a presumption that it will not intervene in event of internal violence. It remains only for the Administration to issue further public statements and give unambiguous directives to missions in Bangkok and Vientiane, making clear that American military personnel and equipment will not be employed for counterinsurgency purposes unless and until the President issues contrary instructions.

Obviously, the introduction of these new presumptions would increase by some margin the risks to Thailand's integrity and independence. Reinterpretation, revision or abrogation of the Southeast Asia Treaty could lead some planners in Peking to view as less serious the danger that an effort to conquer Thailand would result in war with the United States. On the other hand, the presumption as we have stated it would not cause them to view the danger as negligible. In any case, we would assume that estimates of the efficacy of SEATO constitute only one among many factors influencing Chinese policy and that a change in such estimates would not in itself lead the Chinese gov-

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ernment to choose a complex, costly and uncharacteristic course of action. Indeed, one can argue that, since China's military moves thus far have been, or at least seemed, defensive in character, we could advantageously reduce the appearance of threat to China by closing down American air bases in Thailand and withdrawing U.S. military personnel now stationed there.

More worrisome, because more likely, is the possibility that adoption of the second presumption would encourage North Vietnamese aggression against Thailand. One cannot consider this contingency without taking account of how the third presumption would affect events in Laos. At present, the United States is intervening in Laos, albeit under some camouflage, for American military personnel are performing combat missions. If the presumptions recommended here were to be put in force, American aid to the non-communist Laotians would be limited to money, matériel and, at most, provision of advice at government and army-headquarters level. Since the communist Pathet Lao receive support from organized units of the North Vietnamese army, and since the ebb or cessation of fighting in South Viet Nam will free still more North Vietnamese units, it is predictable that the result of a reduction in U.S. involvement would be a relatively early triumph by the Pathet Lao. The Kingdom of Laos would become a North Vietnamese satellite. Given kinships among tribes on both sides of the Laos-Thailand border and the presence already of communist insurgents in northern and northeastern Thailand, it is at least possible that events would so develop as to bring a North Vietnamese invasion of Thailand comparable to earlier North Vietnamese invasions of Laos and South Viet Nam.

Thailand would be at a serious disadvantage. Although its population is almost twice that of North Viet Nam, the disparity will narrow if Hanoi controls Laos and parts of South Viet Nam. More important, the Thai army is less than one-fourth the size of North Viet Nam's, and, except for one division that has served in South Viet Nam, it has no comparable combat experience. In open warfare, the Thais would probably lose, leaving the way open for a North Vietnamese march to Bangkok. Reasoning thus, one could argue that the recommended presumptions should not apply in this case and that the President should indicate his readiness to commit U.S. forces in order at least to even the odds.

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There are, however, good reasons for not doing so. In the first place, the sequence of events just described is only one among many that might develop. It is by no means inevitable that large numbers of North Vietnamese would remain in Laos after communists came to power in Vientiane; certainly it seems likely that the victorious Pathet Lao would wish their allies to depart. Though judgments about the Hanoi government are notoriously susceptible to error, one can at least imagine arguments that might be used within that government to oppose any courses of action that might lead to war with Thailand—police responsibilities at home and in "liberated" Laos and South Viet Nam; lengthy and vulnerable lines of communication; relative weakness in the indigenous communist movement in Thailand; the relative absence in Thailand of any resources that would contribute to fulfilling North Viet Nam's long-delayed industrial development plans; the possibility that to attack Thailand would be to walk into an American trap (as, communists now say, the North Koreans walked into such a trap in 1950); and the danger that, in such event, North Viet Nam would lose its ability to remain relatively independent of Moscow and particularly of Peking.

At present the Thai armed forces are instruments of government, not instruments of war. They receive a relatively small share of the total budget (12 percent, as compared with 20 percent in North Viet Nam, 33.5 percent in India and 45 percent in Pakistan). The Thais might decide on a serious defense effort. At the same time, or perhaps as an alternative, they might seek some accommodation with the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. Historically, the Thais have displayed great flexibility and skill in diplomacy. They have preserved their independence for more than seven hundred years, and there is no reason to suppose that they would show want of resource in doing so now.

Nor is there reason for believing that the Thais could not adapt to the presumption that American forces would not be available to help them combat internal violence. In fact, Thai leaders take pride in the fact that, unlike the Vietnamese, they have not become dependent on American personnel for the maintenance of internal order. Their view thus far has been that, with American funds and supplies, they can cope with any foreseeable level of domestic insurgency.

Adoption of the three proposed presumptions would obviously

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increase by some margin the possibility of Chinese aggression. It would increase still more the risks for Thailand of a North Vietnamese attack and of mounting insurgency, supported from outside by Chinese and/or North Vietnamese. It would make not at all unlikely a shift on the part of Thailand either to a more neutral status or to outright alignment with communist states.

Even with full recognition of these risks, and of lesser risks in other areas, adoption of the three presumptions set forth earlier appears desirable. In regard to the specific case of Thailand, these presumptions would reflect the broadest definition of American national interest that is likely to be accepted by the American people and Congress in the foreseeable future. It is improbable that the public and Congress would approve a long-term commitment of American forces to meet any contingency except perhaps an overt Chinese attack. There is no way in which a commitment of forces to combat North Vietnamese or to offset Chinese or North Vietnamese support of Thai insurgents could avoid becoming a long-term commitment unless—and perhaps not even then—the United States were to resort to forms and levels of violence never employed even in Viet Nam. If these estimates are correct, it follows that, in the Thai case as in others of less sensitivity, the President should not only adopt the recommended presumptions but make his adoption of them unmistakably clear to those who work for him.

V

Even if the suggested presumptions were in effect, the United States would still have obligations requiring substantial non-nuclear forces. Their adequacy could well determine the extent to which the margins of the presumptions might be tested. But the size of non-nuclear standing forces—and thus of the budget for what is identified as "general-purpose forces"—is primarily related to commitments to resist major overt aggression, and choices about the number of such contingencies. Forces that can be used to meet major contingencies can also be used in smaller contingencies. It has become as fashionable as it is obvious to assert that American non-nuclear forces can be reduced only as American commitments shrink. But this prescription neglects two further factors: contingency planning and force mixture. The Nixon Administration is reported to have examined the

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problem of contingency planning and to have reduced the preparedness requirement from a capability for simultaneously fighting two major wars and one minor war, to a capability for one major and one minor war at the same time. The question of the quantity and mix of forces required to deal with particular kinds of crises should be subjected to similar scrutiny.

The time is ripe for such reëvaluation for a number of reasons. First is the cost squeeze within the military budget, primarily the result of increasing unit costs and domestic needs and pressures. Second is the increasing mobility of general-purpose forces, which makes the same units available for a wide range of secondary contingencies; hence the requirements for these contingencies are not additive. Third is the fact that the chief determinant of force requirements is a psychological rather than a military variable, *i.e.* the conception in Russian minds of a credible American commitment to non-nuclear defense of Europe, and the conception in West European minds of a credible American deterrent, not only against attacks by the Soviet Union but against independent action by either of the two Germanys. This dual credibility at the non-nuclear level is important, both because of the political danger of unravelling NATO and the military danger of encouraging nuclear proliferation through European loss of confidence in non-nuclear defense. Recalculation of the forces necessary to meet the U.S. commitment in Europe may or may not produce a different result, but it should make the commitment more credible to the extent that the rationale is more realistic. The same sort of reevaluation could produce similarly useful results with respect to U.S. forces in Japan and Korea.

The Administration should be able to establish as a target the reduction of general-purpose forces to levels that characterized the Eisenhower period. Those levels—14 Army and Marine divisions, 16 tactical air wings, the traditional 15 attack carrier task forces, and 9 anti-submarine carrier task forces—would entail no significant reduction in the American capability to meet a major European contingency, and would leave a small force for dealing with a minor contingency. If actually established, such force levels would cost approximately $30 billion per year less than present general-purpose forces (including those deployed in Viet Nam), $17 billion annually less than those advocated within the military establishment for a baseline posture,

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and $10 billion less than those projected as a result of President Nixon's decision to prepare for one major and one minor contingency.[1] Of course, cuts of such magnitude may be impossible to effect, given the inevitable resistance of military interest groups and their Congressional supporters. Nor would the force mixture of the Eisenhower era be an ideal to be imitated. The security of the United States is too complex and ambiguous a notion to permit pinpointing the spot on a scale of military spending where relative risk becomes relative security. But this is not to say that "one can always squeeze another $X billion out of the defense budget." Indeed, one should assume that, unless cuts are directed to specifics, they are likely to remove more muscle than fat. Setting Eisenhower-era levels as a target, however, would compel the services and operating commands to recalculate and rejustify requirements that have escaped fundamental reëxamination since 1961.

Even cutbacks to force levels of the 1950s would not reduce the actual capability of the United States to go beyond the suggested presumptions, should the President, or the President and Congress, decide to defend non-allies, or to intervene in support of a government menaced by internal violence. The absolute minimum force needed to meet basic treaty commitments, even if the North Atlantic Treaty and the Japanese-American Mutual Security Treaty were the only two to remain in effect, would be more than adequate to cope also with at least the first stages of any secondary contingency. Severe cutbacks in general-purpose forces might, however, make it easier for the President to put in effect the suggested presumptions. For the critical variable is the set of expectations within the bureaucracy, and an apparent leanness in non-nuclear forces would help to persuade the bureaucracy that the President genuinely intended to stand behind the presumptions he had announced. On the other hand, the maintenance of ready non-nuclear forces larger than those necessary to fulfill basic treaty commitments would not only arouse skepticism about the President's seriousness but, almost inevitably, would cause bureaucratic attention to focus on alternatives involving the use of force. Further reductions and recasting of general-purpose forces are therefore a necessary corollary of the introduction of new presumptions into American foreign policy.

[1] In deriving these numbers, the authors have drawn heavily on the work of William W. Kaufmann. All of the projected savings are in 1972 prices.

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WHEN AND HOW TO USE 'SALT'

By Jeremy J. Stone

SERIOUS arms-control talks seem to have begun but the question of how best to exploit their promise persists. In the past, our national strategy with regard to armaments had to be consistent with many fixed domestic political (and bureaucratic) facts of life: the attitudes of Congress, the power of the Pentagon, the prevalence of cold-war ideologies, and so on. Today these presuppositions of arms policy are in flux. Conscious efforts to reshape these domestic factors have become an integral part of the problem of managing the arms race. Indeed, they can in large measure substitute for formal treaties which are much more difficult to achieve. In developing a strategy for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), arms controllers must therefore answer the question: How much really needs to be negotiated to end the arms race? The answer to this question will illuminate such important issues as the emphasis to be placed upon the talks at this time and the way in which the discussions should be used.

The most conventional approach to arms control tends to ignore domestic problems. It assumes bargains in which a monolithic entity called the United States agrees to refrain from acquiring certain weapons if an adversary monolithic entity called the Soviet Union promises to refrain from acquiring the same or related weapons. Neither will refrain without such agreement because of an "action-and-reaction" phenomenon in which each side responds to the actions of the other, producing an arms spiral. Most observers consider this phenomenon intuitively obvious; it is what people think of when they think of arms race. And it provides the justification for the formal treaty that is presumed to be the alternative to the race. According to this view, it is when, and only when, the other side stops "acting" that our side can stop "reacting"—and vice versa. Hence a simultaneous halt, presumably formal, is the only theoretical answer.

But does the evidence for this action-and-reaction phenomenon really support the conclusion that a treaty is the only possible solution? In 1955, not long before the missile gap, there

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was an assumed bomber gap: a defensive Soviet tactic of flying bombers in circles, to suggest the existence of a much larger fleet, induced the United States to increase B-52 production by 50 percent. Here we have action and *over*reaction.

Sophisticated explanations of the action-and-reaction phenomenon often refer to the long lead-time involved in building strategic forces. This causes each side to react to *possible* weapons systems on the other side. Thus Secretary McNamara explained our overproduction of land-based Minutemen on the grounds that we thought the Soviet Union would build more than in fact it finally did. Indeed, Defense Department spokesmen sometimes speak of the need for technological vigilance as if the mere simultaneous existence of Russians and technology demanded that we pursue the widest possible range of potential weapons systems. Here we see reaction *without* action.

The recent history of the ABM debate raises an even more serious possibility. When the Sentinel missile defense came under attack, it became politically necessary to change its justification if it was to be continued. The change in rationale came to rest on intelligence that the Soviet Union had built a few percent more SS-9s in recent months; long extrapolations were used to suggest a threatening build-up. It can be argued that in this case "reaction" was searching for a justifying action.

Sometimes "action and reaction" are interpreted as referring to those political interactions in which we feel obliged to have a missile defense because the other side has one. Here especially the term "action and reaction" hides the essentially domestic, and potentially avoidable, character of the response. If all actions and reactions were of this sort, the spiral could be broken if one side refused to buy weapons for which there was at best only a psychological case.

In fact, political observers know that neither nation is monolithic. They recognize that both nations are almost invariably divided on any reasonable arms-control proposal. Indeed, in both, a relatively clear distinction can be drawn between those who are actively interested in arms control, and those who are hostile to it or intensely skeptical.

These hawks and doves are struggling to shape their country's attitude toward arms control. Their disagreement often extends directly to related political and economic issues such as the size of defense expenditures, the threat posed by the adversary coun-

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try and the desirability of détente. An individual's views on many diverse issues, the role he plays in the society, and even his personality characteristics are closely correlated with whether he is hawk or dove. Thus decisions on arms policy are directly and indirectly woven into the fabric of domestic political struggle on a broad front.

In this view arms agreements are an alliance between the doves in each society against the hawks. The doves, unable to control the arms-spending proclivities of the hawks—proclivities stimulated by the spending of adversary hawks—want to construct with adversary doves a treaty that would preclude such spending. Thus doves in both countries would accomplish together what neither alone could manage. This analysis concedes that the problem lies largely in domestic attitudes, but suggests that the solution lies in international negotiations. The conception of an "alliance between doves" has more validity than the monolithic "action-and-reaction" analysis. But it shares the necessity for a formal treaty—a treaty that signals and coördinates the halt.

Unfortunately, an alliance between arms-control doves requires that they gain the ascendancy in *both* superpowers; and in the internal politics of neither is such a trend discernible. In this decade, the U.S. Defense Department has shifted from what was perhaps the most dovish plausible leadership to the most conservative. Previous Administrations in this decade believed in taking initiatives and in seizing upon, and pursuing, every Soviet indication of willingness to move toward arms control. The present Administration will negotiate but not pursue. Earlier in this decade, the Soviet leadership reflected Mr. Khrushchev's intense interest in such related issues as de-Stalinization, dismantling the cold war, improving Soviet economic standards and liberalizing Soviet political conditions. Now the leadership is less dynamic and more conservative; the doves seem fairly well isolated.

The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union will soon be one quarter of a century old, and sustained, fruitful arms-control discussions have occurred only on atmospheric testing and proliferation. It has taken three years to move from agreement in principle to start SALT talks to agreement actually to commence. Immense financial pressures, and the spectre of more, were necessary to get this agreement. But even so, in

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both societies, notwithstanding the rhetoric customarily reserved for approving arms discussions in principle, there is clear evidence that SALT holds no better than third priority. Today in the Soviet Union, the border problem with China and the German signature on the nonproliferation treaty seem more urgent. Tomorrow, these historic Soviet preoccupations with East and West may take some other form, but they will not vanish. Today, we are primarily preoccupied with violence at home and abroad, and no end is in sight.

Internal political changes in both societies as well as periodic turmoil in Eastern Europe or on the Sino-Soviet border can disrupt the delicate efforts to achieve complicated agreements. And technology is changing so rapidly that the agreements necessary to cope with it are quickly outmoded. Thus in the April 1969 issue of *Foreign Affairs* William C. Foster, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, concluded that the "central fact" in the U.S.-Soviet confrontation was that "progress in technology" made it "both necessary and possible" to place restraints on the nuclear arms race. Only nine months later, the SALT talks have just begun and already some of the "technological stars and planets" are passing out of that "favorable conjunction" which he then saw.

Many of these obstacles are of long standing and have been well understood. But, in the past, arms controllers have seen no alternative to pressing for bilateral agreement, formal or perhaps informal. And they have seen no particular danger in this strategy. Now that the SALT talks are beginning, however, the danger of placing undue emphasis upon them should be recognized: each side is going to blame the other for any delays or failures that may occur; each side is going to become hypersensitive to the possibility that the other side is secretly exploiting delay to achieve strategic advantage; and each side may come to believe that it must therefore build, or threaten, a new strategic weapon system in order to bring the other side to its senses, to show vigilance and to avoid inferiority.

In 1967, it was largely because the Soviet Union had agreed in principle to strategic talks, but had then delayed in setting a date for talks, that the Congress began to fear the Russians were "stealing a march on us" and "playing us for fools." By 1968, Senator Jackson, an ABM supporter, was arguing for Sentinel as a "compelling reason" for the Soviet Union to begin talks.

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And there is reason to believe that the Soviet SS-9 missile build-up is a way of persuading the United States that it should talk from a basis of equality rather than from the position of strength which the Russians feel we are prone to cultivate. The SALT talks could accelerate the arms race by encouraging these lines of thought in both countries.

Finally, even if formal agreement is reached, the price may be high. In order to get the Test Ban Treaty, President Kennedy was forced to provide the Congress with public assurances of continued underground testing that virtually foreclosed the possibility of a complete test ban. Today, the United States is contemplating SALT agreements which some would describe as a tent under which the arms race might continue—agreements that provide some ABM and some MIRV and so on. It is symptomatic of the doves' pessimism that some are clinging to the hope that a comprehensive agreement—any comprehensive agreement—would so signal the ascendancy of a dove alliance as to be of decisive significance. They concede that to get an agreement, most of its strategic content may have to be given up.

II

The poor prospects for achieving a formal treaty quickly and the real possibility that emphasis on this objective may accelerate the arms race suggest that we should reëxamine the necessity for a formal treaty. How little might we negotiate and still end the arms race?

A fundamentally new concept of the postwar period was that peace might be the child of terror. Arms controllers quickly realized that the amount of terror necessary could be achieved by a finite number of weapons aimed at a finite number of adversary cities. Of course these weapons would have to be invulnerable to attack. But with this caveat, there need be little interaction between the strategic arms policies of the superpowers and no need for an endless build-up. This is the idea of finite deterrence. It has the virtue that no *agreement* is necessary to end strategic weapons build-ups—only the avoidance of excesses. And that avoidance needs no SALT talks. What has gone wrong?

Two factors have complicated the situation, yet both can be resolved with a minimum of negotiation. The first factor has to do with efforts of each side to blunt the reliability and effectiveness of the forces on the other side. First we, and now perhaps

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they, have acquired forces designed to put the adversary's weapons out of action in the event of war—that is, a counterforce capability. First they, and now we, have begun to think seriously of missile defenses that might blunt the effectiveness of weapons after launch. These are major complications to finite deterrence and they do give rise to strategic interactions.

The second factor complicating the adoption of finite deterrence is that strategic forces have grown by accretion. For example, we are now accustomed to maintaining three separate strategic forces, each capable of destroying the Soviet Union: bombers, land-based missiles and sea-based missiles. Rationalizations can be offered for this but at bottom it is service rivalry and bureaucratic inertia that sustain three distinct systems. Even McNamara could not induce military services to give up whole strategic forces and missions. There is a tendency in both major powers to maintain strategic forces, or new variants of them, after they have basically become obsolete. Thus strategic warheads and efficiency of delivery vehicles steadily increase, each increment justified in terms of ever greater security against attack. Ever more stringent standards for deterrence are applied, so that, as one wag has asserted, last year's counterforce capability becomes this year's minimum deterrence.

Instead of maximizing the invulnerability of the forces we have, this approach tends to try to patch up the vulnerabilities of existing forces and, periodically, to add an entirely new force. The result is a mix of vulnerablities which may actually encourage fears that are without justification. Thus, since we know our bombers are vulnerable on the ground, we are tempted to fear that Soviet tests of orbital bombs may be directed against bombers.

It is now hard to imagine a new Soviet strategic force that would not appear, to some at least, as designed to exploit a U.S. vulnerability. Paradoxically, the effort to get more insurance with many strategic forces only raises unending problems of making sure that the insurance is itself reliable. And since most observers can grasp only a part of our strategic elephant at a time, they are constantly fixated on "vulnerabilities" and constantly propagating alarm. The way to resolve this problem is to stick with highly invulnerable forces, dispensing with vulnerable ones as rapidly as they become obsolete. We should ignore the marginal and often specious insurance the latter provide.

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The only remaining important interactions of forces would then arise from the potential of ballistic missile defense to neutralize missiles after launch This may require SALT discussions. But it does not require treaties. Each side must simply warn the other that large ABM programs will lead to weapons improvements aimed at ensuring penetration. In comparison with a treaty, the mutual avoidance of large ABM programs seems a relatively easy matter to arrange informally, since they are large and expensive, time-consuming to build, and unlikely to deny the other side its ability to destroy 50 adversary cities.

The only remaining question is whether invulnerability can be assured. Fortunately, there are the oceans. Three hundred million cubic miles of sea provide us with enough cover for whatever modes of deployment we may wish to have. Anti-submarine warfare has made little or no progress, while ever quieter and deeper-diving vehicles can carry missiles of ever greater range. Scenarios designed to show that these boats could be subject to simultaneous attack outrage realistic judgment. And the time required to build the systems necessary to implement such an attack would provide time for future countermeasures.

Arms control, then, could begin at home. Each side could, in its own interests, avoid the expense and complications of maintaining obsolete strategic weapons by facing the political-bureaucratic problems associated with eliminating them. Moreover, the two nations need not follow the same schedule in setting their houses in order. If each resolved to acquire only what was genuinely required, the action-reaction syndrome would be broken and the need for a treaty vastly reduced.

Consider, as an application of these principles, the problem of MIRV—multiple independently guided reëntry vehicles. On the one hand, we could decide that we would not build MIRV if the Soviet Union satisfied us that it was refraining from doing so. And we could seek to achieve this understanding formally or informally. But it would then be necessary to warn and even threaten that a failure of negotiations would lead to our deployment of MIRV. On the other hand, it should be recognized that we do not need it to counter a Soviet MIRV. Our MIRV has been funded on the grounds that the Soviets were building a large ballistic missile defense. They do not seem to be doing so. Hence building MIRV, if negotiations failed, would violate the policy of acquiring only what we need. The proper response to

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a Soviet MIRV would be to discard the land-based missiles it threatens and construct—only if absolutely necessary—more submarines or a new sea-based system. Such a policy has the massive advantage of depending only upon ourselves. It is a major recommendation of this article that the United States not depend upon the Soviet Union to resolve our own domestic arms problems. And this policy also hews to strategic realities rather than blindly matching adversary actions.

We can, by inventing one reason or another, make our missile defense or our multiple warheads a response to something the Soviet Union is doing, or might do. Action and reaction can become a cover for a drive to stay ahead in a meaningless contest. An unspoken alliance of great strength in both countries will support such a contest. Some will be persuaded that the particular reaction is necessary for strategic reasons. Some will want it for its economic or political benefits. Many are just easily persuaded of whatever point of view is dominant. But we need not acquiesce in these pressures.

III

What tactics are suggested by this analysis? If the doves attempt to solve any particular weapon problem by treaty, they run the risk that failure of negotiations will be used to justify going forward with constructing the weapon. If, on the other hand, the doves attack the weapon project as plainly and simply wasteful, they run the risk that a failure to head off comparable procurement by the Russians will lead to irresistible pressure to match them.

The decision turns on the probability of success in the SALT talks. If the talks are obviously going to fail, it would be better if each side resisted defense expenditures on the principle that arms control begins at home. But if the talks seem bound to succeed, obviously the treaty would be the best outcome. The emphasis on the SALT talks should be proportional to their probability of success.

What is that probability and what does it suggest as a course of action? It is well understood that the SALT talks are the beginning of a very long road. The probability of success in the near future is low, in part because hawks seem to be in control. If they are forced to negotiate, they will simply blame failure on the obduracy of the other side. This militates against putting

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great emphasis on the talks. On the other hand, the tendency of hawks to buy weapons to excess makes them especially vulnerable to the charge of waste. And at the present time great progress is being made in the United States in bringing to public awareness the need for limiting waste in defense processes. We see before us the possibility of dismantling many of the undesirable alliances of attitudes, roles and interests that have grown up in our society over 25 years of cold war.

If we emphasize the strategic talks, we must give up on this course for many years. If we concede that the negotiations are likely to bear fruit, the traditional response of our political system will be to refrain from domestic political struggle over defense matters.

Thus Mr. McGeorge Bundy has cautioned in this journal (October 1969) that the President, and he alone, can handle the negotiations—which is true—and deduces our obligation to rally round. This would mean a halt to attacking as excessive the weapons about which we are negotiating, despite the fact that they may be redundant. He suggests that the SALT talks provide an occasion for mobilizing opinion against the arms race, but it seems at least as likely that SALT becomes an occasion to blame the Russians for that contest. If feeling in this country has reached the point where much arms spending is considered just plain wasteful, why mobilize opinion to negotiate about that waste? If the chance of imminent success is low, should we protect an unholy alliance in favor of excessive armaments by making the issue a bipartisan matter requiring nationwide support for the President?[1]

If we tie our efforts to remove distortions from our society to Soviet efforts to curtail their own excessive defense spending, we may lose our opportunity to improve our own processes. Our social systems are not comparable and they are not converging. Our own standards should govern our own attempts to improve ourselves. We should not wait for the Soviet Union to reach the stage at which it can begin to examine critically its own processes of weapons acquisition.

[1] Mr. Bundy said: "It has been entirely reasonable for believers in arms control to place themselves where their own best judgment led them in the debate on the ABM, but as the SALT talks begin the President has a necessary claim to trust." But the ABM debate probably had the greatest favorable impact on arms limitations in the cold war thus far. Should critics forego such expressions of opinion for the decade the arms talks might take, regardless of how the Administration is negotiating or what weapons it is procuring?

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This point of view is not based on trust of the Russians. They will continue to seek decisive military advantage. And if they gain, or think they have achieved, advantage they will try to exploit it. But there is no advantage to be had in a world filled with thousands of nuclear weapons on each side. Nothing we or they can build will deceive any political leader into believing he can conduct a nuclear war. Nuclear war between our two countries *is* unthinkable, and will stay that way for Presidents and Premiers. In the postwar period, as the Soviets' strength has grown so has their caution. We should stop thinking that they will cut loose at the next unmatched acquisition of weapons. The danger of irrational Soviet conduct cannot be further reduced by an increase in our arsenals.

IV

The argument thus far has been concerned only with the emphasis to be placed upon the SALT talks at a time when they seem unlikely to produce immediate progress. Whatever the emphasis, the talks must continue and we must hope that they will result eventually in a final treaty. But during periods when formal treaties are difficult to attain, many other possibilities for using the talks will exist.

In general, the talks will provide a kind of continuous arms-limitation hotline. Their role in transmitting authoritative warnings will be critical in solving the problem of ballistic missile defenses. As each crisis in weapons procurement erupts, it will be possible for both sides to advise, suggest, recommend, exhort, enjoin, warn, caution or, possibly, even apologize. Such problems as those of missile defense cannot be solved once and for all, but must be managed over time as new kinds of defenses are invented.

Again, we should not expect too much. For example, it is sometimes argued that an important purpose would be the discussion of intentions. Actually, many adversary decisions are now being made on the basis of what the other side *might* do in future. And because each side is opportunistic about exploiting weapons technology, technical advances can produce changes in intentions; so can changes in leadership. Moreover, it could be serious if one side thought it had been misled about the other's intentions. This will limit such discussions.

Another current idea calls for preliminary negotiations on

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principles. One might try to gain formal acceptance of the desirability of finite deterrence, of keeping weapons invulnerable, and so on. But such principles can take much time, and in the process of formalizing them, much of their content would disappear.

Still another idea is that the SALT talks might be used to help the Soviet Union avoid making such cost-effectiveness mistakes in arms procurement as would accelerate the arms race. For example, we might give high Soviet officials the facts and arguments with which to oppose missile defense. But the pressures that produce these mistakes are probably not so easily punctured. Prompting Soviet political leaders may be comparable to prompting Congressmen with good questions to ask military witnesses; much more is usually required to change a government position.

As each side is now in substantial ignorance of what the other really thinks, the SALT talks may conceivably produce unexpected intellectual chaos. Both hawks and doves on each side base much of their position on premises about the other side which are false. Thus, established battle lines within each country may be disrupted by a rising tide of facts about the opposing country's attitudes. A prominent example from the recent past was the impact on the ABM debate of Premier Kosygin's assertion that he thought missile defense "defensive." Here was a man widely considered a Soviet dove using arguments that assisted surprised American hawks. Or we may learn that the Soviet Union is building SS-9s for the political purpose of provoking precisely the outcry that U.S. arms controllers try to warn them against. Or Soviet citizens may be shocked to hear how coldbloodedly American strategists compute the hostages they want to maintain. In any case, it is certain that the talks will be full of surprises. In agreeing to talk, both countries have set in motion a process which has wider implications than either can weigh.

In Viet Nam, we are learning that face-saving negotiations with others may be more complicated than the unpleasant and inevitable task of questioning our own decisions and processes. The arms race is like that. It would be nice to believe that the weapons we buy are forced upon us by the Russians. It would be nice to argue that any failure in the talks will justify business as usual.

A failure of the talks would justify certain business, but it would not justify anything like business as usual. Since the nego-

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tiations with the Soviet Union are likely to be long and hard, we cannot neglect the business of putting our arms-procurement processes in order. And if we fail to do so, then the negotiations will likely fail in any case.

Therefore the first priority ought to be a thorough examination of the arms-procurement process at home. The talks should be pursued intently and pushed as fast as possible. But for the near future, there will be no contradiction between pursuing agreement abroad and attacking our own problems at home. When a hard choice does come between rallying around the President or pressing for reform at home, each American will have to decide on the basis of the political context where his responsibility lies.

We have gotten into the habit of talking technically and politically about the means of agreement before generating at home the preconditions in will and in processes. It is hard to imagine an important formal treaty occurring unless each side has found it possible to confront successfully its own political-bureaucratic problems. Hence an approach that puts domestic confrontations first may be not only an *alternative* to a formal treaty but a precondition.

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DILEMMAS OF THE ARMS TRAFFIC

By Geoffrey Kemp

THE United States' practice of selling or giving large quantities of military equipment to foreign countries gives rise to a series of policy problems which, though often simple to identify, are not easy to resolve. Over the past two years, in an effort to exercise more control over the transfer of arms, Congress has added several restrictive clauses to the Foreign Assistance Act, which authorizes military aid, and a new Foreign Military Sales Act, which controls sales. Although tighter control may have a marked effect upon the overall nature and size of military aid and sales programs, the basic issues at stake inevitably escape the somewhat cumbersome and general language of legislation. In essence, the problems are ones of judgment in particular and highly differentiated cases.

Much of the underlying criticism that surrounds these programs is based upon several consistent themes: that arms sales and aid have become a bad investment and have contributed to the already dismal number of conflicts in the non-industrialized areas of the world; that there is a basic inconsistency in the logic of a foreign policy that professes to be concerned with arms limitations and the reduction of defense expenditure throughout the world and yet has resulted in the United States becoming the world's largest arms supplier; that the argument that arms transfers buy the United States political influence is seriously mistaken, as Pakistan, Greece, Iran and several Latin American countries have shown; and, most important, that arms aid can herald the beginnings of a major military commitment by the United States to the defense of other countries, such as Viet Nam, Laos or Thailand.

Other critics, though not prepared to agree with such sweeping generalizations, have raised questions concerning programs in certain areas, and have called for more open discussion of the various policy trade-offs. Should the United States make an open-ended commitment to supply combat aircraft, tanks and surface-to-air-missiles to Israel? If so, how many and what types and for how long? Would such a commitment be a realistic

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price for Israel's restraint in the nuclear weapons field? Which military assistance programs to Latin America should be abolished or cut back? Military assistance to authoritarian régimes, such as those in Greece, Portugal and Spain, raises the question as to whether the strategic benefits to the alliance balance the political costs. How should the United States respond if Zambia requests military aid to defend itself against American-equipped Portuguese forces in Angola or Mozambique?

The list of questions could be extended, for the sheer size of the U.S. involvement in the arms business is almost bound to create problems. Therefore, before focusing on the policy issues, it is necessary to give a few figures.[1]

II

Between 1950 and 1968, the United States appropriated over $33 billion for military assistance programs to foreign countries. Approximately $15 billion of this was earmarked for Europe and Japan (excluding Greece and Turkey); $9.7 billion for East and Southeast Asia; $5.6 billion for the Near East and South Asia (including Greece and Turkey); $687 million for Latin America; and $218 million for Africa, of which over 50 percent went to Ethiopia. The major individual aid recipients since 1950 have been: France, $4.1 billion; Turkey, $2.6 billion; Korea, $2.5 billion; Taiwan, $2.4 billion; Viet Nam, $1.5 billion (up to 1966); Greece, $1.4 billion; Belgium, $1.2 billion; Italy, $1.2 billion; and Britain, $1.0 billion. Thus nine recipients out of a total of at least eighty have received over 50 percent of the total. The overwhelming bulk of U.S. arms aid has gone to those countries which have been assumed to have faced major military threats from communist countries: the NATO allies and those Asian nations on the Sino-Soviet periphery. U.S. military assistance to those countries directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been very low ($46.0 million to Iraq, mainly before

[1] I have not attempted to cover the many quantitative and qualitative aspects of the arms-transfer process that are required for a detailed analysis of the subject. I have also not mentioned any of the more detailed recommendations that can be suggested for improving the techniques for administering United States military aid and sales. However, in writing this paper I have found the work of three colleagues, Lincoln P. Bloomfield, John H. Hoagland and especially Amelia C. Leiss, an invaluable help. In particular, see Bloomfield and Leiss et al., "The Control of Local Conflict: A Design Study on Limited War and Arms Control in the Developing Areas," prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), and John H. Hoagland, "Arms in the Developing World," *Orbis*, Spring 1969.

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1958; $50.0 million to Jordan; $34.0 million to Saudi Arabia). If Viet Nam costs are omitted, the size of the overall Military Assistance Program has fallen consistently since Fiscal 1961. The FY 1970 program totals $434 million, of which over 75 percent is earmarked for Greece, Turkey, Taiwan and Korea; $21.4 million has been earmarked for all Latin American countries, and $20.5 million for Africa.[2]

The figures for overall U.S. military sales were not high before 1960. However, since 1964 average sales ($1.2 billion) have consistently exceeded the value of aid. By far the largest sales have been made in the industrial countries, especially Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Australia and Japan, and the oil-rich countries. Looking at the general trends, the falling size of the Military Assistance Program has been offset by the growth of sales. Combined aid and sales during the 1960s has varied between $2.0 and $2.8 billion.

How do these totals compare with those of other arms suppliers? Estimates of the value of Soviet aid and sales to foreign countries are exceedingly difficult to make. However, if transfers to the Warsaw Pact powers and Communist China are included, there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union ranks second to the United States. In terms of items of equipment, it is probable that the Soviet Union has delivered more tanks and jet aircraft to its allies than has the United States. If totals for the Third World (excluding China) are considered, the value of Soviet aid and trade has probably not exceeded $10 billion since its first major program in 1955 with Egypt. The bulk of Soviet arms in the Third World has gone to a few major recipients—China, North Korea, North Viet Nam, Cuba, Indonesia, Egypt and Syria.

Britain and France rank next as suppliers, with average sales of $300–400 million. Most of Britain's recent sales have been to oil-rich Middle East countries. However, France has recently sold arms to Peru, Brazil, Lebanon, Pakistan and South Africa. West Germany, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Israel and Australia have all developed the capability to manufacture certain types of arms and have shown little reluctance to sell their products abroad, al-

[2] None of these figures includes costs incurred in Southeast Asia after 1966. Responsibility for funding military assistance to Viet Nam, Thailand and Laos has been transferred to the Department of Defense budget.

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though several, notably Sweden and Holland, have made a real effort not to sell to countries engaged in combat.

Since major supplier countries exercise very tight control over the export policies of their private arms companies, and since most arms transfers are government-to-government, the only "uncontrolled" trade that occurs is that arranged by the private arms dealers. However, the most successful arms dealers have found that it is in their interests to coöperate with their host governments and avoid selling to countries on the black list. Thus, although the clandestine arms trade may make the headlines occasionally, its net effect on the world's arms market is negligible in monetary terms. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances —as, for example, Biafra—the clandestine arms trade can have a marked effect upon the ability of one side to sustain a conflict.

Have these arms transfers served American interests over the years? Have the original purposes of the specific military aid and sales programs been fulfilled? There is no simple answer, since the record is a mixed one. Rather than attempt a chronological and geographical survey of the entire program, it is more useful to focus on some of the more frequent policy dilemmas that have occurred over the past twenty years.

III

The dilemmas begin within the Executive Branch of government, where disagreements arise as to the wisdom of arms agreements, even with close allies. The success in selling arms to Western Europe illustrates the problem. Those responsible for U.S. economic interests have stressed the need to sell arms in the important European market to offset some of the foreign-exchange costs of stationing 300,000 American troops on the Continent; and the military lobby has argued that the original Military Assistance Program and now military sales can help to standardize the equipment of NATO forces, thereby improving their efficiency. Others, more concerned with political relationships within the Alliance and elsewhere, have emphasized that the hard-sell tactics of American companies, helped by the Pentagon, generate considerable ill will in countries such as Britain and France, and have forced them to sell their own arms to sensitive areas such as Latin America and the Middle East. Germany and Italy have also retransferred large quantities of obsolescent American equipment to pay for new arms. On other occasions,

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however, it has been considered politically wise to agree to sell arms to Britain and France, even when it was not perceived as being in the best military interests of the United States and the Alliance as a whole to do so. The sale of Polaris missiles to Britain and C-135 tanker aircraft to France, which provided essential elements for the British and French nuclear forces, were negotiated at the very time that great efforts were being made to deëmphasize small national nuclear forces. Since each of these arguments is strong in itself, the optimum policies are not self-evident.

A different type of dilemma arises over the question of arms supplies to Israel. In this case, the issue is not how to share an arms market with allies, but how to balance the need to preserve Israel's security against the dangers of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and continued bad relationships with Arab countries.

There are some compelling reasons why, in the short run, the most important U.S. policy objectives have been served by supplying certain weapons to Israel, and why it would be unwise to deny Israel further supplies in the hope that such restraint would enhance the prospects of a multilateral political settlement between the various parties to the conflict. For instance, a unilateral decision to delay or withhold aircraft and spare parts would stand the risk of tipping the crucial balance of air power, not necessarily in favor of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan, but at least away from the present clear superiority which Israel enjoys. It can be argued that as long as Israel remains the dominant local airpower in the Middle East, the likelihood of a full-scale resumption of war is lessened, though not, of course, completely removed. If Egypt became persuaded that it, rather than Israel, could gain mastery of the air in the event of an all-out war, the temptation to plan a major offensive campaign against Israel would grow. If Israel believed that this was a real probability, it would prepare for preëmptive action, and the stage would be set for the fourth war.

If Israel could no longer rely upon the United States for arms supplies, it would undoubtedly step up efforts to seek them elsewhere. What is more, assuming no political settlement, it would redouble its attempts to build up its own arms industry, and would almost certainly move further toward a nuclear option. The problem for the United States is, then, to provide Israel with an *optimum* military force that is not so large as to remove

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all constraints on Israel, but sufficient to deter yet another premature and highly destabilizing Arab offensive, and the inevitable Israeli response. What numbers of F-4s or A-4s or Hawk missiles or tanks should be supplied to Israel, and over what time period, depends upon Israel's day-to-day losses in the present war of attrition, and upon the level and quality of arms supplied to Egypt by the Soviet Union. Though Israel can easily hold its own against any combination of local Arab powers, success in battle must be measured by the speed with which it can overcome its enemies, while the Arab nations, because of their greater numbers of less highly trained manpower, can afford a prolonged war. As a consequence of these asymmetrical conditions, a simple "balance of power" based upon the principle of parity will never be acceptable to Israel. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to imagine a meaningful U.S.-Soviet arms moratorium that would be welcomed by either Israel or the Arab countries. The American dilemma is that it will probably have to continue to sell Israel arms as a price for not becoming involved in a war.

Another persistent problem that has bedeviled American policy, and given rise to much criticism, is that recipients of U.S. military hardware may use it for purposes for which it was not intended and which the United States opposes. There are many examples to draw upon: Pakistan's use of American arms against India in 1965 resulted in a joint Anglo-American arms embargo to both countries; the El Salvador-Honduras war of July 1969 prompted Senator Fulbright to call for an end to all U.S. military assistance programs to Latin America; Portugal's use of American NATO-supplied arms in Angola and Mozambique has aroused widespread criticism; Indonesia's use of American military transport aircraft during its confrontation with Commonwealth forces in North Borneo caused difficulties with Britain; threats by Turkey and Greece to use their NATO forces against one another over the Cyprus crisis in 1965 gravely weakened the reliability of the southern flank; the use of American-supplied tanks to quell riots in Latin America or oust governments, as in Greece, is understandably a cause for concern.

The dilemma is, of course, that these incidents in themselves may not provide sufficient grounds for abolishing aid programs or denying sales. For instance, a primary reason for providing Pakistan with arms in the early 1950s was to secure base rights

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at Peshawar which were then considered very important for U.S. strategic interests. Peshawar has since declined in importance and, in any case, the United States has been asked to leave. But problems arising out of the 1965 embargo, which infuriated India as much as Pakistan, remain. (India had been receiving limited quantities of American military assistance since the 1962 Chinese border war.) Though the decision to cut off supplies to these countries may well have been a contributing factor in modifying the hostilities between them at the time, one long-term result was that it convinced both Pakistan and India that the United States and Britain could not be relied upon to fulfill their contractual obligations with respect to arms supplies. Pakistan's military links with China were strengthened, to the tune of 100 jet combat aircraft and about 100 T-59 tanks; India improved its growing relationship with the Soviet Union, and, most important, accelerated the development of a much larger and more broadly based indigenous armaments industry in order to avoid the indignity of bowing to big-power pressure in the event of a future conflict. India's present intransigence on the issue of the Nonproliferation Treaty is, to some degree, related to the bitter legacy of 1965.

In each of the other cases, different problems are raised. Greece and Turkey are cornerstones of NATO: should they be denied arms because of their domestic policies or their dispute over Cyprus? At a time when Jugoslavia and Rumania are anxious about Soviet intentions, and the growth of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet continues, is it wise to put more pressure on the Greek colonels? This was tried before and failed; or, perhaps not enough pressure was applied.

IV

It is often argued that the United States should simply refuse to supply arms to certain, if not most, countries. But the record shows that, if the United States declines, the Soviet Union, France or China will simply take its place. There are two particularly notorious examples of this pattern. One was the Egyptian-Soviet agreement in 1955, which followed the West's refusal to lift the strict arms rationing imposed by the 1950 Tripartite Declaration by Britain, France and the United States. The other was Indonesia's decision to purchase vast quantities of Soviet arms in the early 1960s, after the United States had refused to

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meet President Sukarno's more flamboyant requests for military matériel. These are by no means isolated cases.

But should the United States be concerned? Undoubtedly, Soviet intervention in the Middle East was made easier as a result of Western efforts to restrain Arab armaments, and the next generation of revisionist historians may feel that every effort should have been made to keep the Soviet Union out of an area so vital to the West. In the case of Indonesia, however, it can be asked how much the Soviet Union benefited from the billions of dollars' worth of submarines, jet aircraft and missiles supplied to that country. Since President Sukarno's ouster in 1965, the West has established close relationships with the generals, and the Indonesian military forces are now used almost entirely for counterinsurgency operations against left-wing guerrilla groups and dissident West Irian tribesmen. The Soviet Union's investment has won it little popularity with the present régime.

Similar dilemmas are evident in American policy toward Latin America: indeed, attempts by both Congress and the Executive to deter Peru from first buying American supersonic jets, then British subsonic jets and then French Mirage V fighters point very clearly to some of the political costs of exerting pressure, even with the best of motives. The demand for new jet aircraft in several Latin American countries, including Peru, has not been based solely on the whims of prestige-conscious air force colonels. For purely technical reasons, old aircraft must usually be replaced by more advanced types, which tend to be more expensive. A relevant question is, therefore, which aircraft transfers the United States should encourage and which it should oppose. Peru's decision to purchase the French Mirage V can be termed wasteful if measured in terms of military utility. For a total cost of about $30 million, Peru has acquired one squadron of aircraft which can fly at twice the speed of sound. For the same investment, it could have bought four squadrons of helicopters or small armed jet trainers, or several heavy transport aircraft, or hundreds of trucks and jeeps. Since the main threat to Peru's security is internal, despite the polemics over Chile's intentions, the Mirages seem ill-suited to Peru's real security requirements. If U.S. economic aid is to be indirectly used to subsidize weapons procurement, then the weapons should, at least, be those that enhance the security of the country.

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But once military rationality is introduced into the discussion, another set of problems needs to be weighed. Is it necessarily in the interests of the United States to encourage authoritarian Latin American régimes to manage their armed forces with maximum efficiency? For a minimal investment, the U.S. Army Mobile Training Team sent to Bolivia in 1967 to train the Bolivian Rangers demonstrated that well-planned counterinsurgency operations can pay handsome military dividends. The successful capture and destruction of Che Guevara's guerrillas was probably not a chance operation. But, for precisely this reason—namely that élite, well-trained ground forces can support but also can depose both constitutional and authoritarian governments, and can destroy but also can assist opposition groups that the United States may or may not approve of—the advantages of optimizing military skills in particular countries are not self-evident.

What would happen if the United States drastically reduced its program of military aid and sales in Latin America in the belief that the present policies work against long-term United States interests? There is little reason to suppose that this would reduce the level of Latin American defense expenditures. The evidence of the past few years suggests that the United States would lose such influence as it has in limiting transfers of expensive weapons to chauvinistic governments and leave the field open to France, Britain and even the Soviet Union. France, in particular, has shown that it is quite prepared to ignore U.S. or world opinion and sell arms wherever it can. Its arms sales to South Africa have effectively destroyed the United Nations arms embargo there; its policy of supplying arms to Biafra, yet denying Israel arms it has paid for, cannot be regarded as an expression of noble principle. Neither France nor Britain will provide arms to Latin America free; they require either hard currency or favorable trade agreements. The Soviet Union might provide "free" arms, but at a high political price. Even so, some will insist—especially after the El Salvador-Honduras war—that the United States should get out of the arms business. Though unnecessary defense expenditures in Latin America undoubtedly undermine the whole purpose of economic assistance, the political costs of abruptly ending military assistance programs would seem very high.

The lessons to be drawn from Southeast Asia pose the most

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difficult dilemma of all. A primary purpose of military assistance there has been to assist countries in defending themselves against internal or minor external attack, without the need to involve U.S. ground forces. Viet Nam suggests to some that precisely the reverse happens: military assistance is the catalyst for deeper military involvement. Quite naturally, critics see the same danger occurring in Thailand and Laos. Yet, if the United States cuts back on military assistance to these countries at a moment when it is trying to reduce its own military presence in the area, the repercussions in Canberra and New Delhi, as well as Djakarta, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, might be very serious. Though the case for cutting the overall U.S. defense budget is overwhelming, the financial costs of military assistance are tiny in comparison to outlays for the nation's general-purpose forces. The record of some military assistance programs in Asia, notably in South Korea, suggests that return on the investment, though a long time in coming, is not negligible.

V

A final, more general problem is how to control the international traffic in arms. What are the prospects for consensus among the major suppliers? So long as arms transfers are perceived, in general, to be a useful albeit sometimes unpredictable instrument of foreign policy, and often lucrative as well, the chances for general agreement seem very slender. It is doubtful whether the United States, the Soviet Union or China will be deterred by the experience of several bad investments from continuing this practice. The numerous countries which are now entering the field for commercial reasons are also going to be hard to persuade to give up a profitable business. It is not inconceivable that Japan will one day reënter the field on a large scale; already, several East European countries have engaged in arms sales to the Third World. If the demand for arms remains high, as seems probable, the supply is likely to continue, though cutbacks in U.S. and Soviet assistance programs would seriously affect the quantities of arms many of the poor countries could afford to buy.

Can demand be curbed, especially in the Third World? These countries do not look favorably on attempts by the industrial powers to restrict their military capabilities, and regard proposals for regional arms-control agreements as yet another ex-

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ample of great-power interference with their sovereignty. The assumption that small countries should be denied modern armaments is, in their view, directly contrary to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which grants the right of members to defend themselves against aggression. Unless the nations of the Third World are themselves prepared to initiate proposals for restrictions on the supply of conventional weapons, it is doubtful whether any significant controls that would seem worth the political price can be instituted by the supplier nations.

Two modest efforts at the United Nations, one by Malta in 1965, and another by Denmark in 1968, failed to arouse much enthusiasm among members. And as things stand, the chances of regional initiatives are remote. There was a time when Black Africa was considered a possible area for such a move. However, the continued and increasing incidents of violence across the continent, and above all the ominous armed might of South Africa, have made disarmament a non-issue almost everywhere in Africa. Zambia has recently signed an agreement with Italy for helicopters and jet trainers, on the grounds that in the last resort Zambians will have to rely upon themselves for protection against their white-ruled neighbors.

There have no doubt been severe institutional weaknesses in the management of the military assistance programs, many of which have been criticized by Congress, and, hopefully, remedied. But the basic dilemmas remain. These suggest that there are costs as well as benefits incurred if arms are denied to friendly countries; that on occasion arms transfers can give the supplier influence over the recipient's behavior, but sometimes not; that moral or political gestures proscribing the sale of arms to certain countries will not necessarily be adhered to by all other suppliers; that arms transfers can be made both a substitute for American forces and a catalyst for greater American involvement in local conflict; that successful sales efforts in Europe force Europeans to sell arms to the Third World; and that universal agreement on the need for arms control and disarmament is paralleled by a sustained demand for American armaments. At present there are no easy policy conclusions and no substitute for treating each request for arms on its own merits, bearing in mind that arms transfers have long-term implications going well beyond the effort to maintain a military balance or improve the balance of payments.

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THE CHURCH IN LATIN AMERICA

By Thomas G. Sanders

THE Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has long been criticized for helping to maintain an anachronistic social system and economic underdevelopment—low levels of education, a rigid class system, disinterest in economic achievement and valorization of order and tradition. Catholics themselves admit that few creative thinkers have come from Latin America, that theologically and administratively the institution has conformed to patterns drawn chiefly from southern Europe. Yet today no institution in Latin America is changing more rapidly than the Catholic Church, and in directions that have important implications not only for defining new relationships between Christianity and the values of society, but also for the role that the Church will play in the region's development.

Like many cultural changes, however, this one has been neither as abrupt nor as total as casual observers have often reported. Just as the Church was never as monolithic or reactionary as its critics claimed, recent reform movements have not totally captured the Catholic community or followed a single, unified path. Rather, the Church is in a continuous transition which has greatly intensified in the last decade, building on a long tradition of division and dissent that dates as far back as the early sixteenth century, when Father Bartolomé de las Casas provoked a debate over the Indian policy of the Spanish conquerors.

An examination of the effect of the structure of the Catholic community on decision-making and a discussion of recent trends among Catholic élites will help to clarify the Church's function as an agent for change in Latin America.

Such an analysis must begin with the Catholic people in Latin America, by distinguishing between the masses, 90 percent of whom profess to be Catholics, and the élites, who have a greater understanding of what their religious commitment means. The former are not profoundly Catholic by any criterion: theological awareness, sacramental participation, mass attendance or conformity to the Church's ethical teaching. Since Catholicism does not seriously shape their public actions, it is inappropriate to praise or blame the Church for what these "Catholics" do. More

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or less illiterate, participants in various forms of culture religion, in minimal contact with the Church, the lower classes have not shared in the renewal of Catholic life in Latin America. Their place in the Church, nevertheless, represents one of the great unsolved pastoral problems.

The élites, on the other hand, are composed of bishops, clergy and laymen whose educational level and participation in Church institutions enable them to internalize Catholic teaching and apply it to their everyday decisions. Recent changes in the outlook of the Church have produced a wide range of reactions among these élites. Those who attended religious schools or belonged to Catholic Action a generation ago usually have a quite different point of view from today's younger generation, and clearly, the views of individual Catholics, though deriving in part from Church teaching, are shaped by a whole range of non-religious factors: the views of relatives, the outlook of the social class to which they belong, personal economic interests or other educational influences.

Brazil, for example, was the scene of two extremely different dramas of Catholic activity in early 1964. In one, hundreds of thousands of upper- and middle-class women engaged in "Marches of the Family with God for Liberty," protesting against the "communism" and "corruption" charged to the régime of João Goulart. In the other, the most concerned youth, largely products of élitist Catholic Action organizations, participated in a range of activities by which they hoped to share in a "revolutionary" movement leading to "socialism" in Brazil. How did Catholic motivation and principles influence the two patterns of action? The former reflected the training of the official Brazilian Church in the 1940s and '50s, which regarded communism as the chief threat to everything that was valued, and defined political action moralistically as opposing corruption and defending the family. At the same time, the class interests of these people, their anxiety about inflation, economic chaos, the possibility of proletarianization and a political swing leftward, reinforced the themes mediated by the Church. The latter group, on the other hand, represented a new generation more preoccupied with underdevelopment and injustice than with supposed Marxist dangers. They were imbued with a theology challenging them to participate with non-Catholics in movements leading to change and the creation of a more just social order.

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The context in which they acted—as students and intellectuals in universities, sharing in discussions on development and its ideological prerequisites, and engaging in projects among the lower classes—similarly reinforced the radical ethical perspective they received in Catholic Action.

Differences of opinion among Catholic élites, then, seem to come from two influences: (1) the various interpretations of social responsibility prevalent in the Catholic community, which may correspond in greater or lesser degree to the current teachings of the Pope, bishops and theologians; (2) nonreligious factors, which influence the values and responses of an individual—indeed even the way he reads the Church's teaching. The Church recognizes this interplay, for it assumes that its social principles are generalized and that each person, living with his own problems, must in the final analysis make his own choices as to their proper application.

Keeping in mind the distinction between masses and élites, and the factors producing varied élite reactions, how does the position of the Church on key Latin American issues in fact develop? According to the ideal Catholic model, decision-making moves from the top, the papacy, downward to the laymen. The Pope enunciates broad principles on a certain topic, as Paul VI did on problems of development in *Populorum Progressio* or on responsible parenthood in *Humanae Vitae*. Subsequently, regional and national organizations of bishops may apply papal teaching to the more specific problems within their jurisdiction. The Latin American Bishops' Council, usually called CELAM, has been especially active in analyzing regional issues in the light of papal declarations and giving guidance to the national hierarchies which have moved rather slowly in Church renewal. Below CELAM, most of the national councils of bishops have issued documents speaking more directly to Catholics in their countries. In the last stage of this model, priests and laymen read what the authorities of the Church have said and apply it to their own situations.

The dominant note in this conception is the initiative and guidance of the Church's highest authorities in confronting and acting on issues. The documents of CELAM and the national bishops' organizations reflect their adherence to papal orientation in frequent reference to encyclicals. On all levels of this process the teaching conveys a sense of reasonableness, modera-

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tion and almost celestial wisdom, marked by careful and unified devotion to past tradition and superior authority.

If this ideal model were wholly accurate, one could comprehend the Church's relation to Latin American problems merely by searching out what the Pope and bishops have said. To adopt this simple method, however, would distort the manner in which Catholic thought, individuals and organizations interact with society and would miss the dynamics behind the current struggle for relevance in the Church.

The papal and episcopal documents deserve examination not for their transcendent wisdom but because they reflect the consensus, compromises, trends and pressures of various interest groups within the Church. The Pope and the bishops are not innovators on social issues; rather they respond to the ideas and activities of individuals who have been dealing with these issues, reacting to changing public pressures, testing policies, and who feel that the Church should now take an official position on them.

The problem of economic development is a clear illustration. The papacy has a long history of speaking on social problems—labor organization, just wages, the role of the state in the economy and the function of private property—going back to the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903). It did not, however, deal with what we understand by the term "economic development" until 1961, when Pope John broke the ice with some minimal remarks in his *Mater et Magistra.* A more detailed discussion appeared in the Vatican Council Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* (1963), but only in 1967 did Pope Paul (in *Populorum Progressio*) dedicate an entire encyclical to development.

This lag in the official teaching of the Church did not deter many Catholic students, politicians and government officials from absorbing the new economic views that began to circulate after World War II, largely through the influence of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. They formed organizations and took positions, sometimes in conflict with other Churchmen, for years before the Church officially spoke. Certain progressive bishops, such as Msgr. Hélder Câmara, a Brazilian, and the late Msgr. Manuel Larraín, a Chilean, had important influence on higher Church authorities, arguing that they must deal with these issues in terms of fundamental Catholic ethical convictions and to avoid the Church's becoming irrelevant.

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The documents of the Church reflect polar pressures. On the one hand, because they must satisfy both liberal and conservative prelates, they often resort to vagueness and ambiguity to gain acceptance. On the other hand, the liberals, because of their greater conviction and sophistication on the issues under discussion, tend to dominate meetings of the bishops and frequently succeed in getting their views inserted in the documents.

Grasping the dynamics of change in Church policy thus requires careful attention to innovating élites, which include some bishops but primarily priests and laymen. Innovation is a prerequisite to adaptation and relevance in Church teaching, but by its very nature it involves action which lacks the security of official Church approval. It is not surprising, then, that innovators appear as radicals in conflict with current interpretations of Catholic social doctrine. Many aspects of the present consensus, as reflected in the episcopal documents, were regarded by the Church as irresponsible only a few years ago. While official teaching already contains features that will mature into greater significance in the future, those who want to understand what the role of the Church may be thirty years hence should look not to the consensus of today but to the attitudes of innovating élites which are shaping the consensus of tomorrow.

II

The current modernization of the Church in Latin America began in the 1930s, when Catholics were stirred by fresh and exciting political options associated with neo-Thomism and fascism—both claiming to interpret authentically the papal social teaching. The neo-Thomism of Jacques Maritain converted a segment of the young intellectuals in the Church to religious pluralism, democratic processes, the defense of individual and group rights, and opposition to totalitarianism. In Chile, for example, the major legacy of this period was the Falange Nacional, a party founded in 1938 on neo-Thomist principles, which attracted the ablest young Catholics and evolved by 1957 into a Christian Democratic Party. In Brazil, the Church's major group of intellectuals, associated with the Centro Dom Vital, devoted themselves to communicating neo-Thomism, strengthening liturgical life and forming Catholic Action groups as a prelude to revitalizing Catholicism in the country.

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By the fifties, then, the Church was in a state of flux. With varying force and effort in different countries, certain bishops, priests and educated laymen were criticizing the internal structure of the Church and arguing for greater social relevance. Significantly, by the time of the Vatican Council the Latin American bishops generally supported the reforms recommended there. During the fifties, also, a few Latin American Catholics were beginning to go beyond Maritain, adopting existentialist motifs from Emmanuel Mounier and Louis J. Lebret, and analyzing nationalism and Marxism for their relevance to the problem of underdevelopment.

In discussing élite movements within the Latin American Church, many writers have emphasized—too simply—the emergence of what they call a modern, reformist or progressive position as opposed to a more traditional one. At the same time they have emphasized characteristics which fit their own presuppositions about Latin American development within the context of options offered by the rivalry between the Western and communist blocs. These errors have led to a neglect of the division within the modernizing élites and overlooked the linkage of some Catholics with non-Catholic intellectuals in seeking an approach to the region's problems which is distinctively Latin American and free from the interests of the cold-war contestants.

The outside world first awoke to a new Catholic attitude to Latin American development in the late fifties. Articulated by spokesmen who favored reform, it was validated through activities conducted under Church auspices, such as the promotion of labor organizations, credit unions or housing for the poor. The major symbol, however, came to be Chile's Christian Democratic Party, which emerged as a dynamic new hope, gaining impetus from the disappointment in older political movements and the turn taken by the Cuban Revolution. Under the leadership of outstanding intellectuals like Eduardo Frei and Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democrats, who had languished as a miniparty for two decades, began after 1957 to build new strength among the progressive middle class, youth and women, and to become the leading alternative to Chile's Marxist Popular Action Front. Their moderation and reformism, balance between private initiative and state planning, sympathy with the Alliance for Progress, affinities with Christian Democratic movements in Western Europe, and messianic sense of being Latin America's

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alternative to Marxism, attracted admiration and support from abroad.

The Chilean Church came to represent an ideal pattern of the new Catholicism. Alongside the Christian Democratic Party a number of progressive priests were busy in community organization and development, formation of unions and similar constructive projects. An outstanding group of Jesuits trained in the social sciences promoted discussions among younger Catholics aimed at formulating policies to meet the country's problems. In 1962, the Chilean episcopate threw its support on the side of basic reforms in agriculture and education and urged prompt attention to unemployment, malnutrition and urban housing conditions. In the same year the bishops of Talca and Santiago donated lands owned by the Church for an experiment in agrarian reform that was to shape subsequent legislation. The Chilean Church thus presented a unified approach to development; from hierarchy through clergy to laity, the interlocking components of the Church projected a constructive image that attracted increased support from Chile's indifferently Catholic population. Most important, the results were effective, for in the 1964 presidential election Frei conquered the perennial candidate of the Popular Action Front, Dr. Salvador Allende.

Since 1965, however, the unity of this approach has deteriorated. Despite impressive programs of industrial investment, agrarian reform, public control of copper production, and social programs aimed at the lower classes, the Christian Democrats have lost electoral support and squabbled internally. In May 1969, several leading members, including Senator Rafael Gumucio, of a family renowned for its devotion to the Church, withdrew to form the Unitary Movement of Popular Action (MAPU). The Jesuits, who are popularly regarded as the intellectual mentors of the Christian Democrats, are now divided, and their journal incurred the censure of the bishops, apparently for publishing an article reflecting some appreciation for Che Guevara. In August 1968, a group of priests, nuns and laymen seized the cathedral of Santiago, chiefly to protest against the coming of Pope Paul VI to Colombia; they organized themselves into the "Young Church" to prod the ecclesiastical authorities and to act against continuing injustice in Chile.

Hindsight enables us to see that the woes of Chile's Church did not begin in 1968. The Chilean pattern, or what observers

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thought was the Chilean pattern, existed alongside another quite different Catholic perspective on Latin American problems. As far back as 1957, a minority of the Christian Democratic Party proposed united action with the Left, but were outvoted by those who advocated a "Third Way" between capitalism and socialism. The party platform had long opposed capitalism, but this was usually interpreted by outside observers as support for a mixed economy. Few noticed that some leading Christian Democrats wanted to abolish capitalism and replace it by "communitarianism," which they described as "a form of socialism." The slogan for the 1964 election, "Revolution in Liberty," clearly meant reformism; but some younger militants apparently believed that victory would usher in a real revolution, in the sense of a new economic order, a restructuring of social and political power, and an independent foreign policy. Some of the more active Catholics, furthermore, did not sympathize with Christian Democracy, viewing it as an unwarranted attempt to stamp a Catholic hue on a pluralistic and secularized society.

Since the late fifties, these and other more radical themes have circulated among Latin American Catholics, but they received sparse attention. The chief center of religious leftism or radicalism was in Brazil, where Catholics in the early sixties shared with communists and other Marxists the leadership of the National Student Union and the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers. As radicals came more and more to dominate the news media, critics incorrectly belittled the coherence and significance of their position. In 1966, one of Colombia's most competent priests, a sociologist trained in Europe, died fighting with a guerrilla band. A couple of years later, one of the outstanding young bishops of Northeastern Brazil publicly praised Cuba as an example of resistance to "North American imperialism." The most recent incident centered on the voluntary withdrawal from sacerdotal functions of a learned priest in Mexico, whose criticism of the American Church and government had provoked a Vatican investigation into his opinions.

The participants in these actions were neither unstable nor eccentric, but were among the outstanding Catholics in their countries and representative of a growing critical outlook within the Church. To regard them as irresponsible crypto-Marxists because of their often enunciated anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism distorts their intention and significance. It fails to dis-

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tinguish Marxism from the quest of sophisticated Latin Americans for an autonomous economic policy and a replacement of power structures that have held the bulk of the population in passivity and backwardness.

III

A more appropriate framework for analyzing the more radical Catholic trends is suggested by recent events in Latin America. It seems evident that the Alliance for Progress—at least under that name—is passing. Ironically, since the basic ideas of the Alliance came from Latin America, in the proposal of Brazil's President Kubitschek for a Pan-American Operation and in the suggestions of the Economic Commission for Latin America, the initiative of President Kennedy and the intrusion of United States interests into aid policies transformed the image of the Alliance into something North American. Nevertheless, as a Latin American answer to Latin American problems, the Alliance was responsive to concerns which had preoccupied some of the region's most reflective élites for decades. This quest for autonomy does not necessarily mean an irrational rejection of suggestions from abroad, but a conviction that solutions must be molded to fit local contexts and that foreign rather than Latin American interests dominate initiatives so far taken by the developed countries. "Escape from dependence" is a common theme in what is sometimes called "regional nationalism."

Recently this outlook has gathered new strength. The Peruvian expropriation of the International Petroleum Corporation and Chile's new policies toward the Anaconda Company are responses to popular aspirations for control over basic natural resources. Peru's staunch defense of its territorial waters to a 200-mile limit, firmly backed by Ecuador and Chile, is linked not only to the economic significance of Peru's role as the world's leading fishing nation but to the defense of national dignity. More significant than these actions has been the initiative by the Latin American countries, through the Special Commission for Latin American Coördination (CECLA), in informing the United States what they want rather than waiting supinely for Washington to determine its policy to the south. The frank comments of Colombia's President Lleras and Chile's Foreign Minister Valdés to President Nixon, and the harsh criticisms of the Rockefeller Mission in the Latin American press, all reflect a

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festering irritation and impatience, even among moderates, for greater independence of action.

The Church fits into this context. Like certain other Latin American institutions, it has had to work its way out of traditional perspectives and functions bound to the underdeveloped past, through a stage of almost uncritical adoption of guidance from outside sources whose financial backing, power and technical competence seemed to hold the key to renovation and development. The next stage, into which some Latin American institutions appear already to be moving, is likely to be based on greater self-analysis and reliance on internal resources.

For the Latin American Church such maturation has implications not only for public policy but for the renewal of Christian life. As a young Chilean bishop describes it, "The Chilean Church presently depends on foreign money, foreign clergy, foreign ideas. The reconstruction of the Church will begin when it has to depend on itself." Autonomy for the Latin American Church means independence not only from the developed nations but from Rome as well. At the bishops' synod held in Rome in October 1969, Latin Americans were among the leading spokesmen for greater freedom of decision.

Not surprisingly, those with innovating social and economic views often have critical suggestions for the Church as well. In the past, the values, contacts and support of the Church tended to mirror the power structure. The proposals for a new Church represent a reversal of tradition. In contrast with the posture of strength from which the Church operated—socially prestigious, friendly with the oligarchy, exaggerating the Catholic commitment of the population—the critics hope for a weak and poor Church, humble and rooted in the lower classes, dynamized by small groups acting with strong conviction to better society. Fundamentally, they believe that the Church should recognize its minority status, as representing a small number of profound Christians in a religiously diversified and secularizing region.

If the real Church is a minority, it must be doubted that Catholicism has a special mission to "save" Latin America through organizations of Christian inspiration like the Christian Democratic Party. This insight, that much "progressive" Catholic action represents an attempt to establish a "new Christendom," originated with the Brazilians prior to 1964 and is gaining ever wider acceptance among thoughtful Churchmen. The next step

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is a policy of coöperation with other groups which share a concern for Latin American autonomy, economic development and drastic social change. These may include, and in some instances have included, Marxist groups, though the Marxist-Catholic alliance should not be exaggerated as a dominant motif. Many Catholics now hold a set of convictions that may be shared by communists but are also held by many non-communists as well: (1) development requires control of vital natural resources by Latin Americans; (2) public control of key sectors of the economy is preferable to private control; (3) Latin Americans must unite to prevent violations of their sovereignty based on ignorance of local reality, such as the American invasion of the Dominican Republic or the continued blockade of Cuba; (4) the majority of the population should acquire a critical awareness and establish organizations through which they, rather than the minority, can exert political pressure on issues of public policy. Given these principles, common activity with leftists and hostility to aspects of the United States presence in Latin America are natural corollaries. If Catholics now use such catchwords as "imperialism" and "colonialism" with reference to the United States and "class struggle" to describe their social structure, it is because Marx, who is a respected sociologist in many parts of the underdeveloped world, offers a set of categories that make sense to them.

IV

The most recent statement of the bishops, that issued by CELAM at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, is entitled, "The Church in the Present Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the [Vatican] Council." It illustrates how themes once considered radical are now acquiring authoritative respectability as part of the consensus. Even though it suffers from the ambiguity typical of episcopal pronouncements, the Medellin document reveals the domination of a relatively advanced group of bishops in its formulation. In contrast with attitudes of only a few years ago, the Medellin document avoids any pretense of giving "Christian answers" or assuming that the Church has a special solution to Latin American problems. Rather, the bishops insist that they merely want the Church to participate with other institutions in what is described as a given process of transformation.

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Gone, too, is the long familiar anti-Marxist tone. To be sure, many bishops personally continue to consider communism the chief problem in Latin America, but the document, in its section on "International Tensions and External Neo-Colonialism," deals with something else: "the consequences for our countries entailed by their dependence on an external center of power, around which they gravitate." After referring to the depreciation of the benefits of international commerce for underdeveloped countries and criticizing the flight of capital, remission of profits and dividends, progressive indebtedness from borrowing and international monopolies, the document denounces "imperialism of any ideological type, which may be exercised in Latin America in an indirect form and even with direct interventions." The reference is clear. It contrasts with the sense of affinity toward the developed countries common in the Church only a few years ago. In questioning the virtues of private foreign capital and the effects of external financing, it reflects the belief of critical Catholics that anti-Marxism had obscured a more fundamental problem—the relations of Latin America with the United States and other developed countries.

The general diagnosis of Latin American problems in the Medellin statement is not unique, nor does it provide technical answers. These lie outside the competence of the Church. "Our contribution does not intend to compete . . . with our national, Latin American, or world organizations, much less reject or ignore them. Our purpose is to stimulate effort, accelerate accomplishments, deepen content, and penetrate the whole process of change with evangelical values." The Church, as a molder of consciences and an interest group, supports the contributions of other public and private institutions.

It views its special mission as "contributing to the integral promotion of man and the communities of the continent." Integral promotion refers to the fulfillment of man's multiple possibilities and responsibilities, while the focus on communities mirrors the long-time organic or "solidary" way in which the Church has viewed society. Though the latter stress has affinities with the corporativism of an earlier era, the bishops insist that the structures between person and government must be "organized freely, without undue intervention of the authority and dominating groups."

Related to "integral promotion," but representing a genuine

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innovation, is the focus on "awakening of consciousness" (or in its original Portuguese form, *conscientização*). This concept, which developed in radical Catholic circles in Brazil after 1960, refers to the transformation of the passive, exploited lower classes into conscious and critical masters of their own destinies. In its original form it implied a shift of power to the lower class, but as it spread it underwent some reduction of its revolutionary implications for social change. The bishops in the Medellin document frequently use the term in a somewhat diluted sense, as "awakening consciousness and community habits in all professional circles and groups."

The more vigorous sense of *conscientização,* however, appears in the section on education, a field in which an able group of advisers has encouraged CELAM to adopt advanced and innovating ideas. The Medellin document is clearly inspired by the views of Professor Paulo Freire, a Brazilian exile who is Latin America's most creative educational philosopher. Criticizing schooling at all levels, it concludes that schools are "more preoccupied with the transmission of knowledge than with the creation, among other values, of a critical spirit. From the social point of view, the educational systems are oriented to maintaining the existing social and economic structures instead of transforming them." The alternative proposed is "liberating education," which endows the student with some control over his own development; it should be "creative" and anticipate "the new type of society which we are seeking in Latin America." The Church "feels particular solidarity with every educational force tending to liberate our peoples." One can scarcely imagine a sharper reversal of traditional Catholic pedagogical concepts.

On economics, the statement criticizes both "liberal capitalism" and Marxism, for both systems "violate the dignity of the human person, since one has as presupposition the primacy of capital . . . in function of profit, while the other . . . in practice becomes a totalitarian concentration of power in the state." According to the bishops, economic enterprises should be "fundamentally a community of persons and unity of work, which need capital for the production of goods." They look with sympathy on coöperatives, ownership of capital by workers, and participation of labor representatives in managerial decisions as steps toward the new economic order which is usually called "communitarianism."

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The bishops reject violence as an instrument of social change. While recognizing the justice in many arguments of those who advocate it, they insist that "justice, and consequently peace, will be achieved through a dynamic action of awakening consciousness and organization of the popular sectors, so that they can then urge the public powers, who are often impotent in their social projects without popular support." This position comes at a time when many Catholics, especially youth, have lost faith in nonviolent solutions. The alternative proposed by the bishops represents a significant advance over older positions, which emphasized reasonable, harmonious discussion as the legitimate means of overcoming injustice. Popular awakening and organization point explicitly to pressure by the lower classes as an instrument for defending their interests and sharing more fully in social decisions. Since one of the most obvious weaknesses of much traditional Catholic social thought was its failure to recognize the role of pressure and conflict in constructive change, *conscientização* represents a noteworthy breakthrough in this area.

Finally, the discussion of family planning deserves some mention. Here the bishops, no matter what they personally think, had to conform to the declarations of Pope Paul VI. The document fails to face frankly the need for family planning as part of economic development. Nevertheless, family planning is progressing at an encouraging pace. Even though some hierarchies have criticized family planning programs, nowhere is the Church carrying out a concerted campaign against them; key Catholic leaders support them; and in practice the Church has worked out ways of evading the official position to which it must give a nod. Lower-class women generally do not know the position of the Church and, if they do, ignore it. The most effective government program of family planning in the region is sponsored by Chile's Christian Democratic government, while the fastest growing may be found in traditional Colombia. In practice, modern Catholic élites believe that the Pope is wrong on this issue and that a future pontiff will modify it.

V

It should now be clear why simple generalizations about the Catholic role in Latin America are hazardous. The directions of élite action and official thought are in transition. Catholics know that the Church is not simply a structure to which they adapt

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themselves, but a community from which its members derive motivation and, ever more frequently, a critical outlook which is impatient for development, tired of injustice, resentful of outside paternalism. Just as the Church provides a perspective forcing its élites into criticism and action, the conscientious decisions Catholics make, in turn, reshape the consensus articulated by major spokesmen. Such a dynamic interaction cannot be encapsulated into a sharply defined contribution of the Church to Latin American development. In the final analysis, that contribution is made up of the actions of Catholics.

Nevertheless, as an institution with a position, the Church seems certain to share in the regional consensus favoring nonviolent change. Although it understands the necessity of economic development and supports it, the technical aspects of economic growth lie outside its professed competence and restrict action to a few trained individuals. The Church, therefore, has postulated for itself a special vocation in social development—criticizing injustice and carrying out programs for popular participation in social benefits and political decisions. If "regional nationalism" gathers strength in the major Latin American countries, the Church, while sympathizing with it, may have an important impact by insisting that governments dedicate themselves not only to national autonomy but to serious reform.

The important contribution of Latin American Catholicism to our understanding of social change, *conscientização*, will then assume a decisive significance. Latin America is underdeveloped, not only because it does not produce enough, but because the majority of the people cannot and do not know how to participate in national life. Just as the quest for self-definition of a minority, the Black *conscientização*, is shaking the United States today, the "awakening of consciousness" among Latin America's majority will have even more revolutionary, unpredictable consequences. In this process, which cannot be postponed indefinitely, Catholics and the Church may have a formative role. The maturity of thoughtful Latin American Catholics is most aptly symbolized by their recognition that this awakening should not be guided by "Christian principles," but that Latin Americans, who are people before they are Catholics, will define their own style of emancipation.

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GREECE UNDER THE COLONELS

By C. L. Sulzberger

THERE have been three widely separated political Greeces: the ancient city-states, the Byzantine empire and modern Greece, which won its independence from the Turks less than a century and a half ago. In essence, there is little relationship between the governance of these three Greeces but, because of classical influence on contemporary education and because the early Athenians were so gifted in defining and elaborating systems of thought, there is a persistent tendency to regard contemporary Greece in terms of its antique glory. Nowadays above all, when the country is governed by a stolid group of Colonels, it is fashionable to decry dictatorship in the birthplace of democracy.

"Democracy" is, of course, a Greek word and a Greek invention although the democracy made famous in the Athens of the fifth century BC was economically founded on slavery, and Plato's "Republic" is in fact a treatise on elementary fascism. Moreover, one should not forget that "anarchy," "tyranny," "despotism" and, above all, "chaos" are also Greek words, to say nothing of "demagogue." Actually, as Aristotle pointed out: "The forms of government are four—democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and monarchy; and hence the power that governs and decides in them is always some part or the whole of each."

None of the three stages of Greece—classical, medieval or modern—has been famed for good government, very possibly because the Greeks are too intelligent, too unruly and too self-seeking to submit easily to the dictates of others. Few recent Greek statesmen have qualified as able to produce sustained stability in an inherently unstable nation. It can be argued that Constantine Caramanlis, Prime Minister from 1955 to 1963, headed the most successful modern administration but was too vain to accept political defeat, and instead of leading a parliamentary opposition—as Churchill had done in England—he departed in a huff for voluntary exile.

II

The disappearance of Caramanlis left no one with the prestige or personality to unite the center and right-wing majority that

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dominated Greek opinion after the bloody Civil War ended in 1949. George Papandreou, who took over the Prime Ministry after the 1963 elections, sought to capitalize on his popularity and oratorical skill by winning the center to an alliance with liberal opinion and to consolidate his position by social and agricultural reforms which risked the fiscal stability created under Caramanlis. He was a conventional type of Greek politician, a good speaker, a subtle behind-the-scenes operator and, although not above rabble-rousing techniques, an undoubted patriot, a middle-of-the-road man and an anti-communist.

Such moderation was not demonstrated by George Papandreou's son, Andreas, who rose to considerable eminence during the years of his father's Prime Ministry and, as a Minister, put his finger in many other pies including that of KYP, the Central Intelligence Agency. Andreas was not on close terms with his father as a youth; his parents were separated. During the Metaxas dictatorship before the war, when still in his teens, he joined a left-wing student organization, was caught and arrested. According to Constantine Maniadakis, then Minister of the Interior, he informed on his associates. In any case his mother pleaded for his release, which was granted on condition the young man leave the country. A wealthy shipping magnate (father-in-law of Stavros Niarchos) generously paid for Andreas's move to the United States, where he eventually became an economics professor and an American citizen.

Andreas Papandreou returned to Greece under the Caramanlis régime. When the local political picture began to fascinate him, he gave up his American passport and started to display increasing hostility to the United States. Exceedingly ambitious, he seemed to sense that the future might hold promise for any politician seeking to unite a coalition of youth, underground communists, the non-communist left, anti-Americans and the anti-royalists who had always been an important element in recent Greek history.

In July 1965, Andreas told me: "I would like to be Prime Minister, but I won't violate my principles to be one. My father loves me as a son, but my unbending tendencies have caused him trouble. I am a tough nut. He felt I was going overboard. He has not supported me politically as his successor. In fact, he has gone the other way. After George Papandreou, I have the widest popular base in Greece. I do not need George Papandreou."

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That summer the King eased the elder Papandreou out of office and installed a succession of weak governments in an effort to disintegrate the Papandreist Center Union majority in Parliament. This tactic did not work well. King Constantine, who was only 23 and had come to the throne suddenly after his father's death, was counseled by close advisers to intervene in the deteriorating political situation. Subtle arguments were adduced for the constitutionality of this intervention and, when the elder Papandreou tried to name himself Minister of Defense as well as Prime Minister (so that he could head an investigation into an army plot to which Andreas allegedly was linked) the King moved in. Andreas seized the opportunity to edge his father increasingly out of the public eye. He helped to foster mass demonstrations in which the communist underground and its permitted *locum tenens,* a far-left party called *EDA,* enthusiastically collaborated.

III

Constantine's intervention was certainly not a success. Greece had originally become a monarchy after shrugging off the Turks "so that all division and rivalry for preference should cease among us." Unfortunately, this form of government, even when mixed according to the Aristotelian formula, failed to pacify the fractious, fickle Greeks. King Othon was expelled in 1862. King George I was assassinated in 1913. King Constantine I was twice deposed—temporarily in 1917 and permanently in 1922. Constantine's son reigned briefly before dying from a monkey bite. George II was unseated in 1924 when a republic was proclaimed. He returned as king in 1935 and reigned with maximum difficulty for twelve years before dying. His brother Paul succeeded but died early, in 1964. Constantine II, the present ruler, was promptly faced with crisis and eventually by the military coup d'état on April 21, 1967. The young King tried to overthrow the consequent dictatorship by his own countercoup eight months later but failed. He flew off to exile in Rome.

The current fashion is to decry the military coup as a rape of democracy. Indeed it was; but democracy in Greece is no virgin. There had already been eight military revolutions or coups d'état since World War I: the revolution of Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas (1922); the abortive counterrevolution of Generals Gargalides and Leonardopoulos in 1923; the coup d'état

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of General Pangalos in 1925; the coup d'état of General Condylis in 1926; the abortive coup d'état of General Plastiras in 1933; the abortive Venizelist rebellion in 1935; and the dictatorial coup of General Metaxas in 1936. Besides, the last two generations have featured innumerable minor acts of sedition and constant intervention of military juntas in governmental affairs. It seems impossible to keep the Greek army out of politics.

The postwar army had been riddled with secret societies and, although the King sought constantly to keep it on his side, a good deal was going on which even the King's men didn't know. To begin with, there was an extreme right-wing group called *Chi,* which, as World War II was ending, conducted a murderous vendetta against communists. There was *Pericles,* another conservative officers' organization; *Aspida,* a small left-wing army conspiracy; and, the best-known of all, *Idea.*

Idea stands for ieros (holy), desmos (band), ellinon (Greek), axiomatikon (officers), and was formed among officers who had fled to the Middle East from occupied Greece during World War II. Its creator and chief was Lieutenant General Solon Ghikas, Chief of the Army General Staff at the time of his retirement in 1956. Ghikas, a small, stocky man with shrewd eyes, pointed features and toothbrush mustache, is still alive, 71, active and keenly interested in events. At one time he was a minister in the Caramanlis government. *Idea* was thoroughly anti-communist, pro-King and basically pro-Caramanlis (although the latter had his own running feud with the Palace). *Idea* became a kind of holding company for the Greek high command. All Lieutenant Generals (the highest rank except for the honorary title of Field Marshal awarded to Alexander Papagos) were or had been members. Although *Idea* had faded into inactivity, its fraternal band of Lieutenant Generals on the Supreme Military Council decided in 1967 to "interfere" in the political situation when the King's effort to disintegrate the Papandreists had clearly failed and he had been forced into calling elections in May of that year. It was feared Andreas Papandreou would become a dominant force and lead the country out of NATO toward a neutralist or pro-Soviet posture.

A month prior to the scheduled election, Andreas Papandreou announced a mass meeting in Salonika, and shortly thereafter the Supreme Military Council met under the presidency of General Spandidakis to decide whether to "interfere" before or after

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the Salonika demonstration, which, it was feared, might lead to a violent leftist take-over. However, while all the Lieutenant Generals agreed that action was necessary, they disagreed on the timing; in the end, a majority voted to move only after the demonstration. General Zoetakis, then commanding the Third Army Corps in Salonika, immediately gave a warning of what was ahead to a secret junta of Colonels who had been conspiring in the shadow of the Generals. Actually they had been planning a coup d'état for at least eleven years.

During this crucial period, few people had any idea that a tightly disciplined handful of Colonels was waiting in the wings to seize the country. Some of them were individually known to diplomats—especially George Papadopoulos, once a key man in Intelligence—and all were of course known to the Generals; but nobody was aware of the extent or effectiveness of their underground organization.

As early as 1956, when General Nicolopoulos headed the Supreme Military Council, he had informed the other Generals that a group of officers was organizing a political plot within the army, and he named as conspirators George Papadopoulos (present Prime Minister), Nicholas Makarezos (one of the top triumvirate) and John Ladas (a security specialist and member of today's 12-man Revolutionary Council). The Generals were skeptical and refused the severe measures proposed by Nicolopoulos, although they did agree to transfer the suspects to positions in which they did not command any units.

In 1958 Nicolopoulos called a special Council meeting with the sole purpose of discussing the same group of field officers whom he accused of "trying to mix the army into a conspiracy." He requested the other Generals to agree to retire the suspects, but the Council again refused, claiming they all had excellent records and the evidence was inconclusive. This was a principal reason for Nicolopoulos's resignation in September 1958. He was succeeded by General Siridakis, who dropped the issue. In 1959 General Kardamakis succeeded as Council president and actually promoted the suspects, making Makarezos chief of his personal staff. After the coup Kardamakis was given a comfortable position as head of the National Power Authority.

When Zoetakis passed down word in April 1967 that the Generals were not going to move immediately, the Colonels decided to strike. Papadopoulos had been their guiding genius from the

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start, even during earlier days when first General Balas, then General Patilis (now a Deputy Prime Minister) had been formally acknowledged as the Colonels' leader. The operation led by Papadopoulos moved under the code name "Prometheus."

Prometheus, as a matter of fact, was simply the label of a contingency plan prepared in the Athens general headquarters, which Greeks proudly call "the Pentagon." It had been accepted as part of NATO's response in the event of war with a communist country. Prometheus foresaw, in the event of such a war, the need for swiftly rounding up communist leaders and other security suspects, as well as for taking over key points such as radio stations, airfields and communications centers. The purpose of the original plan was, of course, to prevent a coup d'état, not to promote one. But Papadopoulos had seen how easily this purpose could be perverted to his purposes. Two things were necessary: the first was to move enough tanks around Athens to ensure speedy capture of all key points. This was prepared by the plotters' senior officer, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos (now first Deputy Prime Minister), who headed the armored training center and commanded the only tanks near Athens (the rest being on guard along the northern borders).

The second was to win the allegiance of a high authority who would issue, over his own name, orders implementing the Prometheus contingency plan. Such became the role of Lieutenant General Gregorios Spandidakis, Chief of Staff, who defected at the last moment from his colleagues on the Supreme Military Council. As the Junta believed Spandidakis could not be relied upon to act without the King's approval, he was informed of the plot only at the very last minute. He was then persuaded to issue orders for Prometheus in order to avoid risk of clashes between army units. Spandidakis was right when he told me just after the operation: "The coup succeeded totally all over Greece, and in three hours, only because orders for executing it had been issued by the Chief of Staff himself." It was not exactly a proud boast. Spandidakis was temporarily rewarded with a Deputy Premiership but now is on the shelf.

IV

When the Colonels struck it was widely assumed that this was another instance of traditional pro-royalist military intervention. It had been known that Constantine was increasingly inclined

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to listen to those of his generals who urged an army take-over. Even when old George Papandreou was bustled off to arrest, the former Prime Minister was convinced this was a monarchist generals' plot in reaction to his son's excessive activities. That night of April 21–22, he told a friend locked up in the same detention center that he had often warned Andreas to quiet down and couldn't blame the King for his high-handed reaction. Yet Constantine was as surprised as anyone by the Colonels' coup.

At 2:15 a.m., April 22, the King had just dozed off in the country palace at Tatoi, some miles from Athens, when his friend and secretary, Major Arnautis, telephoned: "They are smashing my door with guns." "Who?" the King asked. "I don't know," Arnautis shouted. Constantine said: "Hold on. I am coming to help you." "For God's sake, don't come," screamed Arnautis. "Call the police. Have they announced anything to you? What's the army doing? I am trying to get reinforcements sent up to Tatoi." Before the King knew what was happening the house of his mother, Queen Frederika, had been surrounded by tanks; his supporter, Premier Canellopoulos, had been menaced with tommy-guns; Arnautis was pistol-whipped; and almost all telephones were cut. George Rallis, a pro-monarchist Minister, managed to reach Tatoi by telephoning from a suburban police station and the King told him to try to get the army in the North down to Athens. However, within minutes Tatoi was also surrounded by tanks. A short while later Papadopoulos, Makarezos and Pattakos arrived at the Palace to tell young Constantine: "The coup was done in your name in order to save the country." When the furious King demanded: "Where is my Prime Minister? Where is my government?" Pattakos answered: "You have none; we have arrested them all."

Later that morning the King drove to "the Pentagon" and confronted the rebel leaders, demanding the prompt release of Arnautis, Canellopoulos and others. He insisted that civilians be included in any new government and a little-known but esteemed conservative named Kollias was made Prime Minister. When the Colonels initially protested that Washington was on their side, young Constantine rejoined: "Obviously you are mad. Certainly the Americans are not on your side. Remember the case of Argentina? When the army took over there the United States withdrew its ambassador. The way you are going, you are bound to fail and you will isolate Greece from its friends." Con-

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stantine cautioned Pattakos, the new Interior Minister: "I hold you personally responsible that no drop of blood shall be shed and no politician shall be harmed." Constantine refused to sign any document legalizing the coup and took special pains to warn against any thought of executing Andreas Papandreou, saying: "No executions. Remember you can't execute politicians." Pattakos replied: "Turks we shall never become."

So much for the legend, assiduously spread by opponents of the United States, especially Andreas Papandreou, that the coup was American-inspired and that both the King and Washington were privy to it. Also, incidentally, Papandreou's life was saved by Constantine's prompt intervention and not, as has been widely affirmed, by the later intervention of foreign liberals. I saw him at the time, in the little hotel at Pikermi where he and about 30 other opponents of the Junta (including prominent communists) were being held under heavy guard. I wrote: "He put on a gallant front but he looked a tiny bit grey around the mouth and couldn't keep his hands still the way it sometimes happens when people are frightened. He admitted that he had been wholly surprised by the coup. He was fast asleep when a ring at the door was followed by the door itself bursting inward. Taken to a military headquarters, he was held there 20 hours. A doctor dressed his injuries (a minor foot cut suffered during arrest). After less than a day he was brought out here and has nothing to complain of—except lack of freedom." Subsequently Andreas was released and allowed to leave Greece; he has since been working hard from abroad to achieve the Junta's overthrow. Cold-shouldered by the exiled leaders gathered around Constantine and Caramanlis, he signed a joint pact with Antonis Brillakis, a communist activist leader who had escaped to Italy.

The next phase of this unpleasant tale was the King's unfortunate countercoup of December 1967. Constantine had no illusions about the Colonels and had been in discreet touch with certain of his generals. General Peridis, principal commander in the North, assured him he could seize Salonika with its key communications and radio station by 11:00 a.m. on December 13, the day selected for the attempt. Early that morning Constantine sent his military aide (a stooge of the Colonels) on a phony assignment, summoned Prime Minister Kollias to Tatoi, virtually kidnapped him and his wife's physician (the Queen was pregnant) and flew off to the North. But Peridis had been

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wrong; Salonika remained in the Colonels' hands; and by late the next day it was evident that the uprising had failed. The King fled to Rome with his family and has lived there ever since.

During the ensuing twenty-two months the situation has stultified. Constantine sought, from Italy, to rally liberal support but he has not been notably successful. He has so far refused to consider returning to Athens, as suggested by some royalists, including Foreign Minister Pipinellis, insisting that first the Colonels must implement their Constitution, restore press freedom and indicate when there will be free parliamentary elections (both of which remain suspended). But all contacts between the King and the Junta (including three talks by the King with Pipinellis last summer) have been fruitless. While most of the Colonels still decorate their offices with portraits of the King and Queen (as well as their Phoenix symbol), they seem in no hurry to bring Constantine back on any terms.

I am reminded that Franco in 1946, thirteen years before he designated Prince Juan Carlos (Constantine's brother-in-law) as his eventual successor, assured me he was a monarchist and implied that he would eventually hand over the reins to Don Juan, Count of Barcelona, the father of the boy-Prince. Franco waited so long that Juan Carlos grew up, became legally eligible and politically tame. This may be the formula the Colonels hope to apply to Constantine and his baby son, Prince Paul.

The Junta, headed by Papadopoulos, who is clearly the boss, has been consolidating its position. Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos comprise a triumvirate at the top, just under the actual dictatorship of Papadopoulos. The next highest echelon of the Junta is the twelve-man Revolutionary Council. Only three of these twelve remain on active military duty; the rest have retired.

On the whole the Colonels have stuck together remarkably well despite constant rumors of friction. In 1968 two officers named Gadonas and Karydas were supposed to be in the Revolutionary Council and seem to have been dropped. Below the top echelon of the Council itself, it is believed a second group of twelve subordinates exists; and beneath them a less organized body of junior officers, widely known as "the Captains," bringing to about sixty the controlling group of officers, retired and active. No one can be entirely sure of this hierarchical order because Papadopoulos has managed to impress on all his colleagues

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the need for strict secrecy, an unusual phenomenon among Greeks. The battalion commanders around Athens are proven loyalists.

So far there is no valid hint that Papadopoulos is in the slightest hurry to restore freedom. Once he told me that the régime might be called Guided Democracy. Eventually, he said, Parliament would be brought back, with certain safety features neutralizing weaknesses of the past. But applying the old Aristotelian definition, the régime contains more oligarchy (the New Class of field officers) than aristocracy, monarchy or, above all, democracy. Its administration has been tough, but inefficient and confused. It has not managed to attract many of the nation's élite to help govern.

Greek society has slowly congealed. Public administration and education have deteriorated. The press has been stupidly censored and is now too wary to experiment with a theoretical easement of restrictions. The Constitution exists only in theory; the reality is martial law. Informers and police agents are everywhere. Only by the expedient of expensive short-term borrowing instead of cheap long-term loans have the currency and economy been kept apparently stable. While many businessmen profess content with the absence of strikes, the normally disputatious Greeks are in general sullen and silent. Afraid of the Colonels' policemen or fearful of a return to chaos, many of them refrain from commenting on the régime. This is abnormal in a nation which inherited from Solon a law which ordained that "he shall be disfranchised who, in time of faction, takes neither side."

V

It is hard to see how the Colonels are going to be ousted unless they fall out among themselves; and there is no evidence yet to signal such a quarrel. Papadopoulos seems to enjoy encouraging rumors of disputes within his Revolutionary Council, primarily in order to use these reports as proof that his colleagues would not tolerate such moves as announcing a date for elections or bringing back the King. Furthermore, the opposition both inside and outside Greece is more divided than it appears. Inside the country only the Center Union element, headed by the relatively conservative Mavros, accepts the national leadership proposed by Caramanlis; abroad, Andreas Papandreou and Brillakis lead a left-wing outflanking movement aimed against both Cara-

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manlis and the King. One prominent politician, the pro-Caramanlis former Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, argues that the only way out is for the opposition to collaborate with the Colonels and arrange a basis for at least a small minority opposition in a future parliament.

The Colonels have had several windfalls. The Arab-Israeli war, Soviet naval expansion in the Mediterranean, and the Libyan coup d'état have combined to make the U.S. Sixth Fleet depend more heavily on Greece's harbors and airfields. Spiro Agnew is seen by the Colonels as a pro-Hellenic asset of no mean proportions. And the neo-isolationist mood in America permits the Administration to pursue a passive policy toward Athens despite the exhortations of those who are doves over Viet Nam yet hawks over Greece. The communist underground is playing a cautionary game, leaving bomb-throwing and pamphlet-distributing largely to liberals and conservatives.

Papadopoulos has drastically purged the armed forces of the King's men and, by giving pay raises and other economic favors to loyalist officers and NCOs, has obtained a certain amount of well-positioned personal backing. There is no doubt that his régime is harsh, although most impartial observers do not think that those who are in prison or restricted liberty for political reasons today number more than twice as many as were held under the last George Papandreou government. Nor do I believe that torture is official policy, although gendarmes and especially Ioannidis' military police have sometimes been ruthlessly brutal.

Unhappily, Washington is criticized by all sides in this intricate dispute. Andreas Papandreou and the communists claim the Colonels were installed by the CIA and are supported by the White House. Caramanlis and other exiles earnestly insist that if Washington embargoes all arms shipments to Greece—not just heavy weapons—the army will rise up and the government will fall (which I personally do not believe). Even King Constantine felt he was snubbed by President Nixon when he attended Eisenhower's funeral.

It is my own feeling that we must carefully distinguish between military policy toward a member of the NATO alliance and political policy toward Greece as a nation. As we learned to our embarrassment in Portugal, a country can contribute help (in that case the Azores) even if we don't like its ideology. Greece as a key component of NATO's Southeastern Command

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deserves the weapons available to other allies, including more modern tanks, guns and aircraft now held up by executive decision. An M-48 tank is no more useful against hostile crowds than an M-47, but it is certainly more useful against potential external enemies.

Policy-making is a cold, calculating business. It must be remembered that the best-organized political force in Greece today is, unhappily, Papadopoulos's purged army. If the Junta gets truly disillusioned with Washington, it retains the option of turning toward Moscow. This may sound like nonsense in light of the violently anti-communist professions of the Colonels and their emphasis on Discipline, Order, Nationalism and Christianity. Nevertheless, I remember how hostile Nasser was to Russia in the early 1950s when he held his own Marxists in jail. He told me "all communists are thieves" and stressed his allegiance to Islam which, our experts insisted, could never tolerate accommodation with Marxism. It should not be forgotten that, although the communists inside Greece are today remarkably quiet, and many of their number are locked up, all the communist nations with which Greece had relations before the 1967 coup still have their embassies open and maintain excellent, even cordial, relations.

Nevertheless, apart from the important matter of arms, the United States has every legal right and moral obligation to continue stressing disapproval of the régime and to urge moderation and return to democratic methods. American officers—who are photographed far too often with Junta officials—should be discouraged from going to Greece except when plainly necessary and should be instructed to eschew all political conversations. And every member of the large U.S. embassy staff should be officially ordered to echo Washington's own distaste for dictatorship. Pressure of this sort is legitimate and desirable. The point to emphasize is that promises of reform with no date attached are not acceptable. American policy should take account of the fact that although Papadopoulos was able to seize power and hold it, he still has been unable to demonstrate that he knows what to do with it.

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CUBA REVISITED
AFTER TEN YEARS OF CASTRO

By Viator

A RUSSIAN oil tanker moves slowly past the sixteenth-century Spanish castle guarding the narrow entrance to Havana harbor. Castle and tanker symbolize dominion, but of very different kinds. To the Spaniards, Cuba was first and foremost a source of wealth—its own wealth and the wealth of Latin America to which it held the strategic key. To the Russians, it represents an economic loss on the order of some $350 to $400 million a year. The payoff for them is in the coin of political strategy: an extension of the frontiers of communism to the Western Hemisphere.

How real these political dividends are is a question to which, for reasons touched on later in this article, the Kremlin must revert with increasing frequency. Meanwhile the tankers come and go, bringing in more than 95 percent of Cuba's growing oil requirements—a reminder to the Cubans that if they control their destiny more surely now than they did during the four centuries of Spanish rule, the control is still far from absolute. And to control their own destiny is above all else what the leaders of this intensely nationalist régime want to do. "We have known," said Castro last year, "the bitterness of having to depend on others and how this can be turned into a weapon against us." That Cuba should pay her way in the world, as independent of the Soviet Union as of Spain or the United States, is for the militant revolutionary an objective no less important than a higher standard of living. To achieve either, and certainly to achieve both, requires of the Cuban people an initial period of heavy sacrifice.

Austerity then is the first thing that hits the Western visitor—and it is a stunning blow for one who knew Havana before the Revolution. The miniature Manhattan skyline along the seafront is still an incomparable sight as the sun goes down; the shabbiness fades into silhouette pricked out with lights, and the tropical night seems full of promise. But the promise is unlikely to be fulfilled. Behind the familiar façade the bars and nightclubs are shuttered throughout the working week; dimly lit shops reveal empty shelves; skeletal cars clank homewards among the over-

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crowded buses. The queues are for ice cream and cinemas. Early next morning they will form for the necessities of life.

That food and clothing should be rationed in an underdeveloped country where over 30 percent of gross national product goes to investment is hardly surprising. But it is difficult to argue on balance-of-payments grounds that pleasure needs to be so strictly rationed. Cabaret girls are homegrown; they cost no foreign exchange—and indeed could earn a little from the trickle of tourists. No, this aspect of austerity is the product not of economic policy but of a puritan reaction against the license of the past and a frenetic sense of urgency on the part of the leaders; time taken off from the building of the new society is time wasted.

The puritanism dovetails into the social and economic strategy of the régime. Castro wants to get people out of the towns, partly because he believes that spiritual regeneration comes from working the soil, but also for the more practical reason that, after an abortive attempt to industrialize during the early years of the Revolution, agriculture is now recognized as the basis of the economy and needs to have labor more readily available. The last thing he wants, therefore, is to increase the attractions of the town. "More ruralism, less urbanism" is the slogan.

It is a difficult slogan to put into effect. Building resources are already overstretched; there is little to spare from the construction of new schools, hospitals, farms and factories. A target of 100,000 new living units a year has been quietly abandoned, and at the present rate it will be many years before homes can be provided in the country for any significant proportion of the urban population. Meanwhile, agriculture claims the "voluntary" labor of the townspeople for limited periods at a time, ranging from a weekend to a couple of months. Thus the visitor to Havana, while he may look in vain for the sophisticated animation of the past, will be aware of a constant bustle of departure and arrival; and though he is entitled to be dubious about the voluntary character of this movement, he may well be impressed by the cheerfulness with which those caught up in it pile into their trucks and drive off to the Spartan encampments awaiting them.

Such signs of *alegria,* however spasmodic, prompt the question whether the Cubans have in some remarkable way contrived a form of communism without tears. Has this dreary creed

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been transmuted in the Caribbean crucible? At first sight a negative answer is suggested by the fact that, since the Revolution, hundreds of thousands of Cubans have abandoned their possessions and started life afresh in the United States; and there are many more waiting to follow their example. But to regard this as a massive vote against communism is an oversimplification. The Revolution was by no means committed to communism when the first wave of refugees left. They went because they saw no hope of coming to terms with the radicalism of the Revolution and were afraid of being victimized. What then are the motives of those leaving today? It is difficult to generalize, but the evidence available suggests that the majority are going primarily because they find the conditions of life too hard. They condemn the system not because it is undemocratic or indifferent to human rights (it is both), but because it fails to deliver the goods. If they could be sure of being better fed, clothed and housed, they would stay. If this analysis is anywhere near correct, it is hard to argue that communism as such is anathema to the majority of the Cuban people. To all appearances at any rate, the creed (in so far as it is understood) sits lightly.

The reasons for this acquiescent attitude are to be sought in the Cuban character. It is sometimes said that the Cubans are individualists to the point of not bothering about abstract social principles or political theory; and there may be something in this. But to the outside observer the most striking characteristic of the Cuban is the human warmth which enables him to fit easily into the life of his community. The Cuban may not love his neighbor as himself, but he makes a better shot at it than most. A social conscience of a kind exists: the concept of social justice gets more than lip service from some at least of those whose material interests it threatens, however much they may disagree with the methods used to introduce it. Moreover, the gregarious instinct of the Cuban makes regimentation less irksome than it would otherwise be. The communal activities of the mass organizations—membership is hard to avoid—are not wholly unenjoyable. Add to this a sense of humor which the authorities are wise enough not to stifle (jokes against the régime are permitted in the theatre, for instance); an absence, within the limits of decorum, of any such sexual repression as is imposed by the Chinese Revolution; a benign climate; a natural resilience in adversity; and a new sense of national pride and dignity. The

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net result is a state of morale which, without being buoyant, does not sag too badly either. Deprived of so much, the Cubans are like unspoiled children, taking inordinate pleasure in simple things.

But while it can be said that Cuban communism presents a less unattractive face than communism elsewhere, there are no good grounds for believing that it is fundamentally different in character or that the human material is in any way unique. The "new man" who will give of his best without the stimulus of material incentive is likely to prove no less of a chimera in Cuba than elsewhere. The acquisitive instinct of *Homo Cubanus* is dormant because there is nothing to acquire. To suppose that it will die out altogether before the long-promised increase in consumer goods requires an act of faith of which few people are capable.

There is no early prospect of this being put to the test. The Cuban economy is still in a straitjacket. But the impression prevails that it is slowly gathering the strength to break out. There are two short-term goals, which may to some extent prove incompatible. One is a 10-million-ton sugar harvest as from 1970. The other is diversification of agriculture—a bid to break free from the monoculture of sugar. Castro has committed the honor of the Revolution so deeply to the target of 10 million tons that most laymen believe it will somehow be attained; the experts have their doubts but concede that 8 or 8½ million is a possibility—a big jump from the estimated 4.8 million of the current year. As for diversification, the standard tour laid on for visitors gives some idea of the possibilities, but statistics are in short supply. Marine resources are being tapped on a scale never attempted before; planned production of fish for 1970 is 175,000 tons, as compared with 25,000 tons before the Revolution. With 8 million head of cattle and a huge program of artificial insemination based on the crossbreeding of the traditional Brahmin with the imported Holstein, dairy and meat production can be expected to go ahead fast. Cuba is well on the way to self-sufficiency in rice, with prospects of an exportable surplus. Egg production is soaring. There are extensive new citrus plantations and they seem to be prospering. Coffee has been planted on every available square inch of land in and around Havana, though its prospects are questionable. Extensive and intensive cultivation is generously supplied with fertilizer, backed by an expanding

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system of irrigation and roads, and in certain sectors it is highly mechanized. Success will bring out the figures but failures are liable to go unrecorded. If things go at all as planned, sugar in the mid-1970s will account for considerably less than 50 percent of the total value of agricultural production. At present it accounts for about 70 percent.

What level of productivity do these plans assume? What indeed is the current level? Nobody says. Perhaps nobody knows. It is certainly low, but to admit this is to question the value of moral incentives; and these, to the detriment of the Cuban economy, are now sacrosanct. The régime no doubt can point to some remarkable outbursts of energy. Appeals to patriotism, the blood of the martyrs, the competitive instinct and the challenge of the OAS boycott do undoubtedly work, but fitfully; only a small minority of Cubans have shown themselves capable of the sustained effort which is needed to realize the potential of their fertile country. Moreover, these dedicated few are not necessarily the ones best qualified by education and experience to carry the rest of the country on their backs. Revolutionary zeal having always been regarded as the prime qualification for Party membership, the Party has now woken up to the fact that its general educational level is appallingly low and that it is incapable of providing the trained cadres required to stimulate production. So they are going back to school. Meanwhile, much energy continues to be misdirected and ill-coördinated, and the level of productivity obstinately refuses to rise.

The dilemma for Castro is painful. To achieve his cherished objective of independence of Soviet economic aid, he must jettison his principles and introduce the kind of concessions to the profit motive which are now an established feature of the Soviet and East European economies and of which he has been so openly critical. The signs are that he would rather postpone the day when Cuba can balance her account with the Soviet Union. But can the Russians afford Castro's principles? Alternatively, can they afford to let him down? The dilemma is painful for them too. It looks at present as if they will settle for further subsidies provided Castro ceases to sabotage Soviet policy in Latin America by seeking to discredit the Moscow-oriented communist parties. A bargain on these lines could easily come unstuck, however.

It would be wrong to suggest that, having balanced her ac-

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count with the Soviet Union, Cuba would promptly divest herself of communism as if it were a cloak donned purely to obtain Soviet aid. For one thing, Cuba will still need the Soviet Union as a market for her sugar—and indeed as her principal trading partner. But this is not the real point. The real point is that, however heretical the postures which Castro occasionally strikes, Cuban communism is no disguise. It may be highly eclectic, but Castro at least would claim that it is a purer form than any to be found elsewhere. The Party apparatus is forbiddingly orthodox, and the system as a whole is as totalitarian as any Stalinist could wish. The limits of dissent are narrowly drawn and the machinery for dealing with those who transgress them is more efficiently maintained than most machinery in Cuba.

This is an aspect which needs to be examined more closely. The visitor to the Isle of Pines will be shown four gruesome circular buildings constructed in the 1930s to serve as what then passed for a model prison; they are now awaiting demolition to make way for a school. The guide will describe in some detail how the prison came to be used for the brutal taming of the political opponents of Machado and Batista. He will be less explicit about the fact that until early 1967 the same prison was crammed with Castro's own political detainees. These were not set free. Their continued presence was evidently found to be incompatible with plans for turning the Isle of Pines into a kind of laboratory for social experiments, and they were transferred to the main island. The number of political prisoners now in Cuba is a matter of guesswork; Castro admitted to 20,000 in 1965. All that can be said in extenuation is that they are believed to have been more humanely treated since the present Minister of the Interior was appointed some 18 months ago. Indeed, the régime would hotly deny a retributive element in their attitude, and in this they may be sincere. The attitude tends rather to be clinical: critics and opponents of the régime (the line between them is not too finely drawn) are regarded as suffering from a contagious political disease; they require isolation and treatment.

What then is Castro's prescription for a healthy society? Plenty of hard work for everybody is an important ingredient, but in accordance with the best communist doctrine it must be neither wholly intellectual nor wholly manual. Mechanization of agriculture is to reduce the need for purely manual labor, and the system is to be so contrived that every man and woman will

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be able to deploy to the full his or her physical and mental capabilities.

Castro also prescribes a strong dose of egalitarianism. He is not content with the drastic redistribution of wealth which has already taken place. About a year ago he announced that it was the policy of the régime to equalize salaries, working from the bottom upwards, not from the top downwards. He admitted, however, that this was a very long-term goal. Meanwhile, in response to inflationary pressures, such adjustments as are being made to the salary structure tend to be downwards. Less, therefore, has been heard lately of the equalization of incomes, more of the gradual withdrawal of money from the internal economy. Many things are free already: education, of course, and basic medical services (you can pay for better treatment); most housing; weddings and funerals; admission to sporting events; and, for an ever-growing proportion of the workers, the midday meal. The ultimate goal is stated to be a moneyless society in which everybody would be provided with the comforts and amenities as well as the necessities of life. Each is to receive according to his need, but it is tacitly accepted that some needs are more equal than others and nobody has yet attempted to explain where the line is to be drawn between private and public needs. Castro will no doubt continue to "need" his helicopter, his fleet of cars and his numerous houses scattered up and down the country. Indeed it may legitimately be claimed that these are not a rich man's diversion; they are the tools of his trade, just as a car is a tool of a doctor's trade.

It will be clear that the egalitarian ideal is no more likely to be achieved in Cuba than elsewhere. Nevertheless, the area of unearned privilege has been heavily reduced over the past ten years and is likely to continue to shrink under the pressures of the educational system. Education at present is compulsory only at the primary level, though a fairly high proportion of students continues through secondary. The régime contemplates nothing less than universal education up to and including university level. The three existing universities have been condemned as citadels of privilege and are to be abolished as such. They will be converted into institutes of advanced research while facilities for university-level studies, heavily slanted toward science and technology, will be provided at the main centers of work throughout the country—a system of apprenticeship on a national

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scale combining study with productive work. How this is to be achieved in terms of teachers, buildings and equipment has not been made clear, but nothing could be more egalitarian than the intention. The entire population is to pass through the same educational mill.

By projecting current trends against the general background of the social philosophy described above, it is possible to hazard a guess at the kind of place Cuba will be in five years time. Barring assassination or any catastrophic setback to his economic plans, Fidel Castro will still be in control—mellower perhaps as he approaches his 50th year but still with fire in his belly. Individual freedom will remain strictly subordinate to Castro's conception of the common weal. Privilege inherited from the past will not have entirely disappeared but will be vestigial—the family car will have disintegrated, the family house will be five years shabbier and less functional, the bank balance depleted. Money will still be in circulation, but there will be few non-essentials to spend it on, and the scale of goods and services provided free by the state will have increased.

Food and clothing will still be rationed, but the rations will be bigger. The housing situation will not have improved appreciably, but there will be many more schools. In general the standard of living will compare favorably with the Latin American average but will be low in relation to Cuba's natural wealth. The technical know-how thrown up by the educational system will still be too thinly spread to compensate for the inhibiting effect on productivity of continued reliance on moral incentives, which are liable to grow weaker as the Revolution fades into history. Demographically, there will have been a slight but noticeable shift from town to country, where new agricultural settlements of a permanent kind will have begun to emerge; but most of the labor for short-term agricultural operations will still be drawn from the towns and accommodated in temporary encampments. Mechanization will account for perhaps 50 percent of the sugar harvest, but the remainder, with coffee and citrus, will continue to make heavy demands on manpower and there will be no problem of unemployment.

It will be a society free of financial corruption in the ordinary sense: there is no doubt that this has been effectively eradicated. But if there is no change in the present curiously permissive attitude toward the use of friends in authority for the cutting of

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official corners, Cuba will still be suffering from a traditional Latin American weakness—and one which could ultimately prove fatal to the dreams of an egalitarian society. There will be few social tensions, but a sense of frustration may well have developed among young people who can find no outlet for their aptitudes in an educational system which ignores the humanities. The new-found sense of nationhood and self-respect will have matured and there will be less aggressiveness in Cuba's external relations. She will still be in communion with Moscow and the bulk of her trade will be with the Soviet Union—and more nearly in balance. Commerce with capitalist countries will, however, have increased, both in absolute and relative terms.

It is presumably not inconceivable that these countries might include the United States. From Washington's standpoint, no doubt, Cuba would have to mend her ways first—particularly in the matter of subversion in Latin America. From Havana's standpoint the U.S. Government would have to mend its ways too—get out of Viet Nam for a start and stop being "imperialist." But anti-Americanism, in the sense of a passionate rejection of everything American, does not appear to be endemic in Cuba. The occasional American visitor (doctor, scientist or journalist) is treated with courtesy and friendly consideration. If, in the course of his Latin American mission, Governor Rockefeller's plane had been hijacked to Cuba, there would have been no demonstration against him—not only because the Cuban Government is not prone to allow that kind of thing, but also because the Cubans have good manners, a strong tradition of hospitality and, whether they like it or not, an affinity with the United States deriving from long historical ties. Public opinion would almost certainly welcome any move by the Cuban leaders toward a rapprochement with the United States. But it is precisely among the leaders that anti-Americanism tends to be most bitter, particularly among those members of the Government who in their day-to-day business discover exactly where the shoe pinches as a result of the OAS boycott. Ministers who, for example, have to take the painful decision to scrap an entire sugar mill because a few thousand dollars' worth of spare parts are unobtainable are not likely to be in a conciliatory mood.

There can be no doubt that the OAS policy of economic denial, known here as the "blockade," has retarded, though it cannot entirely prevent, Cuba's economic development. More im-

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portant still—and is this perhaps its main justification now?—it has made more difficult the export of revolution; trade channels can be used for subversive purposes. Viewed in this light the duration of the quarantine must depend largely on Cuba. But it is important to recognize that, so long as the boycott continues, there will persist in this island a sort of siege mentality; and this undoubtedly makes it easier for the régime to organize, as they are now doing, the economic life of the country on a military basis designed to secure the maximum effort during the critical year or two to come. It also provides the Government with a ready-made excuse for economic failures.

To do them justice, it is not an excuse which is used indiscriminately and out of context. The leaders are often disarmingly frank about the shortcomings of their own stewardship as well as the shortcomings of the rank and file. In a speech last May, Castro described the 1969 sugar harvest as "an agony for the nation" and he went on to list the reasons for its failure: fundamental problems which will require a gigantic effort to solve. A response to this challenge shows signs of gathering momentum. It may be just in time.

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ARAB PALESTINE: PHOENIX OR PHANTOM?

By Don Peretz

BECAUSE many Palestine Arabs are stateless under international law, their importance has frequently been overlooked in the numerous parleys and in the skein of complex international negotiations over the Middle East crisis. The Palestine dispute, as it is euphemistically labeled in the United Nations, has appeared on the annual agenda of the U. N. General Assembly for over twenty years, generally under the guise of assistance to refugees. Neither the principal antagonists nor the major powers officially acknowledge existence of the Palestinians as a nation-party to the dispute.

In a recent interview Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir emphasized that there is no such thing as either a Palestinian nation or people. Palestine Arabs are considered by the Government of Israel as little different from those of the surrounding Arab states. When queried about creation of a new Arab Palestine on the West Bank, Prime Minister Meir pointed out that it would be too small; only if it were part of Jordan or Israel could the area remain viable. Furthermore, she emphasized, there is no representative body speaking for the so-called Palestinians. Had the Arabs who fled in 1948 not urged Jordan's King Hussein into the June 1967 war the Hashemite Kingdom might well have become the successor state to Palestine. Israel's experience with the already existing fourteen Arab states discourages it from supporting the creation of still another. Furthermore, to treat the Palestinians as a political entity would be inconsistent with Israel's internal and external policies. At present the Israeli Government considers its principal antagonists to be the Arab states of Jordan, Syria, Iraq and, to a greater extent, the United Arab Republic. The major goal of Israel's Arab policy is to reach agreement with the U.A.R., whose President Nasser is considered the chief obstacle to peace. The Israelis believe that only after he has been convinced of the need to come to terms with Israel will other Arab nations follow suit.

The reluctance of Israel and the major powers to recognize the Palestinians only inflames the latters' already deep hostility toward the West. Their situation is not unlike that of other self-

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identified national groups in the Middle East which sought international recognition during this century—such as the Armenians, the Jews and the Kurds.

The national identity of the Palestine Arabs has gone through a cycle of: discovery in the 1920s, political failure in the 1930s, near abandonment in the 1940s, disillusionment in the 1950s and '60s, and rebirth, rediscovery and new expectations since 1967.

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Prior to establishment of the British Mandate at the end of World War I, there was no distinctive Palestinian people, nor political entity. The land and its inhabitants were considered backwater regions of the less developed Ottoman Syrian provinces. Only after establishment of the British Mandate in 1920, and the rise of Jewish nationalism in the country, did a distinctive Palestinian Arab consciousness emerge in response to the challenge of these two forms of European intrusion. In that era Palestinian Arab nationalism, led by a coalition of Muslim landed gentry and upper-middle-class Christian Arab families, resembled nationalist movements then emerging elsewhere in the Arab East. Some 80 percent of its constituency was a politically unsophisticated rural peasantry. There was little if any ideology, and that little was devoid of social content. Major emphasis was on elimination of foreign control and influence—in the case of Palestine, British controls and European Jewish influences. The Palestinian Arab national effort culminated in the abortive rebellion between 1936 and 1939; it failed because of massive use of British armed force and lack of internal cohesion among nationalist leaders. Nevertheless, heroes of this rebellion are still eulogized by the new nationalist organizations; their military failures and inability to form a cohesive political movement are overlooked.

The major revision of Great Britain's policies in Palestine, embodied in the 1939 White Paper, was a great victory for Palestine-Arab nationalism since it made an independent Arab state seem inevitable. Nevertheless, most of the country's Arab leaders slipped into lethargy and paralysis of action which was to last nearly thirty years. By the end of World War II, Jewish nationalism in Palestine was much more dynamic, well organized and politically effective. Both within the country and abroad, Zionists and their supporters surpassed the Palestine-

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Arab nationalists in militant political activity, finally voiding the White Paper and achieving their goal of statehood. The disjointed and inchoate Palestine-Arab nationalist movement reached its nadir in 1947–48 with defeat and exodus of the Arab population from Jewish-held areas.

Until termination of the Mandate in 1948, both Arab and Jewish residents of the country were identified as British subjects, although they did not hold British citizenship. When Israel was established, its Jewish and some of its Arab inhabitants became citizens of the new state. More than one million Palestine Arabs were left in an international limbo, with no recognized citizenship status. Within the next decade, Palestinians who remained in the Hashemite Kingdom and in those parts of Palestine annexed to it acquired Jordanian citizenship; a small number of Christian Palestinians qualified for Lebanese citizenship, and the others—some 700,000—have remained stateless persons until today. Syria, while refusing citizenship to Palestine refugees, granted them most, but not all, citizenship rights. Lebanon was reluctant to offer citizenship to the large number of Muslim Palestine refugees it harbored for fear they would destroy the delicate balance between the country's Christians and Muslims. Egypt, already one of the world's most overpopulated nations, kept most of the Palestinians under its jurisdiction penned up in the tiny Gaza enclave, which was governed as though it were still a separate country rather than part of the U. A. R.

During the next two decades "Palestinian Arab" became synonymous with "Palestine refugee" in international consciousness. Even in Arab countries and among the Palestinians themselves there was little distinction, and annual debates over the refugees at the United Nations and the activities of UNRWA further blurred any clear difference. The most visible evidence of Palestinian existence was the network of refugee camps where tensions between the inhabitants and natives of host countries forcefully delineated the occupants from other Arabs.

Jordan needed its Palestinians as a population base for the new Hashemite Kingdom, but all the other Arab states encouraged the displaced Arabs to retain their national identity. This was not difficult since few were socially accepted in the host countries and many non-Palestinian Arabs regarded the outsiders as a disruptive and troublesome element. Palestinians therefore main-

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tained their old social structure and family ties, formed their own political groups, intermarried with each other and continued to regard themselves as a distinctive national group. Recognition of this identity was further encouraged by the United Nations through the network of relief, social and particularly educational services provided to Palestine refugees through UNRWA. In the UNRWA schools, where refugee children were educated by Palestinian teachers, a new generation of ardent Palestine patriots was raised. The most zealous proponent of militant activism against the "intruder state" of Israel was this new generation of U.N.-educated youth.

Various Arab governments attempted to exploit the distinctive character of the Palestine Arab community before 1967. Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Egypt encouraged and gave sustenance to Palestine Arab nationalist groups of one type or another. Usually these groups were instruments of national policy of various Arab governments, which provided them with political and material support, including arms for so-called commando organizations which supposedly operated independently. Inter-Arab efforts to give political respectability and national élan to the Palestinian movement resulted in formal recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization at the 1964 summit meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo. While Ahmed Shukairy, recognized by the conference as leader of the PLO, led it through a maze of verbal pyrotechnics, up to 1967 it had failed to gain real political autonomy or to galvanize strong popular support. In effect, it remained an instrument of inter-Arab policy manœuvres.

After the 1967 fiasco, Palestinians were disillusioned with nearly all the established leadership, organizations and governments; Shukairy and the old-line leadership associated with him were discredited. Wherever there were large concentrations of Palestinians, diverse new groups emerged, led by a younger generation unfettered by the political and social commitments of its elders. The new leadership reflected the transformation of the Palestine Arab community that had occurred during the "lost" generation. Living in or near to urban areas, most Palestinians had lost their peasant skills and outlook, acquiring many of the views and sophistications of town and city. Several hundred thousand were employed in urban trade, commerce, industry and ancillary occupations. More than one hundred thousand had developed skills in the Arabian oil states. In two decades,

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approximately 50,000 Palestinians attended universities, nearly equaling the number of young professionals trained by Israel during this period. The new generation of Palestinians had all the attributes of a displaced minority group, including great aspirations for upward mobility, political restiveness, and a core of revolutionary-minded young men who aspired to "reëstablish the homeland."

Several dozen new Palestinian organizations were created within two years of the 1967 defeat. By far their greatest emphasis was on military or paramilitary activity aimed at Israel. Disillusioned with failures of conventional tactics against Israel and with Arab government fiascos, most of the new groups drew inspiration from guerrilla techniques and activities modeled on those of Algeria, North Viet Nam and Latin American revolutionaries. The objective was no longer that of Arab governments such as the U.A.R. or Jordan—to achieve Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories and to circumscribe and delimit its frontiers—but to obliterate completely the Jewish state.

In the ebb and flow of inter-Arab politics since 1967, the new Palestinian groups have merged, subdivided, reunited and again fragmented, finally organizing themselves into three or four principal political-military organizations: the Palestine Liberation Organization; *Fatah;* the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; and *Saiqa.* While there are political differences and diversities in the type of commando or terrorist activity each advocates, personality clashes rather than ideology often account for the variety of organizations. They differ generally from the pre-1967 groups in their asserted independence from Arab governments, in the growing number of young intellectuals and professionals they have enlisted in their ranks, and in the extent of support they have received from Arabs generally and from Palestinians in particular. While most of the organizations indirectly draw subsidies from Arab governments, including Kuwait and Libya, they have also succeeded in rallying substantial private contributions from wealthy Palestinians and other zealous supporters throughout the Arab world.

The reliability of commando communiqués is highly questionable, but their political effect throughout the Arab East is becoming increasingly obvious. Within the last two years they have created a new identity for the Palestinians. "Refugee" is no longer synonymous with "Palestine Arab." Increasingly, "Pales-

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tinian" is identified with the commando warrior rather than with the downtrodden displaced person. This is evident among Arab students, intellectuals, professionals and the man in the street, from Casablanca to Kuwait. While much commando activity is exaggerated if not entirely fictitious, there is sufficient substance to their achievements to have created a commando mystique. Posters on university campuses and in government offices and shopping centers; the daily radio bulletins and pronouncements by commando leaders; and the Arabic press—all have created in Arab consciousness the image of a new Palestinian who, unlike the traditional and now aging military leadership, is young, vigorous, intelligent, self-sacrificing, intensely patriotic and single-mindedly dedicated to reëstablishment of Arab Palestine. This image pervades even the thinking of commando critics such as Lebanese and Jordanian officials, who recognize that fedayeen terrorism in Israel serves only to weaken their own stability.

Not only Israel but several Arab governments are targets of commando activities. Some leaders of the organizations aim to overthrow any politician who might interfere with their guerrilla strategy against Israel; others have set their sights on total revolution of Arab political life. Among the former are leaders of Fatah and PLO who can coöperate with conservative monarchs or with radical socialists. Within the past year these two less revolutionary-minded groups have been involved in machinations behind the scenes to topple the ruling establishments of Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Libya. In Jordan and Lebanon, commando leaders have sought, with some success, to gain control of strategically located territories for training recruits, or for striking across the Israeli border. The commandos are reported to have taken over fourteen of the fifteen refugee camps in Lebanon and to have free access to most camps in Jordan. This has led to a de facto partition in which King Hussein's government has been forced to acquiesce. Because of the wide support enjoyed by the commandos among Jordan's largely Palestine Arab population, the Hashemite Kingdom has found it impossible to repress them and on occasion it even coöperates in providing covering fire for their movements across the frontier. Consequently Jordan has become the recipient of nearly daily artillery and air strikes, which have leveled towns, disrupted agricultural life in the river valley and threatened both political and economic stability.

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In Lebanon, where Palestinians are a small minority but have considerable support among the population, the commandos threaten to end the country's relative isolation from direct military confrontation with Israel. Since the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 the Lebanese-Israeli border has been more or less free of the military clashes that have periodically erupted between Israel and Syria, Jordan and Egypt. While willing to permit the organizations free movement, fund raising and propaganda activity within its borders, the Lebanese Government has been reluctant to countenance establishment of guerrilla enclaves. The dilemma has torn the government apart, divided the population into pro and anti commandos, and led to threats of both Syrian and Israeli intervention on behalf of or against the Palestinians. But now the commandos are asserting themselves in all areas they deem vital—including the Lebanese frontier. They recognize no right of withdrawal from confrontation with Israel, insisting that every Arab and Arab state has an obligation to join the "War of Liberation."

Members of even the "conservative" organizations were involved in an aborted coup in Saudi Arabia this fall resulting in arrest and imprisonment of several score high-ranking Saudi army officers. In Libya, where hundreds of Palestinians have found niches as teachers, physicians and professionals, they played a role in the successful overthrow of the monarchy. The new Libyan Republic's first civilian Prime Minister is a Haifa native whose family left when clashes between Jews and Arabs made life in Palestine difficult. He has asserted his and his government's full support for liberation of his former homeland.

Public approval of the commandos has become so widespread that Egypt's President Nasser has been placed in the ambiguous position of offering them his blessings at the same time that he calls for implementation of the U.N. November 1967 resolution. More recently, the Soviet Union has also withdrawn its disapproval of the commandos as a reactionary and disruptive element. Now they have been awarded Soviet accolades as fighters for independence of the people of Palestine.

The most wide-ranging goals have been stated by the small but influential and hyper-activist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Led by a zealous Christian Palestinian, George Habash, the PFLP emerged from the militant Arab Nationalist Movement, an organization of intellectuals whose goals were

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considered so revolutionary that it was banned in most Arab nations after its creation several years before the 1967 débâcle. Although it now concentrates its activities on the Palestine issue, its goals encompass the Arab world. The PFLP is splintered into Marxist and more Marxist factions. The most zealous would, with the aid of the Chinese Communists or any other equally revolutionary group, strive now for total revolution throughout the Arab world using any tactic necessary to bring down the political and social structure of all "corrupt" Arab states.

Attacks by the Front on commercial aircraft and civilian centers within Israel and abroad are an embarrassment to less zealous compatriots and to Arab governments. It was a PFLP attack on an Israeli commercial airliner that precipitated the raid on the Beirut airport last year, followed by dissolution of the Lebanese Government and continued internal political crisis. Since the Israeli Government holds accountable Arab countries from which such attacks are planned or undertaken, PFLP tactics threaten continued political crisis in the Arab world. At parleys between the Lebanese Government and various commando leaders conducted last summer in Beirut, the Front openly stated its aim to bring down the country's "reactionary" communal political system.

III

It is increasingly evident that instead of being a tool of Arab governmental policies, the new Palestine organizations are striving to reverse the pattern of control and to exercise strong influence on those governments which at one time controlled Palestinian destinies. The commandos have in effect become an instrument of pressure for more militant action by governments such as Lebanon, Jordan and the U.A.R. The support that commandos have rallied among university students and other leaders of Arab opinion has undermined the few voices of moderation existing prior to 1967.

The commando mystique clearly extends to Arab citizens of Israel and those in the occupied territories. A survey conducted in 1968 by Hebrew University sociologists indicated that Arab defeat in the Six Day War increased respect for the state among Israeli Arab schoolchildren but also greatly intensified feelings of hatred toward Israel, deepened Arab consciousness and made more determined than ever before the resolve to wage still an-

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other war against the Jewish state. With each passing month of Israeli occupation, the number of young Arab Israeli supporters of the commando movement grows. During the first half of 1969, the number of youths who were apprehended for supporting commando activities was nearly one hundred. While small in relation to the Arab population of Israel, the number exceeds the total of Israeli Arabs arrested for such activities since the state was established twenty years ago.

One of the most serious aspects of this phenomenon is that it threatens to undermine relationships laboriously built up since 1949 between the Government of Israel and its Arab minority. Though not ideal, relations had slowly become tolerable. Israeli Arabs had come to be recognized as citizens and many had voluntarily, even willingly, accepted this status. During the past twenty years Israel's universities have graduated several hundred Arabs. While many have been dissatisfied with their minority position, a considerable number found a place in Israeli society. Arabs worked in lower- and middle-level government posts and a few rose to become police officers. However, with increased commando activity, there is growing apprehension among both Israeli Arabs and Jews about the future of amicable relationships between the communities. After every incident the arrest of scores of Arabs and destruction of suspected terrorist homes by Israeli security authorities embitter feelings in both communities. Those who for twenty years strove to liberalize Israel's policies toward its Arab minority find themselves increasingly isolated; this is reflected in the recent election results, which increased by a substantial percentage the number of Knesset members favoring a hard line toward the Arabs.

So far, commando military escapades along the frontiers and terrorist activities within Israel have failed to disrupt life or to have a serious impact on its ever increasing military capacity. The border fighting has claimed 80 percent of the more than 2,000 casualties sustained by Israel since the 1967 War (nearly 500 of them fatal); 10 percent were inside the occupied areas and 10 percent in pre-1967 Israel. This fall Defense Minister Moshe Dayan noted that casualty figures had increased from an average of 50 a month in the year after the war to an average of 157 in the third postwar year. While the casualty rate from Arab confrontations is still less than the number suffered in automobile accidents in Israel, it has an obvious impact on public attitudes

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and further explains the turn toward militancy evident in the 1969 elections.

Indirectly the economy has been affected by the labor shortages caused by the large number of men under arms and by the need for reservists to serve up to age 55. Nevertheless, the economy is booming again, though foreign currency reserves are falling to a dangerously low level and the military budget eats up to 21 percent of Israel's GNP—three times more than in most modern nations.

There is also fear among civil libertarians that security restrictions in the Arab community could lead to increasingly restrictive measures against all dissidents, including Jews. While the vast majority of Israelis support their government's internal and external Arab policies, the small critical minority feels that it may be threatened if commando activities lead to expanded interference by security authorities in Israel's internal life.

IV

In recent months some commando intellectuals have become aware of the importance of winning over potential Jewish dissidents within Israel as well as gaining support in the West. Policy-planning groups in the high command of PLO, now recognized as the representative body of most commando organizations with the exception of the PFLP, have opened discussions about long-range plans in the occupied territories. However, they have failed to come forward with a program that would elicit support or even interest among any substantial number of Israelis or their supporters. At best their political goals are vague and ill-defined.

The commandos state categorically that they seek to destroy the government and state of Israel, its Zionist institutions and its exclusive Jewish character; they brook no compromise based on the pre-1967 borders or even the 1947 U. N. partition resolution. Some leaders have indicated that Palestine would become an Arab state; others have been more ambiguous. None has publically recognized the possibility of coexistence between Arab and Hebrew nationalism, both of which have the identical attributes of a linguistic base, a rich cultural and historical heritage and deeply instilled popular consciousness, and both of which derive from a major religio-national ethos.

Hebrew broadcasts of the commando organizations directed

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to Israel are listened to with derision rather than fear or hope of discovering any serious political intent. The recently announced objective of converting Palestine into a democratic secular state in which all Jews, Muslims and Christians will live in equity is not believed because of the long years in which the people as well as the state of Israel were threatened. The organizations have yet to define clearly the kind of government they propose, the status of minority groups, whether or not the country is to be an Arab state, or what is to become of its Hebrew-speaking residents who retain an attachment to their language and cultural, social and political institutions. The tragedy in this situation—and the root of conflict—is that each group denies the other the right of such identity and strives to assert exclusive control over the area that each believes to be the essential heartland of its national life.

The Palestine Arab nationalist movement represented in the varied groups that have been created since 1967 is still run through with many of the difficulties and shortcomings that have characterized modern Arab politics. The mystique and slogans full of emotional overtones tend to vitiate clear-cut, well-defined policy goals. The tendency to rely on exaggerated battle communiqués, while fortifying their image and mystique, undermines political credibility among those whom the commandos seek most to influence—the Jews of Israel, as well as influential outsiders. Above all there is lack of cohesive leadership. While the Fatah commando and PLO leader, Yasir Arafat, is the most visible and most colorful personality, he still lacks the charisma that Egypt's President Nasser so successfully capitalized on to become the pre-1967 leader of Arab nationalism. During the past two years there have been several instances in which members of one commando group have sought to undermine competing organizations. Yet despite these shortcomings the Palestine movement and the new organizations have become a factor of significance which cannot be ignored in any settlement of the Middle East crisis.

As the more militant groups strike out with increasing frequency at targets such as American oil companies, they threaten to sever the supply of oil to the West. The Front and other commando organizations have threatened to extend their attacks against other Western "imperialist" targets in the Middle East, but if they do so they will merely weaken further the already

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tenuous relations between the United States and the few remaining friendly Arab governments in the region.

Some Palestinians have demanded that they be represented in the deliberations convened to deal with the crisis. This presents an international dilemma. Although some Third World nations are moving toward recognition of a Palestine entity, so far even the U.A.R. has dragged its feet on clarification of long-range policy toward Palestine. Jordan hesitates, since recognition of the Palestine entity would give approval to partition of the Hashemite Kingdom. Neither the United States nor Great Britain can sanction territorial fragmentation of one of their chief Arab allies in the area.

Yet it would be in the interest of all parties concerned if the Palestinians had a recognized voice in negotiations. There are a number of issues in the dispute that are of only indirect concern to the non-Palestinian Arab states, but must sooner or later result in direct contacts between Israelis and Palestine Arabs. These include the return or compensation for Palestine Arab property now held by Israel; the future of Jerusalem, which is not only a Jewish but a Palestinian Arab city; and the status of several hundred thousand stateless persons who left Israeli-held territory in 1948 and 1967. While Israel wants to negotiate with states as far removed from these issues as the U.A.R. or Syria, negotiations would be much more likely to succeed if they were carried on between those whose vital interests are most involved. As for the United States, it will find American interests and American friendships in the area becoming increasingly endangered if steps are not taken soon to reach an accord with what is now the most disruptive element in Middle East politics—the Arabs of Palestine.

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CHINA, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

A British View

By Sir Robert Scott

CIVIL war on the mainland of Asia, in a small country with a tradition of disorder and yet with a millennial record of persistent national identity, has mushroomed into the biggest politico-military issue of the times, comparable to the Arab-Israeli conflict in outside repercussions but far exceeding it in scale of operations. Exceeding it also in complexity. In the Middle East the issues are relatively simple and plain to see. In Viet Nam they are blurred. In the South the fighting is not even recognized as civil war but viewed as insurgency aggravated by intervention from the North.

Putting aside such questions as whether the war will go away when foreign forces go away, the prospects for Vietnamese non-communists and anti-communists, the effects on the morale of the American armed forces and of those of allies, how communists might exploit American defeat, and the verdict of the future, the problem remains: how is the United States to extricate itself? Plainly not after armistice and agreed settlement. Equally not as a disorderly rout. Fighting will slow down—though from time to time with renewed eruptions—but is unlikely to stop for a long time to come. The conclusion seems inescapable that there will be an American military presence in Viet Nam for much longer than advocates of immediate and complete withdrawal are clamoring for. In prosecuting the war the United States was militarily handicapped by inability to deploy the whole range of its armory. In extricating itself from the war it is militarily handicapped by the need to leave some military elements behind.

In battle and in negotiation the objective of the North Vietnamese and of the Viet Cong is political control. Since the death of Ho Chi Minh they can afford to wait a little longer. They do not now feel the same urgency to translate Ho's vision into reality in his lifetime. Moreover, they see the political and military outlook as promising. While it is in their interest to keep up the pressure because they want to see complete and unconditional

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foreign withdrawal in circumstances of political confusion in the South, there is no purpose to be served by shedding too much blood to win what they expect to win anyway.

Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese can afford to devote more of their effort to reconstruction in the North and to Laos. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the Thais had failed to protect Lao territories from Chinese marauders, the French invoked an old claim that all land east of the Mekong belonged to Viet Nam. Intervention led to the inclusion of Laos within the administrative framework of the Indochinese Union. In training the tribesmen in Laos and in supporting revolt there, the North Vietnamese may have more in mind than supply routes to the South.

There is little reason to suppose that Russia will exert political pressure on North Viet Nam, in the form of reduction of supplies and denial of facilities, to persuade it to do what South Viet Nam and its allies have failed to achieve through military and economic pressures—persuade it to moderate its aims and accept a mutually tolerable settlement.

Some new ideas are slowly permeating the minds of the rulers of the Soviet Union. There is some readiness to compromise on aspects of arms control and limitation. In managing the economy they are discovering parallels with the experience of large-scale industry in capitalist countries. Fervent party loyalty is not enough. There must be a high degree of expertise, some measure of autonomy, even the competitive spirit and the profit motive. As in the development of rockets and nuclear weapons, seen by them to be necessary for their security, the navy may likewise have, at first, grown out of defense needs. It was significant that early ships were modeled on those that would have been useful in the last war. The modern Russian navy has long outgrown this early mistake and seems now to herald an active thrusting policy of expansion of Soviet influence far afield.

By and large, however, the impression persists that Soviet political leaders—as distinct from managers of the economy and military strategists—are as old-fashioned, suspicious and doctrinaire as ever. Incipient liberalism and threats to the established order are suppressed ruthlessly. They have no monopoly of prejudice and intolerance—only more than their share. In doctrinal interpretation their reasoning is sometimes as tortuous as any in medieval theological disputations.

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Many throughout the non-communist world, anxious over implications that the United States and the Soviet Union might become involved on opposing sides in the Viet Nam war, have been hoping that the two would work together to smooth the way to settlement in Viet Nam and to lessen the risk of their direct confrontation. However, it is clear that the Soviet Union is not exerting its maximum influence in Hanoi. Cessation of American attacks on the North has relieved the main Russian anxiety, that the war might escalate. With communist victory seemingly in the offing, the Soviets may calculate that this is not the moment to risk a rebuff from Hanoi by counseling compromise unless they see some important advantage to themselves in some other connection, such as American coöperation in reopening the Suez Canal. Besides, there is no particular reason why they should work too actively to bring to an end a campaign that is costly to the United States in men, money and prestige but no longer endangers Soviet security.

Russian policy in Southeast Asia as a whole is to gain influence in any country which can be helped to become anti-Chinese and which one day might help to form an anti-Chinese association. At present Moscow is pursuing this policy not by helping local communist parties but by getting onto amicable terms with governments, whatever their complexion, through cultural agreements, expansion of civil aviation and merchant shipping, trade and other normal activities of bourgeois powers. In the case of North Viet Nam these tactics are not wholly applicable. In the long run, relations between China and Viet Nam are unlikely to be cordial even if both are communist-controlled. In the short run, North Viet Nam cannot afford to be anti-Chinese. The Russians have no option but to recognize this.

II

In most wars, distance lends detachment. Close neighbors watch the fighting and await the outcome with far greater anxiety than those far away. The Viet Nam war is an exception. The equanimity with which countries in Southeast Asia have regarded it is in remarkable contrast to the passions roused not only in combatant countries, but in distant places not directly involved, like Britain. The attitude of, for example, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and even India and Indonesia, has usually been interpreted as due to fear of communism or of China or of

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both, and therefore willingness to see an American military barrier placed between them and China. Moreover, some in Southeast Asia have benefited from American offshore purchases—particularly Japan and Hong Kong.

There may be more to it than this. Southeast Asia seems to be taking the prospect of American withdrawal as placidly as it did the prospect of indefinite American involvement. There is a much simpler explanation than the sophisticated theorizing popular in the West: the nations of Southeast Asia are intensely preoccupied with their own internal affairs. No comparable collection of neighboring countries anywhere in the world exhibits such astonishing diversity of cultures, races and traditions or such wealth of natural resources that from time immemorial have attracted the attention of traders and adventurers from poorer lands—China, Japan, India, Arabia and those in Europe. With the single exception of Thailand, all have only recently achieved independence after colonial status.

Russia will probably succeed in gaining acceptance as a trading partner. She is unlikely to succeed in attempts to sponsor a Southeast Asian association. Only the peoples of Southeast Asia themselves can do this, and for a long time to come they will be handicapped by their differences. For the next decade or so the outlook is turbulent. Fighting in Viet Nam is unlikely to escalate into war between the United States and China—thereby relieving the main Russian anxiety—but it is likely to continue and to spread, in Laos, perhaps to Cambodia and northern Thailand. If new alliances are formed in the area, they are more likely to be based on religion than on awareness of common interests as members of the same geographical region. The most astute politicians in the area, the Thais, skilled diplomats and well versed in international affairs, may set out to develop closer relations with their Buddhist neighbors, Burma and Cambodia, as well as with their kinsmen, the Laos.

III

There are some signs of reappraisal of policy in China, though not yet of the Chinese attitude to the Viet Nam war.

One assumption about China's external policy can be made with some confidence because it flows from her traditional search for security: she will not readily abandon her objectives in Viet Nam. These are first and foremost the withdrawal of

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foreign forces to allay her fears of encirclement, and the establishment there of a government friendly to her and not to the Soviet Union. A Vietnamese communist party ideologically associated with the Soviet Communist Party represents a threat almost as serious, though in a different way, as an American military base. Economically, freedom of transit across North Viet Nam would improve access to Yunnan and to Kwangsi. There is no question of Peking suddenly abandoning these aims or her present policy of helping and encouraging the North Vietnamese. Side by side with that policy, however, she is likely to try to lessen her diplomatic isolation from the outside world.

One result is that Taiwan will probably become once more a live issue. A decade or so ago, representation at the United Nations was seen in Peking as desirable for one reason only, to discredit the Nationalists. Today this is no doubt still in the minds of Chinese leaders, but there are some indications that they now see other values for them in a seat at the Security Council. It would give them a more effective voice in world affairs, now that they can no longer count on the Soviet Union to speak for them. Any such bid depends for success on recognition of the government in Peking instead of that in Taiwan by enough members to make the issue turn on credentials, not on admission as a new member. This would be an important step forward for Peking. From the point of view of the United Nations as an institution, it would become more representative of the world community, though it would not necessarily make that community more harmonious or the institution more effective.

A question mark has hung over the future of Taiwan for the past twenty years. It is much too early to consider a final answer, which in any case will be a matter for the two Chinese governments to decide for themselves. However, others are entitled to say, and in their own interests must say, that while ready to accept the verdict of the Chinese themselves it must not be a verdict reached as the result of fighting which might threaten general security or plunge East Asia back into another war. The only way out of this dilemma, as of so many other international problems, is to proceed step by step to explore temporary solutions without presuming to dictate the final result. If the Mainland and Taiwanese governments agree to rule out the use of force against one another, there is no great difficulty about devising a formula which would facilitate contacts between them

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and Taiwan's continued membership in the United Nations, even if the Security Council seat were occupied by a nominee of Peking and even if neither formally recognized the independent existence of the other. West German gestures toward East Germany may be instructive in the context of Taiwan. But if neither the Mainland nor Taiwan agrees to renounce force against the other, the present stalemate will continue, to the detriment of both and especially that of Peking. Obduracy in respect of Taiwan will serve to perpetuate China's diplomatic isolation.

Policy is a mixture of strategy and tactics. Because the latter change often with bewildering rapidity in response to changing circumstances, it sometimes seems as though policy is in a state of perpetual flux.

China is a country where the basic elements have not changed despite major changes of tactics. Her aims are little different from what they were fifty or a hundred years ago—unity, self-sufficiency, security. The new collective leadership in Peking will not, indeed cannot, change these. They may, however, adopt a new approach in dealing with the internal situation inherited from Mao. Because in all countries foreign policy is a reflection and extension of domestic policy, it follows that there may also be a new approach in dealings with others. China's most pressing need at the moment is time to deal with the situation at home without outside interference. A less provocative note is likely to manifest itself in her contacts with the outside world, even with the United States.

When he came to power twenty years ago, Mao Tse-tung set out to consolidate the authority of the central government, to modernize agricultural industry and defense, and to colonize empty spaces in the far northwest. He set out, too, to remold men's minds as well as their environment. There has been nothing in Chinese history since the Analects of Confucius to be compared with the influence of the Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung.

This Herculean task has proved impossible of fulfillment in his lifetime. As Mao fades from the scene, the weaknesses inherent in a long continuity of authoritarian rule under one man become apparent. Though many of his achievements will endure, he has created rifts from which China will take years to recover. Size is to be taken into account in determining forms of government. Concentration of power at the center may yet prove inappropriate for the Soviet Union, just as control from the capital

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does not work well in India or in Indonesia. Homogeneous though she is, China may yet prove too big to be administered under a highly centralized form of government. Provincial autonomy or some degree of devolution of authority may return. Either would be anathema to orthodox communists.

Some elements of Chinese policy now appear to be going into the melting pot. For the sake of internal stability, the pressing need, there will have to be less emphasis on revival of revolutionary zeal—a prime cause of the present rifts—and more on efficiency in agriculture, industry and transport; on rebuilding the shattered educational system; on administrative reform and on provincial and local initiative and responsibility.

Internal evidence that this is to be the trend in China is as yet barely detectable. In dealings with the outside world, however, there is a new note of conciliation in public pronouncements about the Soviet Union, suggesting that after all, despite violent frontier clashes a few months ago and despite deep differences of opinion, peaceful coexistence is possible. The appeal Ho Chi Minh made in his will for world communist unity is eloquent confirmation of the depth of these differences from a man in a unique position to know both Chinese and Russian standpoints. But in addition to quasi-theological quarrels, there are questions of land settlement and of frontier demarcation, Chinese resentment of economic disparities, and rivalry between the two for the allegiance of other communists.

Sooner or later, fighting between the two is inevitable. China now appears to have recognized the folly of precipitating it. For its part, the Soviet Union must also tread warily, although there has been some loose talk of "taking out" Chinese nuclear installations while this is still, militarily, relatively easy. Whether this talk emanated from impatient young officers or was deliberately spread about by the authorities as a warning to China, it is certain that in the aftermath of a quick blow Russia would have to maintain large forces indefinitely on the frontiers with China, with harmful effects for the economy and for defense dispositions elsewhere. A more extensive campaign against China would probably prove inconclusive and might well escalate, with repercussions at home and in Eastern Europe. There is no knowing how the enemies of communism might exploit the situation. On the other hand, it is permissible for the Soviets to hope that in postponing the day of decision the situa-

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tion need not become critical for a decade or more, because of China's preoccupation with affairs at home.

It would be shortsighted on the part of the Western world to regard tension between the Soviet Union and China with complacency, or even with indifference. If serious and prolonged fighting broke out between the two, Russia would seek to deploy her military and naval power to maximum effect, an objective which entails freedom of transit through the Dardanelles, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal—even at the price of supporting the Arab states in the extinction of Israel. Already, tension with China is a spur to Russian ambitions for influence in the Moslem world despite the probability that this will result in the Indian Communist Party swinging more and more into the orbit of the Chinese communists. In Europe the quandary for Russia is that while she wants to avoid a crisis with the NATO powers on her western frontiers she must continue to repress symptoms of restiveness among her Warsaw Pact allies. At the eastern end of Asia there are already some indications of strengthened Russian friendship with Japan.

In this volatile and explosive situation, with the certainty of Sino-Soviet tension and the possibility of open rupture, entailing consequences that cannot be foreseen, the aim of the West and especially of the United States should be to seek to defuse the risks in so far as that is possible.

IV

American confrontation with China—and perhaps with Russia—seems to have passed its peak of intensity. There still, however, are formidable obstacles to meaningful American-Chinese coöperation: the impact it would have on the United States and on its worldwide relations with others, including the Soviet Union, Viet Nam, Taiwan and Korea; the legacy of twenty years of mutual distrust and recrimination; how Peking could afford a major switch of foreign policy at a time of internal confusion. The obstacles are obvious. It is equally obvious that if they could be overcome there would be sweeping changes in the international outlook. China would be able to diversify her supplies of oil and of modern technological products. She would have a bigger say in world affairs. The United States, having discarded a sterile policy of containment, would gain greater freedom of manœuvre in foreign policy. There might be a hope

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of negotiating an international "hands-off" arrangement in respect of Viet Nam and of Korea, which would not resolve their internal differences but would limit external consequences.

Will enough pragmatism develop in China's external policy to permit this? There is some evidence that this is happening in dealings with Russia. There is as yet no public evidence that it extends to her attitude toward the United States.

It was a major blunder by Mao to conduct policy toward the two leading world powers, themselves at odds with one another, both with powerful forces close to China, in such a way as to antagonize both at the same time. If frontier clashes between China and Russia had escalated into major hostilities, the United States, bogged down in Viet Nam and at risk in Korea, would have had an opportunity to encourage the Chinese Nationalists to create a diversion from Taiwan. Most observers in the West would have discounted such an American policy as highly improbable. Apart from any other considerations, massive and open American support would have been required to make the diversion effective. To the leaders in Peking, however, the risk must have seemed very serious; nevertheless, they continued to provoke both. Even if dictated by the need to rouse and unify public opinion by exploiting instinctive Chinese isolationism and xenophobia, the tactic was dangerous. In fact, the Chinese nightmare of encirclement by the U.S.S.R. and the United States acting in collusion is a fantasy for which they have only themselves to blame.

In the early years of consolidating communist control in China, anti-Americanism served to destroy the popular image of the United States as China's chief foreign benefactor and friend, as well as to whip up public support for Chinese intervention in Korea. Those days are gone. The present generation of Chinese has been reared on anti-American slogans; such pro-American sentiment as still lingers is a negligible political threat to the régime. Militarily, the evidence is clear that America is seeking to lessen its commitments on the mainland of Asia. With less to fear from the United States, China may be disposed to relax anti-Americanism. Moreover, between the two there is no permanent conflict of national interest such as exists between China and Russia.

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V

There is no greater possibility of a neat, quick, final solution to tensions in Viet Nam than to those elsewhere, some of which stem from the past, the product of racial or cultural friction between Moslem and Hindu, Arab and Jew, African and white, Chinese and Malay. In some respects human psychology resembles that of other animals in dislike or fear of those markedly different from themselves. In the United States and in Britain this basic human frailty is apt to be seen in simple terms of black versus white and the solution in simple terms of education and legislation and equal opportunity. It is far more complex and far deeper-rooted than that. As a source of tension, racial and cultural differences are of ever-increasing importance.

Today there is a new factor, a surge of restlessness seeping across national boundaries, the product of improved standards of education, of greater social awareness among young people with more leisure and more contacts than ever before, of the expansion of mass media of communications, of disillusionment with old reformers. A new cosmopolitan radical movement is in the making, as yet without structure, emotional and anarchical, aimless and negative. It may develop its own structure or it may be harnessed by others to serve their causes. It is going to be politically significant.

The choice is not between peace on earth, which is beyond man's grasp, and mutual destruction, which though within his grasp is highly improbable, but between greater and lesser degrees and frequencies of violence. It is to this more modest target that men should turn their minds, not in a futile attempt to preserve the status quo but seeking to comprehend the roots of tension and to take corrective action while there is time. If we are patient enough and humble enough we can hope to curb some of the superficial excesses and, over a period, to channel the currents into constructive instead of destructive courses.

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JAPANESE CULTURE AND THE BUSINESS BOOM

By Howard F. Van Zandt

OVER four hundred years ago, the first Occidentals to come to Japan, the Portuguese, wrote letters home stating that the Japanese were different from other Asians and Africans and more like Europeans than any people yet discovered. Visitors from Europe and the Americas are still writing the same kind of letters, but whether the Japanese are really more like Europeans is open to question.

Japan's twenty-four year rise from the ashes of burned-out cities is a remarkable story: the base on which to rebuild was weak, the methods followed often unorthodox and their success inexplicable by the criteria normally applied by Americans.

Let us look at the base—102 million people crowded into mountainous, quaky islands with an area equal to that of Montana; 84 percent of the land not arable, and possessing almost no valuable mineral resources. Her two great neighbors are members of a bloc with which trade is restricted, the raw materials and petroleum on which Japanese industry depends must be brought many thousands of miles, and exports must compete in markets where tastes are usually different from those of the homeland.

In examining the methods employed by the Japanese to achieve their economic recovery, one is continually discovering cultural influences at work that must be traced back to their origin to be understood. An example is the dominant role played by the Government. During the feudal period, the Shogunate and clan governments sponsored mining operations and some factories. At the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 these were transferred to the central government which, aided by foreign engineers, installed up-to-date machinery in the mines and built modern factories. Although the Government sold these in 1880, it continued to exercise firm control over big business through both lawful and extra-legal devices up to the end of World War II. During 1945 much of Japan's industry was bombed out of existence, and early in the Occupation the *Zaibatsu* combines, which 65 years before had bought many of the government enterprises, were dissolved. These acts might have broken the grip of the Government but didn't. The commercial banking institutions

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were unable to finance the rebuilding unaided, so the Government was called upon to provide some of the funds. The reform efforts of the Occupation bureaucracy also reinforced the position of the Government in directing business.

In 1864 a foreign chamber of commerce was organized in Yokohama. One of its purposes was to find a way of overcoming government obstructions placed in the way of trade. To quote from a contemporary account: "It was asserted by the Japanese merchants and it was strictly true, that not a transaction of any sort between them and foreign merchants was unknown and entirely uncontrolled by the local officials." In 1948, when British and American chambers of commerce were organized in Tokyo, their concern over government involvement was almost identical to that of their predecessor 84 years earlier.

II

Since government plays such an important part in business life, it will be worthwhile to see how it operates. First, despite a normal amount of complaining, the Government is generally regarded with sincere respect by both Japanese and foreign businessmen. The members of the bureaucracy are well educated, dedicated, able and hard working, and corruption and favoritism are negligible. The percentage of the population on government payrolls is substantially lower than in the United States and advanced countries of Europe.

Each government bureau has responsibilities toward business. The Economic Planning Agency of the Prime Minister's Office has a central policy-making role, preparing long-range plans for economic expansion and indicating where government direction and support should be focused. Influenced to some extent by this advice, the Ministries and independent agencies develop their own plans. The Cabinet also issues white papers on various topics—for example, expansion of scientific research—and these are accepted as guides by government agencies, trade associations and private businesses. Each bureau and branch of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which is the department most involved in business, is responsible for control over segments of industry. Other ministries, such as Posts and Telecommunications, Agriculture and Forestry, Transportation, etc., look after businesses within their scope. The Ministry of Finance, working with the Bank of Japan and commercial

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banks, cools off and stimulates the economy as desired and is second only to MITI in power. Although directives of the government agencies, sometimes termed "administrative guidance," are often extra-legal, they are, with rare exceptions, followed by the financial, commercial and industrial communities as though they were backed by law.

The Japanese, accustomed to coöperative action, also readily work together in voluntary private groups like Sumitomo, Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which have risen from the residue of the dissolved Zaibatsu. Their executive committees, tuned closely to the Government, coördinate the activities of member companies, size up new business opportunities, determine which of the group will go into them, help in the financing and sometimes draw personnel from other companies in the combine.

Since it is national policy to keep employment steady, the Government and all except small companies practice lifetime employment—that is, men are hired on graduation from school and kept on the payroll until they retire or die. Although this system, as regards government functionaries and supervisory employees, is a natural sequel to the feudal practices in effect for samurai during the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), it was not adopted until about fifty years ago for blue-collar workers and then because the complicated newly introduced machinery could be operated only by permanent staffs trained in its use. The Japanese believe this system creates deep loyalties, reduces nervousness and tension, and permits spending more time on in-company training than is possible where job-hopping is common. It also helps keep salaries and wages down, as competition for men is negligible. The system has face-saving devices for shelving low producers.

The Government pays unemployment insurance to those who are out of work; however, thanks to the lifetime employment system, there is less call for this type of assistance than in most other countries. Private employment agencies are virtually nonexistent. Government labor offices find jobs for those who need them and expect applicants who are able to work to take whatever is offered, even if different from what they have been doing. Japan is behind the United States and Europe in its care of long-term unemployed, but since it has what may be the lowest jobless rate of any industrialized nation, there are not many in this category. The public favors the creation of "make work" by Gov-

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ernment and industry if necessary to prevent idleness, so there is some overstaffing. The nation's prosperous condition, however, is solving this problem as the demand for labor is rising steadily.

Japanese industry has been quick to install the newest, most efficient labor-saving machinery obtainable. Where there are two foreign manufacturers offering equally good but differently designed versions of the same product, the Government will often encourage one domestic firm to try one and another the second and to compete. In 1955 the Government and private industry established the Japan Productivity Center. By arranging visits to the United States for countless executives and engineers and special courses in major Japanese cities, attention has been focused on improving productivity. In 1968 labor productivity was 14.1 percent higher than in the previous year and this was the third consecutive year with a rise of over 10 percent.

III

The "love of work" ethic is strong throughout the country and its origins go back to antiquity, perhaps stemming from the terrace wet-rice agriculture which requires coöperation of everyone who farms in a particular valley. If anyone, through laziness or a lack of responsibility, allows the dikes around his paddies to collapse, the farms below his will be inundated. Therefore the group or community feels it has the right and obligation to compel all members to coöperate and work hard. Each Japanese knows that his associates, family and neighbors are looking over his shoulder, and to be acceptable he must conform to what is expected.

The president of one famous company, probably motivated by the thousands of unseen employees looking over his shoulder, thought he would experiment to determine the maximum number of hours he could work in a single week. He kept pushing himself until he reached 92 hours, which he thought were too many! A problem some Occidental managers run into is how to get their Japanese employees to leave the office at night at a reasonable hour, or to take vacations to which they are entitled.

In the postwar period, there has been a socioeconomic leveling which has eliminated most of the rich and most of the poor, leaving a great middle class. This has created a huge market—one big enough to consume most of what Japan's mass-produc-

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tion factories can turn out. The difference in income between college graduates and the poorest paid in the same organization is small at the outset and widens only slowly; as a consequence, there is little class conflict.

Japanese have a more than ordinary willingness to take progressive action. This is partly due to their system of decision-making by committee which entails collective responsibility for results, and not only insures maximum input of ideas, but protects individuals from loss of face or punishment if a scheme fails. If a plan succeeds—and of course most do or the economy would not be growing so fast—no one individual is likely to be given credit. If anyone is boastful or demands personal credit, there will be disharmony in the group, which in Japan's social structure is intolerable. The idea of collective responsibility is related to a feeling called *shu-jo-no-on* (gratitude to nature and other human beings for one's success). To conform to this concept requires abandoning the idea of individual power domination in favor of coöperative group action where no man's success may be attributed to *his* brains and the strength of *his* two arms unaided and alone. The great emphasis on harmony sometimes surprises Occidental visitors; a manager may describe with pride the spirit of concord prevalent in his factory, rather than the profits it makes, even where the profits are high.[1]

Partly because in feudal times survival was dependent upon tight village or clan loyalties accompanied by suspicion and competitive attitudes toward outsiders, the Japanese have a strong sense of belonging and are intensely loyal to the organizations for which they work. This allegiance foments extraordinary competitive zeal in business. Japanese firms, in vying with one another or against foreigners in overseas markets, will at times cut prices to the point where profits vanish. The Government is called in when conditions in an industry become intolerable. As a solution, MITI may impose a type of cartelization.

American visitors are often surprised at the lack of enthusiasm

[1] This spirit of harmony, however, has another side. In order to keep the majority contented, first-class organizations, particularly in small cities and towns, try to avoid hiring any of the approximately three million members of the suppressed classes. The *Eta,* the most numerous, have lived in segregated communities for possibly as long as 1,300 years, and their lot has been no happier than that of the Negro in North and South America —according to a Japanese professor who has studied both. Others include the almost incredible *kitsune mochi no ie,* or families possessing foxes (invisible ones), who are found in Western Honshu, and the *hinin* (un-humans), who are so low in the social scale that even the *Eta* look down upon them. Koreans are also discriminated against.

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shown for the profit motive. They can elicit more interest and respect from their Japanese contacts by talking about helping them increase their market share, or achieving growth or benefiting Japan. The making of profits is not the main goal of Japanese business. Early in the Meiji period the old despised merchant class, which was profit-motivated, clashed ideologically with the samurai, who were more concerned with public welfare. The samurai won out, and for nearly a hundred years the Japanese have soft-pedaled the idea that business exists to make profits. Actually, of course, given the progressive spirit of the people, their preoccupation with growth and their hard work, profits have come almost automatically. In the past five years leaders of the Keizai Doyukai, an élite policy-making group, have, without abandoning the old aims, been making a special effort to get profit included in the list of approved objectives. This is motivated by a desire to cut down waste, to reduce excessive expenditures for business entertainment and gifts, and to curtail losses due to excessive competitiveness.

Enterprises are financed in a way that is puzzling to Occidentals. If a firm finds itself earning bigger profits than are needed for dividends and other normal purposes, it is not likely to increase dividend rates, provided they are already at a generous level, say, 15 percent of par. Instead, the directors, in anticipation of a rainy day, will bury some of the high profits in a multitude of lawful reserves, and siphon off some of the surplus into subsidiaries. The reluctance to increase the dividend rate is partly a result of fear that if they were too generous in dividend payments they might be accused of profiteering by the Government and advised to reduce prices. Shareholders make their profits not from dividend rate increases, but from recapitalizations. When these occur the number of outstanding shares are increased by 50 or 100 percent. The stockholders are offered preëmptive rights to buy the new shares at par. Since stock of an expanding company usually sells far above par, these rights are valuable.

Commercial banks have helped fuel the boom by lending upwards of 90 percent of their deposits. In such an overloaned position, they have had to borrow from the Bank of Japan and this has provided a further government control over business, for the Bank can lend or not as it wishes, and stipulate terms which the commercial banks must pass on to their customers.

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Unfriendly business take-overs, such as sometimes occur in the West, are regarded as almost criminal in the eyes of the Japanese. Their system makes take-overs by domestic rivals very difficult, and by foreign interests impossible. On an average, about one-third of the shares in large companies are held by friendly banks, insurance companies and related corporations. The stability of these great stockholders, who rarely sell their holdings, leaves management free from worry about take-overs. Foreigners are no problem because none may acquire more than 7 percent of the shares of an existing firm without first getting government permission.

Corporations depend on loans from banks and insurance companies for most of their capital. They prefer borrowings to equity capital, because the amount they must earn to pay the tax-deductible interest is only about two-fifths of what they would have to earn to pay dividends of the same amount. To pay a 9 percent dividend, for example, gross profits have to be about 23 percent, as taxes take a little less than half the profits; and before dividends are paid, special reserves must be set aside too. Major corporations operate with an average net worth of only 17 percent of combined debt and equity. The system has worked well thus far because Japan has had no depression for over twenty years, and because the banks and financial institutions are also shareholders and willing to carry clients during adversity. The Government, in pursuing its full employment policy, does not want to see large employers fail and, when necessary, gives such assistance as it can, including inducing prosperous big firms to merge with or assist shaky rivals. There are numerous bankruptcies among new enterprises, however. During the current boom, many men are starting their own businesses, but failures involve so few people as not to cause serious dislocation.

One of the reasons why so many new firms come into existence is because the Japanese are enterprising and capital is available. Japan has the world's highest rate of personal savings, 21 percent of income (as compared to 7 percent in the United States). Japanese save, not so much because of any special need to provide for unemployment or sickness, but rather because of their country's financial structure. Credit, in the form of installment plans and charge accounts, is not yet as common as in the West, so people accumulate the funds before they make their acquisitions. And in addition, the cost of land in the metropolitan areas is so high—

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about three times the price of comparable sites in America—that many people despair of owning a home in the city and let their savings pile up for use after retirement, when they will move to the country. Individuals do not invest their savings in the stock market to the extent they do in the United States, but deposit them in banks and other financial institutions.

Concerns, unless hard up, generally pay all employees bonuses, usually amounting to from one to three months salary, twice a year. While the December bonus usually goes for purchases, most of the June bonus goes into savings accounts.

Despite the high debt ratio of its firms, the nation by comparison with most others is in sound fiscal condition. The national debt is small, and individual indebtedness inconsiderable. The economy is well balanced, and not dependent upon any one product, so it is not as subject to boom or bust as it was in the early part of the century when silk was so important. Most large companies try to diversify, both by entering new types of business and by investing in other concerns. Because of the lifetime employment system some concerns find it necessary to get into new business in order to absorb redundant employees. In such cases, the employment policy results in progress rather than stagnation.

IV

One of the main forces behind Japan's rapid growth is its educational system. Buddhist priests and monks, commencing in the sixth century, started a movement which in time led to education for all, from nobles to charcoal workers. By the year 800 there were five colleges in Kyoto. A Portuguese, writing in 1565, stated that most men and women in the great towns of Japan could read and write—quite an accomplishment considering that to be fully literate one had to know more than 2,000 characters. The masses in the Latin countries had not yet learned 26 letters. Thanks to *terakoya,* or temple schools, chiefly taught by Buddhist clergy, more sophisticated schools taught by Confucianists, and clan, central government and private schools, learning was probably disseminated more broadly in Japan than in contemporary Europe during most of the millennia before the Meiji Restoration. When Japan was reopened a century ago, the high level of literacy made it easy to introduce Western technology. Abstract ideas, however, have been slow of adoption.

Although some other nations are catching up, Japan con-

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tinues to lead Asia in education, and has nearly 900 universities and other institutions of higher learning (several score are currently closed due to the activities of radical students). Unquestionably love of knowledge is one of the central ingredients upon which Japan's success has been built. Careers in commerce or industry attract the majority of students, including ultra-leftist youths. The stated objectives of Japanese business—to achieve growth, to improve the livelihood of the public and to benefit the nation generally—appeal to the idealism of most young people. Incidentally, one characteristic that distinguishes Japan from many other Asian nations is the almost total absence of nepotism, except in small or family-owned enterprises.

Among the attractions of employment with major companies are the fringe benefits. Big firms provide employees with apartments, dormitories or homes, at one-fifth to one-tenth the prevailing market price; many sell company-owned land to their employees at bargain prices on long-term payments. Employers, including government agencies, also own or rent vacation villas on the seashore and in the mountains, where employees and their families can spend their holidays at low cost. Baseball, tennis and swimming facilities, instruction in flower arrangement, traditional musical instruments and the tea ceremony, etc., are often provided free, and in some instances employees may enjoy the long sleep at no charge in company-owned cemeteries, surrounded by those with whom they worked. Big organizations also provide medical and dental services and some have hospitals.

An important concept for the Japanese is that called *amaeru,* which may be defined as a longing to be protected, cared for and cherished. Although present to some extent in other countries, it is unique in its strength in Japan. The paternalism of employers satisfies this longing. (On the political side, the solicitude for the welfare of the Japanese people displayed by Americans during and after the Occupation period also satisfied this need.)

In vogue is a system of salary increases and promotions called *nenko joretsu;* generally, unless business is poor, employees are given pay raises once every year and at frequent intervals are raised in rank as well. In order to facilitate these promotions, far more levels are established than in American business. Often people of different rank do the same work side-by-side; the difference in rank is acceptable on grounds of longer service. Management is slow to promote men over those who entered the

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organization at the same time and with the same educational qualifications, recognizing that this may cause hurt feelings and disturb the collective harmony considered so precious. To get around this, often two men will be promoted simultaneously, although only one will actually be given an increase in responsibilities. At director levels, rather than promote a man over those senior to him, older men may be retired from the parent organization and transferred to a subsidiary, where they will be given titles commensurate with their age and dignity.

One interesting feature of the postwar boom is that it has been led by men mostly between 50 and 85 years of age (the average company president is nearly 58); the octogenarian President of EXPO '70, super businessman Ishizaka, did not rise to the top executive level until he was 63!

Japanese workers at all levels are to a surprising degree self-propelled. Knowing what their organization's objectives are, having a lifetime commitment and possessing the self-assurance that comes from having been with the same employer for a long time, employees at lower levels frequently take responsibilities that in the West would be reserved for managers. Comparative studies indicate that the Japanese are also more disposed than Occidentals to proceeding as they feel proper, even if in doing so they disobey orders. The explanation for disobedience usually offered by an employee is that he was proving his loyalty by so doing, for had he proceeded as ordered, the action would have been wrong and injured the enterprise. Another explanation attributes disobedience to the feudal custom of assenting to anything proposed by a superior—even if the underling knows it is wrong and cannot be carried out; later, the employee quietly substitutes a workable plan. Unless the results of disobedience are calamitous, supervisors normally are not much ruffled by the "misunderstanding" of orders.

V

Much of Japan's technology has been purchased from the West, chiefly from the United States. Payments in the form of royalties and service fees in the postwar period have exceeded $1.5 billion. Until the mid-1960s foreigners gladly licensed Japanese concerns, but enthusiasm has waned as many Japanese firms, once the license periods expire, have tried to enter markets which the licensers preferred to keep for themselves.

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More and more foreign concerns insist upon owning at least 50 percent, and preferably a controlling interest, in any firm that uses their technology. The Government refuses to agree to this in most instances and is encouraging Japanese companies to accelerate their own research and development. Nevertheless, the government appropriation for science and technology in 1968 was only $535 million, as compared to more than $17 billion in the United States. By almost any measurement, Japanese research and development is far behind that of the United States. The Government recognizes that it will be necessary to buy foreign technology if the economy is to continue to grow at a rapid rate. To do this, and also to obtain a steady infusion of new ideas into business management, Japan's leaders know that they must open the doors to foreign equity investment. But domestic pressures against this are so strong that the Government has felt it prudent to move slowly.

The target date for capital liberalization is 1972. Even then it is expected that the Government will retain the authority to prevent outsiders from taking over or dominating any domestic industry. Many Japanese fear that if foreign firms were allowed to enter freely they would overwhelm the country, and economic stability and labor tranquility would be disrupted. The Ministries are apprehensive that foreign concerns would not accept the Government's extra-legal administrative guidance, thus endangering the politico-economic establishment. There is also doubt that the majority of Westerners would show adequate understanding of Japan's mores, and fear that they would eventually find themselves at odds with their employees, their bankers, their suppliers, their joint venture partners, their customers, their trade associations and the Government. Such problems would lead to business failure, and perhaps even damage foreign relations.

Japanese question whether foreign businessmen, for example, could be expected to develop enough understanding of the complicated *giri* and *ninjo* psychological concepts in the short time most of them stay in Japan to operate harmoniously. *Giri,* which plays a compelling role in Japanese society, may be defined as "sense of duty," or "recognition of a debt of gratitude." One of the meanings is akin to keeping "face." In business, much manœuvring is in response to *giri* influences. *Ninjo* is humaneness, sympathy and kindness. The occasional mass layoffs in Western

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factories, and the coldness with which Occidentals are believed to dismiss employees, seem to the Japanese to demonstrate a lack of *ninjo*.

The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan has for many years been offering instruction to its members in Japanese psychology, business practices, law, customs and related culture, believing that resident expatriates will thus have a better chance of satisfying both the demands of home offices for profits, and Japanese insistence that the gears of foreign-controlled companies mesh with the Japanese system. Several universities, private training firms and trade associations in Tokyo are also offering courses for foreigners. So different is the culture, however, that it generally takes about three years in residence, and faithful attendance at the training seminars and courses, before the average Westerner develops confidence in his ability to do business in Japan.

About half the existing offices of foreign companies in Japan—mostly the smaller ones—are staffed exclusively by Japanese. One might think that this would solve the problem, but it doesn't. If executives at headquarters responsible for the operation are unfamiliar with Japan's customs and business practices, the indigenous staff is not likely to receive the understanding or coöperation requisite for success and a smooth-running operation.

The massive transplantation of U.S. business methods and ideas, without adaptation to local conditions, which many Japanese predict would follow complete liberalization, is looked upon with consternation. Chairman Sazo Idemitsu of Idemitsu Kosan, one of Japan's most powerful business leaders, expressed this concern in the *Asahi Evening News* in August 1965. "I have repeatedly pointed out," he said, "that the American methods of business management will not fit Japan. The differences of social make-up and spiritual life must be taken into consideration . . . The Japanese method . . . is based upon harmony and loving kindness toward one another. . . . The American business method might make an appeal at the beginning with its aggressiveness and novelty. But Japanese people cannot take American aggressiveness into their hearts."

Idemitsu's views can best be understood when one realizes that business management methods are largely abstract concepts. The Japanese, although hungry for foreign technology, have never shown much enthusiasm for abstract Western ideas. (Even after

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a century of enormous missionary effort, only about one Japanese in 170 is Christian.) The fact that the Japanese may not well understand and are slow in accepting U.S. management techniques should not, of course, be interpreted as a sign of anti-Americanism. In all Japanese public opinion polls Americans rate as the most popular of foreigners. The relatively rapid transfer of business ideas between the United States and Europe, where the cultures are so similar, has given us an unrealistic yardstick with which to measure our progress in Japan.

Fortunately, however, the Japanese are pragmatists. Even though they fear strange management concepts borne on the wings of invading Occidental companies, they recognize that some alien ideas are needed. To counteract their severe labor shortage, and too rapid rise in retail prices, for example, many Japanese believe that American marketing methods must in some degree be adopted. The five tiers or so of wholesalers and jobbers in the Japanese structure not only are wasteful of labor, but make retail prices excessive and create such anomalies as automobiles and TV sets of Japanese make being sold abroad at one-half to two-thirds of the Tokyo price.

Recognizing that her citizens would not be hurt, but in some instances benefited, the Japanese Government in the summer of 1969 promised to dismantle the antiforeign capital fence, taking it down partly in 1970 and 1971, and finishing the job in 1972. Specifically, it has already been announced that starting in October 1971 foreign companies may enter joint ventures with Japanese automobile manufacturers, with participation limited to 50 percent.

There are continuing intergovernmental discussions regarding means of speeding up the process and resolving other economic and political problems at the same time. It is hoped that both Japanese and American lobbyists will be cautious in their public pronouncements during these negotiations, for careless remarks could be misinterpreted and complicate the task needlessly. Thanks to the enormous reserve of *giri* debts of gratitude to Americans built up in Japan over the past two dozen years and the huge reservoir of good will in the United States toward the Japanese, it should be relatively easy to solve the occasional differences that must inevitably arise.

Now that the Japanese Government has determined to liberalize, the time has come for American companies to start pre-

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paring their Japan programs for the 1970s. Besides considering such matters as whether to export or manufacture, thought should be given to what types of personalities will best be able to obtain coöperation from the Japanese; there will be neither growth nor profits if there is misunderstanding and discord.

Attention should also be given to determining what American management concepts should be followed in Japanese operations, and what Japanese methods retained. Those introduced should be presented in such a way that the Japanese do not feel that foreign abstract ideas are being imposed roughshod. It should be remembered that the Japanese may, if they feel ill-treated, reimpose strict controls.

American firms should also include in their plans a program for educating their staffs in Japanese psychology, business practices, etc. This instruction should not be limited to the men to be assigned to Tokyo or Osaka, but include concerned home-office personnel, particularly where the Japan office is staffed entirely by Japanese. Strangely, even though Japan is expanding industrially at a faster rate than any other nation, and has a system that is unlike our own, few universities in the United States offer courses that explain how it operates, or how the Japanese think. Now that opportunities to work with the Japanese are to expand greatly, courses of instruction must be offered.

American efforts to learn how the Japanese system functions, and the reasons why, will be much appreciated by the Japanese, and allay some of their fears. We expect foreigners to follow our ways when they establish operations in the United States. We owe it to the Japanese to make an effort to learn something about theirs in exchange for the privilege of coming into their country despite their misgivings.

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BRAIN DRAIN OR OVERFLOW?

By George B. Baldwin

DESPITE the amount of attention devoted to the "brain drain" in recent years, no firm consensus has emerged as to whether or not one exists. Today we know much more about the international migration of professional manpower than we did five, four or even three years ago. But the "more" we know is mainly facts, and not all that many; men still have difficulty saying what the facts mean and deciding whether or not the brain drain constitutes a problem of "disturbing dimensions"—as the Pearson Commission called it.

Instead of mass movements of relatively unskilled and untutored peoples into the world's empty spaces, international migration has increasingly become the movement of people with education seeking opportunities in more developed countries to use skills that education has given them. The dramatic increases in foreign study since World War II, the explosion of international communications and the decline in the cost of travel have combined to internationalize the market for educated manpower to a degree previously unknown. This widening of the market, combined with full employment in the West, has greatly increased competition for professional manpower, especially the competition for exceptional talent. For some employers, this international competition has brought trouble; for many individuals it has brought opportunity.

There can be no quarrel with the statement in the United Nations Report[1] that "highly trained personnel from many developing countries are emigrating to a few major developed countries, that the size of this flow is large and that it is increasing at a rapid rate." But there is great question whether this migration is seriously hurting the countries that are the net exporters of trained manpower. The surprising fact is that in most developing countries the number of professionally trained people who are becoming available for home employment is rising, not falling, and in country after country the numbers are rising faster than their economies can absorb them. One certainly cannot make this statement about all countries, or even all underdevel-

[1] "Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries." Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, 5 Nov. 1968, 85 p. (mimeo A/7294).

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oped countries. But if we begin with the Big Picture about professional migration from the less developed world, it appears to be not a drain but an overflow. The less developed countries (LDCs) are not being stripped of manpower they badly need; more often than not they are being relieved of manpower they cannot use.

However, the loss of highly educated manpower is not a phenomenon that affects only the world's less developed countries. Britain has perhaps shown the greatest anxiety about the problem as a result of the large numbers of scientists, engineers and physicians who have migrated to the United States. Britain's vulnerability is mainly a matter of language. Norway and Switzerland are two other European countries that have lost quite substantial proportions of their annual output of professional manpower to North America. Canada's relation to the United States is much like Britain's: it loses large numbers to U.S. employers but gains large numbers from other Commonwealth countries and from several European countries as well. Canadian authorities, however, have been far less concerned than the British about emigration to the United States. In Europe many more countries have *not* suffered from a brain drain than have—*e.g.* France, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, West Germany, Spain, Italy and Jugoslavia. Japan, too, has suffered almost no losses of its high-level talent. Thus among the *developed* countries the broad picture is of a highly selective gross outflow of professionals in significant numbers from four or five European countries and from Canada, with the United States and Canada the main destinations. These gross losses are partially offset in Britain and Canada by substantial inflows from less developed Commonwealth countries (mainly India and Pakistan). In the six-year period 1961–66, Britain lost 26,800 scientists and engineers through emigration but gained 19,000 through immigration. What is more difficult to determine is the relative calibre of the two groups.

Students of the brain drain know that the statistics on international manpower flows are of limited help in telling us how serious the problem is. This is partly because the statistics themselves are not very good: they are reasonably good in the United States, Britain and Canada; far less satisfactory in France, West Germany and most other European countries; and unsatisfactory to hopeless in most developing countries. But even good statistics

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are of little use unless one knows what one is trying to measure. And in the brain-drain debate there is much ambiguity as to who is a "brain" and what is a "drain."

One thing numbers can tell us is that scientists, engineers and doctors ("professional manpower") do not constitute a large proportion of total immigration into the main brain-gaining country. The United States currently absorbs about 400,000 immigrants annually. Of this number some 60 percent are dependents, people "without occupation" who do not enter the U.S. labor market. Of the approximately 160,000 who do seek employment, between 15–20,000 are classified as scientists, engineers or physicians. Thus only about 4 percent of all immigrants, or 10–15 percent of those seeking work, possess high-level professional skills. These proportions are not very significant, however. They tell us nothing, for example, about how important these 15–20,000 professional immigrants are in augmenting the output of professional manpower from our own educational system; or whether the immigration of 49 Turkish doctors in 1968 represented a large or small proportion of Turkish medical graduates; or whether these doctors were likely to have found useful and satisfying employment had they remained in Turkey.

The statistics also show that the trend of professional immigration over the past two decades has indeed been "up"—but not as steadily or dramatically as might be thought. Figures that separate out professional immigrants from others began in 1949; there was a fairly steady rise from the 1,369 of that year to a peak of 6,046 in 1957. But then the figure declined for four years and did not exceed the 1957 figure until 1966. Substantially the same picture holds for doctors, with the figure staying close to 2,000 per year until it began to climb significantly in 1966. A strengthening of the trend during the past three years has caused considerable public concern. Immigration of scientists and engineers has shot up from the 6,000 level of 1963–65 to 7,205 in '66, 12,523 in '67 and 12,128 in the year ending June 30, 1968. Thus the last years of the 1960s have seen a 100 percent increase in the numbers of scientists and engineers entering the United States and about a 50 percent increase in the number of doctors, as compared with the late fifties and early sixties. These increases, however, are the direct result of changes in the U.S. Immigration Law which permitted people from countries with waiting lists to use quotas not fully taken up by other countries.

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The 1965 revision in the law represented the first stage in this country's change-over from a preference system based on national origins to preferences based on occupational qualifications. Since July 1, 1968, immigration into the United States has no longer been tied to nationality but has been on a first-come, first-served basis depending on a person's skills. (Admissions on the long-standing humanitarian grounds of family relationships, political asylum, etc., were largely unaffected.) The immediate result of this historic change has been (*a*) to hold down somewhat the number of professionals admitted from Europe (since few had been on waiting lists as long as many from small-quota countries), and (*b*) suddenly to open the doors to much larger numbers of professionals from Asia (Western Hemisphere countries had never been on a country-by-country quota basis and so were unaffected by the changes). As a result of this shift in U.S. immigration policy the number of Asian scientists and engineers immigrating to this country increased over tenfold between 1965 and 1967, from 360 to 4,160—exceeding for the first time those from Europe, traditionally the largest source. Most of these Asian immigrants (80 percent) were students already in the United States who were suddenly permitted by the new law to change their status from "temporary visitors" to "permanent residents" (immigrants).

Immigration by foreign students who adjust their status is not something that occurs only in the United States. Australia has estimated that perhaps 20 percent of the 12,000 Asian students studying there do not return home at the end of their studies. Canada is believed to show roughly similar experience with its foreign students, and in the absence of figures for other developed countries, we can perhaps assume losses on the same order of magnitude. However, these "loss" percentages are not nearly as significant as the *absolute* number of students who return home: this number has been rising rapidly as a result of the huge increase in the total number of overseas students.[2]

Somewhat surprisingly, it appears that during the past two decades the number of foreign students who have been lost to

[2] Between 1938–39 and 1968–69 the number of foreign students in the United States rose nearly 20 times, from 6,000 to about 110,000. The number from the LDCs increased from 3,200 to 70,000—or 22 times. In the same period the number of foreign students in the United Kingdom rose from around 600 to 73,000 (of whom 54,000 are from the LDCs). In 1951 Germany had about 100 foreign students in its universities; fifteen years later it had 31,000. France in 1950 had "a few hundred;" by 1965 it had 18,500, preponderantly from Africa. Australia, which had a negligible number of foreign students in 1945–50, had 12,000 Asians by 1966.

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their countries, and the number who have been returned, have *both* been increasing at a compound rate of 20 percent a year. In absolute terms this means that the numbers of science, engineering and medical graduates returning home—just from the five countries with the largest number of foreign students (see footnote 2)—has increased from 1,600 per year in 1950 to more than 20,000 per year today. And this takes no account of the increase in graduates produced locally.

II

If there were a general shortage of university graduates in professional fields in developing countries almost any loss by emigration would hurt. There are countries where professional graduates are desperately short—notably in some African countries south of the Sahara. But for every LDC with an overall shortage of professional manpower today there are probably two with surpluses, present or impending. The reason is simple: in country after country there is irresistible pressure to expand university education, and so many countries have found it possible to do this that the number of college graduates (including professional graduates) has been rising faster than their economies can absorb them. The last statement is important. If one looks at the pure "need" of an underdeveloped country for doctors and engineers and lawyers and agricultural extension agents and plant geneticists and economists and science teachers for secondary schools, etc., then it is easy to see shortages. But if you look at the number of unfilled jobs, or the number of university graduates who have difficulty finding what they consider acceptable employment, then surpluses often appear. So part of the argument over whether or not a brain drain exists depends on whether one looks at a society's "human needs" or an economy's "effective demand." Clearly the latter is the more relevant and realistic test to apply; the real question is how rapidly "effective demand" for high-level manpower can be made to grow. To ask this is to ask the riddle of development.

All this is not to say that development is not being hurt by the migration of key individuals. Gifted, educated, experienced leaders are scarce almost everywhere, including the United States. These are the brains that really count, because they have such high leverage. They are not to be defined in terms of genius or Nobel-laureate quality; but their number is only a small frac-

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tion (5–10 percent) of all professional migrants. They are the outstanding individuals who are unlikely to be satisfactorily replaced even if a country has dozens of men with the same educational qualifications waiting to apply for their posts if they leave. Much of Europe's concern about the brain drain focuses on its loss to the United States of this small class of "key men."

Loss of the key man does not show up in migration statistics. The only way to get at it satisfactorily is to make qualitative studies of important institutions, field by field and country by country, as a basis for judging whether or not those institutions have been seriously hurt by such losses or by inability to repatriate key men from abroad. No one has made such studies on more than a casual basis and it seems very improbable that anyone will. So all we can do is fall back on the assumption that migration of the critical élite would be roughly proportional to the total number of professional migrants. This would mean that losses of key men have risen as total migration has risen. These losses are considerably offset, however, by the rapidly growing supply of key men (albeit younger and less experienced) being generated by expanding education both at home and abroad.

Another person who does not show up in migration statistics is the returnee. Immigration statistics in many countries show numbers of immigrants by occupation and country of origin. But if a man subsequently decides to return home, this is not recorded. It is known, however, that substantial numbers of professional people do in fact return to their countries of origin after working abroad for varying periods (often in the country of foreign education). Such returnees not only reduce the gross outflows reported in official statistics but often their qualitative importance is great: such individuals return not only with foreign education but with experience, outlooks and access to foreign influences they could not have acquired at home. These return flows appear to be fairly sensitive to fluctuations in economic and political conditions and to the development of well-designed "recapture" programs. This means identifying key nationals working abroad, offering them specific job opportunities and providing expenses of return travel. Thus a not insignificant amount of emigration appears to be temporary; and from this "bank" of human resources overseas (perhaps initially unusable at home) withdrawals may automatically occur if home conditions change for the better.

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III

Let us briefly examine emigration in five developing areas:

East and Southeast Asia

Study of high-level migration from seven Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) shows three of them to be "losers" and four not to be. During the past decade, emigration has been rising, quite significantly, in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. But there is little evidence that these losses have had any significant effect on economic growth; indeed, among LDCs Taiwan and South Korea have been noted for their high growth rates. The underlying explanation of the emigration appears the same in all three countries: a growth in university graduates greater than their economies can absorb. In all three countries (and in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand also) the situation is expected to become worse, not better, because of insistent pressure for educational expansion. At bottom, therefore, the Asian brain drain is an overflow, not a drain. Government officials of affected countries acknowledge the emigration but have not considered it much of a "problem." To the extent governments do voice concern it is frequently more political than substantive—a reflection of frustration with the slow pace of development and a convenient issue with which to embarrass the United States.

Manpower losses have not yet affected Malaysia, Singapore or Thailand in any significant degree and government leaders are not yet concerned that the problem may arise. This unconcern is partly because their stocks of high-level manpower and their education systems are somewhat smaller than in the three "losing" countries, so that up to now their expanding economies have been able to absorb the rising supply of graduates. The low level of emigration from these three countries supports the view that, at least in Asia, emigration is primarily an overflow, not a drain.

Japan has no brain-drain problem of its own nor does it create one for its regional neighbors: it neither drains other Asians into its booming economy nor does it lose any significant numbers to the West. In this neutral experience, Japan illustrates perhaps better than any other country in the world the strength of cultural and linguistic barriers to international migration.

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India

Perhaps 5–10 percent of India's high-level manpower has been permanently or temporarily diverted abroad. The order of magnitude represents the proportion of gross emigration of university-trained Indians with degrees comparable to European or reasonably good American degrees. There is no telling how many of the estimated 30,000 Indians abroad (mostly in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada) may eventually return to India. The best estimate is that something like 15 percent of India's annual output of high-level manpower goes abroad soon after graduation in pursuit of work or further study, and that something like 40 percent of these fail to return. The proportions vary considerably by field of study and by level of degree: the higher the level of study, the greater the loss (*e.g.* perhaps 10–20 percent of Indians with postgraduate degrees are today living and working abroad). The proportion of the new output of engineers who go abroad is today around 25 percent; of doctors, perhaps 30 percent. But these high figures represent little loss in view of the widespread unemployment among engineers and doctors in India. Over the next few years unemployment among educated Indians, including those in science, technology and medicine, is expected to rise, not fall. Consequently any brain drain that may be said to exist concerns only the normal shortage of exceptional people that exists in almost all countries. When specific Indian institutions (*e.g.* the Indian Institute of Technology at Kanpur) have developed careful arrangements to identify and to invite home outstanding individuals needed for specific critical openings, they have often been able to repatriate them even at India's much lower salaries.

There is practically no one, in India or outside, who feels that India's economic growth is being held back because the country has lost educated manpower. Indeed, government officials have more than once said they hoped that educated Indians in large numbers would *not* return, since the country has no way of putting them to work.

East Africa

In Tanzania and Kenya, prior to independence, almost all high-level public and private posts were filled either by Europeans or by members of those countries' large Asian minorities.

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It was only after independence in the early 1960s that large numbers of Africans began to go abroad for higher education and the countries' own systems of secondary and higher education began their rapid expansions. A study of experience in retaining professional manpower in these two countries was made in 1967. It found practically no losses of African high-level manpower but substantial losses among Europeans and Asians, for political and social reasons internal to the host country. Thus East Africa (in which Uganda should also be included) is a region in which emigration has been fairly serious but has very little to do with the "creaming" of the country's educated manpower by the international labor market. The process of Africanization was not being held back by any serious reluctance of East Africans to return from foreign study or to remain after taking up employment at home.

The Middle East

Iran and Turkey are probably the two most interesting countries of the region from the point of view of talent migration. Both have had large numbers of students abroad (most of them self-financed), both have rapidly expanding university systems (although Turkey's is twice as large), and in both countries there has been desultory official and private concern about the brain drain. Both countries also display a phenomenon found in country after country, *i.e.* the piling up of professional manpower in the one or two largest cities, with consequent underemployment of some skills (notably medicine) and chronic difficulty in getting educated people to live and work in the provinces. Thus, Turkey and Iran, like many countries in Latin America, suffer from an *internal* brain drain which is larger and more serious than the external drain that has received all the attention. Finally, both Turkey and Iran provide excellent but isolated examples of well-designed, well-administered and largely successful programs to recapture nationals abroad for service in "modernized" domestic institutions, especially universities and hospitals.

Both Egypt and Israel have experienced relatively heavy numerical losses of educated manpower, but in neither country does this seem to have been an important drag on growth. Until very recently, Egypt firmly discouraged its professional manpower from leaving; but in the first half of this year it adopted

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a policy of openly encouraging educated people to emigrate. The brain drain seems neutral with respect to the development of both countries.

Latin America

The Pan American Health Organization sponsored a study of emigration from Latin America to the United States, covering the period 1961–1965.[8] The study found that, "There is no general drain of highly trained people from Latin American countries." In general, the brain drain has not been a source of tension with the United States, as it has been with some European countries, notably Britain. Some countries have been losing very few people: Mexico, Venezuela, Guatemala, Brazil, Argentina and Chile among them. Nevertheless there have been some heavy losers—Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, for example. During the six years studied, Latin America lost, on average, about 600 scientists, engineers and doctors each year, after subtracting returnees. Half of these were doctors, representing about one in twenty of all Latin American medical graduates each year. (These losses, however, were concentrated from eight medical schools in six countries.) Since many of these doctors (and some others) would not have found useful employment at home, their migration meant that "the United States gains more than they lose." Such remedial action as can be taken lies mainly with the "losing" nations, not with the United States. Since all countries are about equally "exposed" to U.S. influences, this differential impact suggests that the main explanation for high losses must be "attributable primarily to conditions in those countries."

IV

The migration of highly educated, technical manpower will undoubtedly continue to worry governments and to threaten or injure employers throughout the world. But already concern for the problem is on the ebb—in Washington, in other capitals, even in the United Nations, where an emotional debate in 1964 launched the Secretary-General's study of the subject. The main conclusion of the best book on the subject is that if both the

[8] "Migration of Health Personnel, Scientists and Engineers from Latin America." Pan American Health Organization, Scientific Publication No. 142 (Report prepared by Dr. C. V. Kidd). Washington: September 1966. 118 p.

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developed and developing countries concentrate on economic growth the brain drain will largely take care of itself.[4] The outlook, therefore, is that little or nothing will be done by governments or by the United Nations to deal directly with the problem. Thus, half a decade of concern about the brain drain seems to be ending not with a series of proposals for reform but with a "decision by default" to enter the 1970s with the ground rules on migration left essentially unchanged in both gaining and losing countries.

The United Nations Report of November 1968 concluded with "no single, sweeping recommendation" and acknowledged that the relationship between emigration and economic development is not clear. However, on the assumption that emigration "may retard development," the Report offered a set of "preliminary guidelines"—*e.g.* the need for developing countries to adopt "relevant" science policies; to formulate educational and manpower policies "related more closely to their own needs;" to consider the establishment of overseas recruitment offices to repatriate highly trained nationals; to "study the effect which salary levels and related conditions have on the migration of talent and, where possible, to adjust salaries and enhance conditions of professional employment; and to improve statistical data on manpower needs and flows (especially on the return-flows, now largely *terra incognita*)." To developed countries profiting from inflows, the United Nations suggested that they "should feel a special obligation to help [the less developed] countries to improve conditions of education;" that they should conduct more of their own programs of research and development (*e.g.* in tropical agriculture and medicine) in "appropriate centres in developing countries;" that "consideration might be given . . . to establishing an international pool of skilled manpower for development" (supported by financial contributions from brain-gaining countries); that they should join with international agencies to "provide centres affording wider opportunities to scientists and other professional personnel for study and research . . . to reduce professional isolation in developing countries;" and that their universities "should be encouraged to develop policies of their own emphasizing the role of higher education in development" and should cultivate "affiliations" with universities in LDCs.

[4] "The Brain Drain," edited by Walter Adams. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 273 p.

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Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of the U.S. Government has felt it necessary to do anything to reduce immigration by tightening direct controls. Two and one-half years ago the Judiciary Committee of the Senate heard Assistant Secretary of State Charles Frankel review a number of suggested changes in U.S. immigration policy and regulations. The main thrust of Mr. Frankel's testimony was on the need to harmonize the economists' concern for the manpower requirements of developing countries with the humanists' concern for personal freedom and mobility. He declined, for example, to recommend that the United States withdraw its occupational preference system from countries which need the same skills we are seeking, since we cannot set ourselves up as a worldwide judge of every country's skill requirements and since such a policy would call for a complicated new set of international agreements. He demurred at the suggestion that we restrict the privilege of our many "temporary visitors"—exchange visitors, students and temporary workers—to adjust their visas to immigrant status. "Visa-adjustment immigration," he argued, is such a small part of the brain drain to the United States that it would do little good in return for the new restrictions it would impose. Frankel also came out against a related proposal that would tighten up on the existing obligation of certain categories of visitors to leave the United States for two years before qualifying for visa-adjustment as "permanent residents." (Such people might, for example, be required not merely to leave the United States but to return to their home countries; or the waiting-period might be lengthened from two to four years.) Finally, Mr. Frankel chose not to take any position on the proposal that all foreign students in the United States be subjected to this requirement.

In sum, Frankel objected to all the major specific changes that had been proposed and came forward with no new ones of his own. The main "causes" of emigration from developing countries, he felt, lay in the "push" factors found in those countries, and the most important thing the United States could do to help was to continue and to expand its foreign assistance for institution-building, particularly the building of research and educational institutions capable of attracting and holding professional people. As for the special problem of medical doctors, Mr. Frankel acknowledged that the United States should indeed

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expand its own training programs.[5] The one Congressional subcommittee that conducted staff studies of the problem in recent years made several recommendations, not one of which aroused any interest in Congress.

One of the more interesting proposals that has been heard among a few economists is that brain-gaining countries should compensate losing countries for the costs involved in producing this "export." Is it not grossly unfair that Egypt or India should invest the equivalent of $20–40,000 in producing a doctor, engineer or physicist only to have him emigrate before he repays his country, in the form of services rendered, for the costs of his expensive education? While a good case can be made for this view on grounds of equity and logic, no one has made any specific proposals. I doubt that such a scheme could be made administratively feasible or that it could overcome the fatal appearance of requiring immigrants to buy their freedom.

A two-year study by Education and World Affairs[6] concluded that it would be a mistake to try to reduce international migration either by tightening up controls on immigration or emigration or by slowing down production in the educational systems of developing countries—the two main categories of brain-drain proposals. Instead, the EWA study emphasizes that the brain-losing countries' top-priority task is to improve the conditions under which the "critical élite" are expected to work. Political, administrative and institutional leaders in developing countries must realize that professional men normally have dual loyalties, divided between their country and their intellectual and professional careers. Losses of key professional leaders will continue unless the conditions of work in their countries can satisfy such elemental needs as minimum salary requirements to permit full-time employment, recognition of individual talent and creativity, adequate progression through career channels, increased labor mobility and opportunities to maintain and cultivate contacts with professional counterparts abroad. The EWA viewpoint amounts to saying that professional men the world over have much the same requirements for job satisfaction and, unless the

[5] We produced 9,862 doctors in 1956; eleven years later the figure had increased by less than 10 percent. Today approximately one out of three new doctors entering practice in the United States is an immigrant trained abroad.

[6] The author was one of six members of this study committee to investigate the International Migration of Talent and is heavily indebted to its discussion and research. EWA's findings and conclusions will be published early in 1970.

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traditional cultures and pay scales of many brain-losing countries (developed and less developed alike) can adapt to these requirements, then, in Kenneth Boulding's phrase, high-level manpower with "get-up-and-go will get up and go."

V

"Stopping migration is not a rational goal," as a Senate subcommittee was reminded in 1967 by Dr. C. V. Kidd, chairman of the EWA study. On the contrary, migration is "good" and more migration is "better"—within limits. Any change in laws and regulations affects in some way the settings on the valves that regulate the amount and direction of migration. But within the limits defined by how the valves are set at any time, the volume of migration will be determined by a complex mixture of "push" and "pull" forces. A major lesson of recent research is an increased respect for the strength of non-salary considerations underlying migration, particularly those related to the working conditions of professionals in their home countries. The more important of these factors are weak budgetary support for research; traditionally hierarchic status systems in academic and governmental institutions which deny satisfying opportunities to able younger men; the poverty of intellectual stimulation (poor libraries, weak professional associations, inability to secure foreign journals, rare opportunities for foreign travel) which creative minds require; career insecurity resulting from political intrusions at the personal and institutional levels; and unemployment and underemployment. These domestic forces ("push forces") would be operative even if there were no salary differentials to throw into the balance. One of the most important conclusions to come out of the EWA research is that countries can withstand quite considerable salary differentials if these other factors are favorable.

The central problem in helping developing countries retain their high-level manpower is to combine respect for individual freedom with the need to minimize the emigration of key people. There is great reluctance in both developed and developing countries to attack the problem directly through tightening controls on emigration or immigration. There is growing awareness that an indirect approach, one focused on causes instead of symptoms, *can* be effective: poor countries *can* compete—because most men have strong ties to their own countries. But many coun-

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tries need help—and nudging—before they will be in a position to profit from the basic loyalty of their professionals.

Among the problems needing attention if brain-losing countries are to compete more effectively for professional manpower are the following: improving counseling services for foreign students before and after arrival in their country of study; assisting in the establishment of more effective "recapture" mechanisms for institutions and countries interested in repatriating nationals studying or working abroad; greatly increasing the U.S. output of medical personnel; experimenting with new health-delivery systems in poor countries to reduce the largely futile dependence on overtrained physicians who, quite understandably, will not live out where most of the people are; assisting—as we have been doing for years, but with more variety and money—the building up of foreign institutions that can offer satisfying careers to the key individuals who count so heavily. These reforms—not reforms in migration controls—are the kinds of things to focus on if we wish to put the brain drain in perspective. In short, we can afford to be relatively relaxed about migration but not to be complacent about its causes.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

AMBASSADOR'S JOURNAL: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE KENNEDY YEARS. By John Kenneth Galbraith. Boston: Houghton, 1969, 656 p. $10.00.

An interesting if wry memoir, which despite occasional aperçus about India tells more about the author than the country to which he was assigned. He was prophetic in warning President Kennedy repeatedly against the deepening American involvement in Viet Nam, and in that sense the past here often becomes prologue.

POWER. By Adolf A. Berle. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969, 603 p. $10.00.

A brave attempt to construct a general theory of power through "five laws" which are seen by the author as universally valid in human society. There is much that is challenging and thoughtful in this book, but the publisher's claim that it is "the first comprehensive treatise on the subject since Machiavelli's 'The Prince'" is somewhat exaggerated.

GANDHI'S TRUTH: ON THE ORIGINS OF MILITANT NONVIOLENCE. By Erik H. Erikson. New York: Norton, 1969, 474 p. $10.00.

This splendid book far transcends a study of Gandhi the man and national leader. It is in fact a rediscovery of the psychoanalytic method through its application in a non-Western setting. Gandhi's spirit is caught in flight.

POLITICAL THINKING AND CONSCIOUSNESS. By Robert E. Lane. Chicago: Markham, 1969, 348 p. $6.95.

A psychopolitical study exploring the private and often unconscious wellsprings of the political ideas of college students. The book is a valuable contribution to the bridge-building process between politics and social psychology.

NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES. By Karl W. Deutsch. New York: Knopf, 1969, 200 p. $5.95.

In this essay on nationalism one of the leading authorities on the subject combines traditional and modern behavioral research techniques in a judicious manner made palatable for the general reader.

TECHNOCRACY. By Jean Meynaud. New York: Free Press, 1969, 315 p. $12.95.

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An impassioned plea to rescue politics from the technocrats and "electronic fascism" and to give it back to the politicians who are responsible to the people. The author, a French scholar, generalizes his findings to all modern democracies in the West, but much of the evidence is marshalled from the experience of his homeland. (French edition published in 1964.)

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS. By Roger Fisher. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 231 p. $5.95.

Good practical sense, bargaining theory and the role of law are blended in this refreshingly simple yet politically sophisticated book.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY: A REPORT BY THE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. Edited by Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere. New York: Praeger, 1969, 274 p. $6.95.

A highly informative study on the "nuts and bolts" of the policy-planning and coördination process in national security matters. After an exhaustive scrutiny of the available machinery, the authors conclude, not surprisingly, that "the force of personality of the President and his principal advisers" is more important than any formal organization procedures.

POLITICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 328 p. $7.50.

Ten essays—all on a high intellectual plane—seeking to relate economics, history, anthropology, psychology, psychiatry, sociology and statistics to the study of politics.

THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE: PAST AND PROSPECTS. By Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul E. Sigmund. New York: Praeger, 1969, 192 p. $5.95.

This book presents one of the most succinct analyses written to date of the relevance—or irrelevance—of Western democracy to the developing world.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. By William L. Tung. New York: Crowell, 1969, 415 p. $7.50.

A scholarly treatment of the subject, with a strong legal and structural emphasis.

NATIONALISM—THE LAST STAGE OF COMMUNISM. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Funk, 1969, 369 p. $10.00.

A readable, though in places somewhat cursory, *tour d'horizon* of the metamorphoses of the communist movement, with emphasis on the period of polycentrism.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Charles E. Bohlen. New York: Norton, 1969, 130 p. $3.95.

Five lectures on U.S.-Soviet relations, delivered at Columbia University in 1969 by the former Ambassador to Moscow.

TRUTH IS THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR —ILLUSION AND REALITY. By Joseph C. Goulden. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, 285 p. $6.95.

A rather persuasive exposé on the Gulf of Tonkin affair in 1964. The author reveals some striking gaps between the "illusion" and the "reality" of the event. His conclusions are frightening enough even though they may be overdrawn.

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EMPIRE AND REVOLUTION: A RADICAL INTERPRETATION OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY. By David Horowitz. New York: Random House, 1969, 274 p. $5.95.

A highly polemical and unoriginal broadside against imperialism, both Western and Soviet, with a pronounced Trotskyist bias.

THE INTERNATIONAL ATLAS. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, 503 p. $34.95.

Here at last is a one-volume world atlas of genuine excellence. In a manageable format (11" × 14½" page size) are 280 pages of superb maps in five series, each consistent in scale and cartography. Generally, geographic names are in the local language. Also 223 pages of text and photographs, charts, index and glossary in English, French, Spanish and German.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK: STATISTICAL AND HISTORICAL ANNUAL OF THE STATES OF THE WORLD FOR THE YEAR 1969–1970. Edited by S. H. Steinberg and John Paxton. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 1,558 p. $12.50.

An immensely useful reference work on the world's states, regional organizations and the United Nations, compressed into some 1500 pages.

AEROSPACE LAW. By Nicolas Mateesco Matte. Toronto: Carswell, 1969, 501 p.

An exhaustive compendium.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE MIGHTY ENDEAVOR: AMERICAN ARMED FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER IN WORLD WAR II. By Charles B. MacDonald. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 564 p. $12.50.

A comprehensive history of the American military contribution in World War II, in the air, on the sea and on the ground. Very good on the crucial battles, but a bit cavalier on some strategic questions at war's end, such as Eisenhower's decision to leave Prague and Berlin to the Russians.

CONTROLLING SMALL WARS: A STRATEGY FOR THE 1970's. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss. New York: Knopf, 1969, 421 p. $8.95.

From a number of well-researched case studies the authors draw inferences for the future that exhibit an unusual combination of conceptual imagination and practical sense.

THE RED ORCHESTRA. By Gilles Perrault. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969, 512 p. $7.95.

An excellent account of the famous Soviet spy ring in Nazi Germany, and especially of its Jewish leader, Leopold Trepper. (The original French edition appeared in 1967.)

COUP D'ÉTAT: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK. By Edward Luttwak. New York: Knopf, 1969, 209 p. $4.95.

A recipe book on how to overthrow governments. Cold-blooded and impressive. Makes a useful companion piece to "The Prince."

REBELS AGAINST WAR. By Lawrence S. Wittner. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 339 p. $10.00.

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This is a scholarly and balanced assessment of the American peace movement from Pearl Harbor to 1960. The author concludes that "the peace movement proved considerably more sophisticated than is commonly thought." One would hope for a sequel to this book to cover the 1960s.

WAR AND/OR SURVIVAL. By William V. O'Brien. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 289 p. $5.95.

An intelligent and well-conceptualized probing into the dilemmas of war, morality and law, by a Catholic scholar.

INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION IN NATO. By Francis A. Beer. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969, 330 p. $10.00.

A solid and thorough study concentrating on organizational and administrative problems faced by the Alliance. Some of the material, unfortunately, is highly vulnerable to quick obsolescence.

THE LITTLE WARS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy and Major General William H. Baumer. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968, 226 p. $6.95.

Seven vignettes ranging from the war with France in 1798 to the intervention in Russia in 1918. One interesting episode: In 1900, a combined Russo-American drive cleared the way for the decisive charge against the Boxers in Peking.

LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE. By Henri Michel. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1968–69, 2 v. Fr. 108.

A standard history of World War II.

ZWISCHEN ALLEN FRONTEN: DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG AUS DER SICHT DES BÜROS HA. By Alphons Matt. Frauenfeld: Huber, 1969, 329 p. Swiss Fr. 19.80.

Revealing extracts from the archives of "Büro Ha," the Swiss Information Agency during World War II, about major military developments on both the Eastern and Western fronts.

General: Economic and Social

DYNAMISCHE WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By Fritz Baade. Munich: List Verlag, 1969, 503 p. DM. 36.

A senior German economist, formerly the head of the Institut für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel, argues that the dynamic world economy is capable of supporting a great increase in population with rising living standards. He devotes most of his space to food, energy, raw materials and transportation, but calls for the industrialization of the less developed countries as well.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS AFTER THE KENNEDY ROUND. Edited by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1969, 224 p. Gldrs. 28.

Papers prepared for an international conference reflecting many different points of view. Largely about trade.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT 1947–1967. By Karin Kock. Stockholm: Almqvist, 1969, 334 p. Swedish Kr. 45.

Valuable analysis focusing on half a dozen of the key problems encountered in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The author is a Swedish economist who has also been a civil servant, diplomat and Cabinet member.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GUIDE FOR DEVELOPMENT: INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND REFORM. By Hiram S. Phillips. New York: Praeger, 1969, 282 p. $15.00.

An experienced aid official provides "a practical guide" for those trying to create institutions that will bring about development and reform. Several case studies.

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: EMPLOYMENT AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT. By S. A. Kuz'min. White Plains (N.Y.): International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969, 108 p. $15.00.

A Soviet economist sees advantages in the encouragement of labor-intensive modes of production in developing countries as auxiliaries to "the production of the means of production."

LA POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE DES PRINCIPAUX PAYS INDUSTRIELS DE L'OCCIDENT. By Jean Saint-Geours. Paris: Sirey, 1969, 576 p. Fr. 62.

A systematic treatise on economic policy-making with much comparative data.

LEADS AND LAGS: THE MAIN CAUSE OF DEVALUATION. By Paul Einzig. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 169 p. $5.50.

A veteran financial journalist puts new emphasis on the familiar phenomenon of speeding up or slowing down payments when a currency seems weak.

FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT. By Raymond W. Goldsmith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 561 p. $12.50.

A weighty comparative study with material from many countries put together in unfamiliar patterns.

INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES OF THE LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION. By Hang-sheng Cheng. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1969, 95 p. $3.95.

Rejecting the usual explanations for the slight use of international bond issues by developing countries, the author, an economics professor, propounds a novel scheme for channeling capital into bonds under World Bank surveillance.

FISCAL SYSTEMS. By Richard A. Musgrave. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 397 p. $10.00.

A thoroughgoing comparative study dealing with developed and less developed countries and also problems of international coördination.

THE MONEY MEN OF EUROPE. By Paul Ferris. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 278 p. $6.95.

Names and numbers of the gnomes of Zurich and their cousins in other countries. A popularly written behavioral study.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. By John Fayerweather. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 220 p. $3.95 (Paper).

This effort to find a broad and consistent basis for looking at problems of international business reflects the widely felt need for theory in the social sciences.

THE OIL IMPORT PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES: AN EVALUATION. By Edward H. Shaffer. New York: Praeger, 1968, 257 p. $17.00.

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A helpful guide through the changing intricacies of the oil import quotas. The economist author questions the program's contribution to security and underlines the advantages gained by some major oil companies.

THE INTERNATIONAL FILM INDUSTRY: WESTERN EUROPE AND AMERICA SINCE 1945. By Thomas H. Guback. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969, 244 p. $10.00.

An exceptionally interesting pioneering work. Deeply involved in the international economy and with an overlay of cultural (or propagandistic) relevance, the American film industry has some rather special problems in economics, policy and governmental relations which have not been much studied and, on the evidence of this first-rate book by a young American professor, clearly ought to be.

A GLOBAL CORPORATION: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF MASSEY-FERGUSON LIMITED. By E. P. Neufeld. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969, 427 p. $15.00.

This detailed history of the Canadian-based producer of farm equipment stresses the effect of international horizons on its development.

LAND REFORM IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE. By Doreen Warriner. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 457 p. $8.75.

A leading student of land reform here deals with the basic problems of this complicated subject and analyzes the experience of a number of countries.

The United States

PRESENT AT THE CREATION. By Dean Acheson. New York: Norton, 1969, 798 p. $15.00.

An incredibly rich and detailed *recherche du temps perdu* about the author's years in the State Department, with affectionate emphasis on the Truman years. The forceful personality of the author emerges most clearly from these pages.

THE LIMITS OF INTERVENTION. By Townsend Hoopes. New York: McKay, 1969, 245 p. $5.95.

This valuable and revealing account by a former Under Secretary of the Air Force shows the evolution of the crisis of conscience among a number of men—in particular Paul H. Nitze and Clark M. Clifford—that finally persuaded President Johnson to reverse his Viet Nam policy on March 31, 1968.

ADLAI STEVENSON: PATRICIAN AMONG THE POLITICIANS. By Bert Cochran. New York: Funk, 1969, 424 p. $10.00.

Stevenson is presented as "the upper-class man in American politics" in this well-researched political biography. The author concludes with the controversial thought that "Stevenson's tragedy would have been more brutal had he attained the pinnacle of power." Viet Nam would have engulfed him too since "he had no different answers from those promulgated by Kennedy and Johnson."

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES. By W. Wendell Blancké. New York: Praeger, 1969, 286 p. $7.95.

This book by a retired Foreign Service Officer about his profession is both instructive and entertaining—indeed one of the best on the subject.

THE KENNEDY LEGACY. By Theodore C. Sorensen. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 414 p. $6.95.

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An affectionate profile of the two assassinated brothers and a somewhat labored effort to project their influence into the future. The author also claims that John Kennedy would not have Americanized the Vietnamese war.

85 DAYS: THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF ROBERT KENNEDY. By Jules Witcover. New York: Putnam, 1969, 347 p. $6.95.

A very personal and often moving account including some sharply etched episodes from the Oregon defeat and the California victory. The eyewitness account of the assassination is detailed and harrowing.

THE YEAR OF THE PEOPLE. By Eugene J. McCarthy. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 323 p. $6.95.

A pleasant and low-keyed report of the campaign, interspersed liberally with quotes from numerous poets. No political surprises.

McCARTHY FOR PRESIDENT. By Arthur Herzog. New York: Viking, 1969, 309 p. $6.95.

A key figure in the McCarthy candidacy has written a fast-paced and often intimate account of the campaign from New Hampshire to California.

THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: SECURITY ON TRIAL. By Philip M. Stern with the collaboration of Harold P. Green. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 591 p. $10.00.

The author of this arresting and detailed narrative not only finds for the defendant but delivers a strong indictment of the American loyalty-security system. The book is somewhat lacking in depth, but it is persuasively argued.

PRIME TIME: THE LIFE OF EDWARD R. MURROW. By Alexander Kendrick. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 548 p. $8.95.

A somewhat overlong chronicle of the great broadcaster's career. The highlights are well told: "This is London," the confrontation with Joe McCarthy, Korea, and the USIA. Throughout the entire book one theme recurs consistently: Ed Murrow's impeccable integrity.

AMERICA SINCE 1920. By Daniel Snowman. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 192 p. $5.95.

A perceptive and, on the whole, not unfriendly essay, by a British scholar.

CONFRONTATION: THE STUDENT REBELLION AND THE UNIVERSITIES. Edited by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol. New York: Basic Books, 1969, 191 p. $5.95.

One of the better symposia on student unrest by nine well-qualified contributors.

The Western Hemisphere

THE OAS IN TRANSITION. By M. Margaret Ball. Durham: Duke University Press, 1969, 721 p. $19.50.

A scholarly treatment—massive, diligent, well documented—of all aspects of the OAS, past and present. Even the future is not neglected, for prospective changes are also included in this thorough scrutiny. Indispensable for serious students of the hemispheric organization.

HACIA AMERICA LATINA DEMOCRATICA E INTEGRADA. By Romulo Betancourt. Madrid: Taurus Ediciones, 1969, 265 p.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The distinguished ex-President of Venezuela sets forth in the first of several projected volumes his thoughts on Latin American political issues and economic unity. Several important speeches and excerpts from private correspondence add interest and value. (First published in 1967.)

ÉCONOMIES ET SOCIÉTÉS DE L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE. By Pierre Léon. Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1969, 480 p. Fr. 19.50.

A century and a half of complex social, political and economic development is summarized by a French academic. An able and thoughtful volume.

REVOLUTION IN MEXICO: YEARS OF UPHEAVAL, 1910–1940. Edited by James W. Wilkie and Albert L. Michaels. New York: Knopf, 1969, 300 p. $4.50.

Forty-eight short selections, covering Mexican life in its full heterogeneity, by participants, scholars and other commentators. Prefatory notes provide background and continuity.

SUBVERSION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN COLOMBIA. By Orlando Fals Borda. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 238 p. $6.95.

An attempt by a Colombian sociologist to delineate the constructive contributions of subversion to the life of his country, today and in the past. The treatment is scholarly, the viewpoint left of center.

THE SHAPING OF MODERN BRAZIL. Edited by Eric N. Baklanoff. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969, 164 p. $6.50.

Seven experts describe the modernization process in Brazil, in essays covering the country's history, politics, economics, geography and educational system. Condensed but authoritative.

URUGUAY: A CONTEMPORARY SURVEY. By Marvin Alisky. New York: Praeger, 1969, 174 p. $6.50.

A summary, well done but necessarily brief, of all aspects of Uruguayan life, including its geographical basis, economy, politics, culture and foreign relations.

POLITICS AND SOCIAL FORCES IN CHILEAN DEVELOPMENT. By James Petras. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 377 p. $8.50.

The political process in Chile, and social classes and groups, are well described in this careful work. Comments on the role of government are significant: "The predominant feature in the outlook of the entrepreneurs and bureaucrats is 'statism.'"

ARGENTINA. By H. S. Ferns. New York: Praeger, 1969, 284 p. $7.50.

A British scholar presents Argentina in its variety and complexity, from colonial times to Onganía. A superior book, written with insight and literary skill, by an author who is both knowledgeable and intuitive.

THE GREAT REBEL: CHE GUEVARA IN BOLIVIA. By Luis J. González and Gustavo A. Sánchez Salazar. New York: Grove Press, 1969, 254 p. $7.95.

Two Bolivian journalists present a well-written account of the 1967 insurgency in which Guevara's remarkable career came to its end. Generally sympathetic to Guevara, the book is nevertheless candid and authentic, incorporating hitherto unavailable first-hand sources.

UNIVERSITY STUDENTS AND REVOLUTION IN CUBA, 1920–1968. By Jaime Suchlicki. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1969, 177 p. $6.95.

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A balanced account, free of fanaticism and dogma, of the student movement in the context of Cuban life. The references to current student apathy and military training are interesting.

PAPA DOC: THE TRUTH ABOUT HAITI TODAY. By Bernard Diederich and Al Burt. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 393 p. $8.95.

The rather lurid story of mid-century Haiti and Duvalier's first ten years of dictatorship. The treatment is journalistic and somewhat brash, but vivid and informed. Lacks a bibliography and an index.

Western Europe

EUROPE AFTER DE GAULLE. By Lord Gladwyn. New York: Taplinger, 1969, 169 p. $4.95.

A timely plea to his fellow-Britons to prepare themselves for the probable post-Gaullist opening to join Europe. The former ambassador in Paris dissects de Gaulle's foreign policy in empathetic fashion, but firmly believes that Europe with Britain will supplant the narrower Gaullist vision.

EUROPE'S FUTURES, EUROPE'S CHOICES: MODELS OF WESTERN EUROPE IN THE 1970s. Edited by Alastair Buchan. New York: Columbia University Press (for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London), 1969, 167 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Six directions in which Europe can move from the present "moment of slack water in the tide of European affairs, of uncertainty and of frustration." A sober and suggestive appraisal, not of what European powers ought to do but of what they can do—and with what likely harm and benefit to themselves and others.

HUMANISM AND TERROR: AN ESSAY ON THE COMMUNIST PROBLEM. By Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969, 189 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.95).

Twenty-two years ago, a French philosopher attacked the anti-communist implications of Koestler's "Darkness at Noon" and demanded greater awareness of Western wickedness and of the humanistic basis of Soviet life, despite terror. Now available in English, it proves to be a timely tract, given today's apologists for revolutionary terror. *Plus ça change. . . .*

TIDES OF FORTUNE, 1945–1955. By Harold Macmillan. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 729 p. $15.00.

This third volume of Macmillan's political autobiography might well be entitled "The Making of a Prime Minister." Covering the postwar decade, it is not quite as engrossing as the preceding "The Blast of War" and the craftsmanship and style are not of the same high order. Some of the best passages cover Churchill's last prime ministership. Readers will look forward to Macmillan's description of his own.

TWENTY YEARS OF NATIONALISATION: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE. By R. Kelf-Cohen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, 339 p. $9.50.

An undogmatic review of the premises of nationalization and the actual results achieved in British industry. By a former civil servant with considerable experience in this tangled field.

WHITEHALL DIARY. By Thomas Jones, Edited by Keith Middlemas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 2 v. $8.75 each.

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Intimate glimpses of the workings of the British government, especially valuable for the First World War and the immediate postwar period, by a member of the Cabinet Secretariat, who on his appointment in 1916 resolved "to act as a fluid person moving about among people who mattered." He did just that—to his own pleasure and that of his present readers. (Volume I covers the period 1916–1925; volume II, 1926–1930.)

CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1914–1965. By Michael R. Gordon. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969, 333 p. $8.95.

The frequent, violent divisions within the Labor Party concerning foreign policy analyzed against the background of socialist premises and shifting political realities. An important and informative study, cogently argued and well written, by an American political scientist. Of interest to anyone concerned with the ambivalent role of ideals in the discussion of foreign policy.

SCOTTISH NATIONALISM. By H. J. Hanham. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 250 p. $5.50.

A sympathetic study of Scottish nationalism, its history and present cultural and political basis. By a New Zealand scholar, now teaching in the United States.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FALL OF FRANCE IN 1940. By William L. Shirer. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969, 1,082 p. $12.50.

A detailed but highly readable account of the French political scene in the years before the debacle of 1940. The veteran journalist turned historian sticks quite closely to the colorful political surface.

A SECOND IDENTITY: ESSAYS ON FRANCE AND FRENCH HISTORY. By Richard Cobb. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 316 p. $8.50.

These spirited and learned essays, by a British don, attest anew to the pleasures and rewards of studying history, especially French history. Cobb's second identity was developed over 35 years of exceptional intimacy with French life.

INDUSTRIAL PLANNING IN FRANCE. By John H. McArthur and Bruce R. Scott. Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research, 1969, 592 p. $12.00.

Though the state has played an important part in French industry in the middle and late '60s, this influence has not come through the planning process. Neither has planning greatly influenced the government's principal industrial measures. In reaching these conclusions after close and extended study aided by many insiders, two professors at the Harvard Business School challenge some of the received wisdom about the French economy. They offer some interesting explanations which have implications for industrial policy in open economies.

LE CONTRAT SOCIALISTE. By Robert Fossaert. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969, 285 p.

An analysis of the present disarray of the French Left and bold speculation on how it should define its future role and program.

COMBATS INACHEVÉS. By Paul-Henri Spaak. Paris: Fayard, 1969, 2 v. Fr. 47.

Small powers sometimes produce great international servants, as these frank and fascinating memoirs attest. For nearly thirty years, Spaak directed Belgian foreign policy and had considerable influence on the whole Atlantic world. A major historical source for the world since 1940.

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ERINNERUNGEN, 1959–1963: FRAGMENTE. By Konrad Adenauer. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968, 375 p. DM. 19.80.

A series of notes concerning the Chancellor's major diplomatic encounters in the last four years of his government. In these unreflective recollections of great value and immediacy, Adenauer's passion for Europe dominates, as does his fear of Soviet Communism and of American withdrawal. Anti-communism could take many forms and, in 1961, he admonished de Gaulle "to create for France a social life that would make that life meaningful and worthwhile even for the younger generation." Altogether a fitting memorial to a towering figure from what already seems like a remote past.

AUSSENPOLITIK IN ADENAUERS KANZLERDEMOKRATIE. By Arnulf Baring. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1969, 492 p. DM. 38.

A penetrating analysis of the early years of Adenauer's foreign policy. The book stops with the defeat of EDC in 1954 which ended his hope of West German integration into Western Europe. His brilliant statesmanship abroad is contrasted with his obtuseness in the practice of political democracy at home. Written by a young political scientist, with literary flair from the very opening sentence: "In the beginning was Adenauer."

WIDERSTAND—STAATSSTREICH—ATTENTAT. By Peter Hoffmann. Munich: Piper, 1969, 988 p. DM. 58.

The most painstaking reconstruction of all internal attempts at overthrowing the Hitler régime. Scholarly, scrupulously detailed, lucid and dramatic, with much new information, especially on the security arrangements protecting Hitler. By a young German historian.

OHNE MASKE: HITLER—BREITING GEHEIMGESPRÄCHE 1931. By Edouard Calic. Frankfurt/Main: Societäts-Verlag, 1968, 233 p. DM. 12.80.

Hitler's extraordinary ability to bully and confuse an interlocutor and his unbridled hatred of the German *Bürgertum* emerge as two of the most important aspects of these confidential interviews from 1931.

WEIMAR CULTURE: THE OUTSIDER AS INSIDER. By Peter Gay. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 205 p. $5.95.

A spirited essay on a colorful cultural epoch, by a well-known historian.

THE DECLINE OF THE GERMAN MANDARINS: THE GERMAN ACADEMIC COMMUNITY, 1890–1933. By Fritz K. Ringer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 528 p. $13.50.

A valuable scholarly study of the German professoriat in the decades before Hitler. Depicting an educational system in crisis and decline, the book has more than purely historical interest.

DEUTSCHLAND UND DER ERSTE WELTKRIEG. By Peter Graf Kielmansegg. Frankfurt/Main: Athenaion, 1968, 747 p. DM. 59.

A scholarly and comprehensive account, based on a judicious scrutiny of the mass of new material published during the last few years.

EAST GERMANY. By David Childs. New York: Praeger, 1969, 286 p. $7.50.

Power attracts attention, and East Germany is becoming steadily more powerful. This informative work pays particular attention to East German reactions to the Czech crisis of 1968.

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IM KAMPF GEGEN HITLER. By Kurt Schuschnigg. Vienna: Molden, 1969, 472 p.

In this important work the hapless Chancellor weaves together his own recollections and historic evidence to narrate the demise of Austria. Restrained in tone, yet unwittingly revealing of the many blind spots that afflicted Austrian policy before the *Anschluss*.

MODERN ICELAND. By John C. Griffiths. New York: Praeger, 1969, 226 p. $6.00.

An English writer presents a readable and useful introduction to contemporary Iceland.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

DILEMMAS OF CHANGE IN SOVIET POLITICS. Edited by Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 163 p. $7.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Essays and debate on the nature, reality and possible direction of political change in Russia, originally appearing in the journal *Problems of Communism*.

MARXISM AND SOCIOLOGY: VIEWS FROM EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Peter L. Berger. New York: Appleton, 1969, 246 p. $6.50 (Paper, $3.95).

A symposium of essays by ten East European sociologists centering on some of the theoretical issues between Marxist and non-Marxist sociology.

ONLY ONE YEAR. By Svetlana Alliluyeva. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 444 p. $7.95.

The year is from December 1966 to December 1967, during which Stalin's daughter left Russia for India and ultimately made her decision to come to the United States. The book contains numerous interesting flashbacks to events and personalities in the Stalin and Khrushchev years. For those who seek only revelations or are intent on proving something, these recollections are likely to be disappointing. But if the reader will be content to let the author tell her story and offer her reflections he will find this to be a very rewarding and mature work.

REVOLUTION UND STAAT: INSTITUTIONEN ALS TRÄGER DER MACHT IN SOWJETRUSSLAND 1917–1922. By Walter Pietsch. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969, 172 p.

An interesting analysis of the formation of the Bolshevik régime and the Soviet state, emphasizing the role of institutions as the necessary means for gaining and establishing power.

50 JAHRE SOWJETRECHT. Edited by Reinhart Maurach and Boris Meissner. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969, 192 p. DM. 22.50.

Essays on the evolution of various facets of Soviet public, civil and criminal laws.

SOVIET NATIONAL INCOME, 1958–1964. By Abraham S. Becker. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 608 p. $19.75.

A calculation of national accounts for each of the years of the Seven Year Plan 1959–1965, aimed at ascertaining the pattern of change in Soviet national income and output. Based upon, and continuing, the procedures developed by Abram Bergson.

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THE GREAT FRIENDSHIP: SOVIET HISTORIANS ON THE NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES. By Lowell Tillett. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969, 468 p. $12.50.

A study of the vicissitudes of Soviet historiography with respect to Russian colonialism and the non-Russian nationalities.

THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND THEIR SOCIETY. By Pierre Sorlin. New York: Praeger, 1969, 293 p. $7.00 (Paper, $2.95).

A sympathetic account, by a French sociologist, of the trials and tribulations of the Soviet people in the years since 1917.

THE RISE AND FALL OF T. D. LYSENKO. By Zhores A. Medvedev. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 284 p. $10.00.

A translation of a Soviet scientist's account of the ravages wrought by Lysenkoism in Soviet biology and of the struggle to eliminate it. The manuscript has not yet been published in the U.S.S.R.

LABOUR DISPUTES IN SOVIET RUSSIA: 1957–1965. By Mary McAuley. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 269 p. $6.75.

A useful effort to surmount both Soviet mythology and Western stereotypes, and to get at the realities of labor disputes and the means for dealing with them.

OPPOSITION IN THE U.S.S.R., 1917–1967. By Roland Gaucher. New York: Funk, 1969, 547 p. $10.00.

An extended account of the numerous oppositional individuals and movements, at home or in exile, through the course of Soviet history: Whites, Kronstadt rebels, Makno, Trotsky, Vlassov, Ukrainian nationalists and many others. Useful chiefly for its effort to bring relatively familiar but scattered stories into a single narrative.

DER SOWJETRUSSISCHE PARTISANENKRIEG 1941 BIS 1944. By Erich Hesse. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1969, 292 p. DM. 58.

A dissertation on the origins and development of Soviet partisan warfare, as reflected in the German military and political documents.

SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS, 1917–1921. By Piotr S. Wandycz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 403 p. $10.00.

Following a concise review of the long and troubled course of Russian-Polish relations, Professor Wandycz makes a detailed and scholarly study of diplomatic and military affairs in the crucial years when both the Polish Republic and the Soviet régime were struggling into existence. Echoes of these years continue to the present.

PRAGUE SPRING. By Z. A. B. Zeman. New York: Hill and Wang, 1969, 167 p. $5.00.

A Prague-born British scholar gives a personal account of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia that burgeoned and was crushed in 1968.

PRAGUE: LA RÉVOLUTION ÉTRANGLÉE. By Michel Salomon. Paris: Laffont, 1968, 381 p. Fr. 20.

A French journalist reports on Czechoslovakia's "eight months of democratic socialism," 1967–68.

LE DEUXIÈME COUP DE PRAGUE. By Jacques Marcelle. Brussels: Les Éditions Vie Ouvrière, 1968, 295 p. Belgian Fr. 180.

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A quite interesting account of the rapid changes in Czech life and politics in the months preceding the Soviet invasion of August 20, 1968.

MEIN KOMMANDEUR, GENERAL SVOBODA: VOM URAL ZUM HRADSCHIN. By Teodor Fiš. Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1969, 158 p.

An account of Ludvik Svoboda's activities in the war years as leader of Czechoslovak troops in the Soviet Union.

JUGOSLAWIEN UND DAS DRITTE REICH. By Johann Wuescht. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969, 359 p. DM. 28.

A history, with documents, of Jugoslav-German relations from 1933 to 1945. The documents are important, the interpretation is bound to be controversial.

SOLDATEN GEGEN DEMOKRATEN: MILITÄRDIKTATUR IN GRIECHENLAND. By Ansgar Skriver. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1968, 197 p. DM. 10.

A German journalist's presentation of the events of the first year following the April 1967 coup in Athens.

The Middle East

THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST: 1914–1924. By Howard M. Sachar. New York: Knopf, 1969, 518 p. $12.50.

In a dramatic presentation of what was in itself high drama, the end of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the many conflicts born of its collapse, the author draws on recent research by many scholars and thus provides a new and welcome addition to the earlier standard works on the period.

ENCOUNTER WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. By Winston Burdett. New York: Atheneum, 1969, 384 p. $10.00.

"A reporter's book and not a historian's," in the author's own words, but he has done some careful searching to supplement his own observations on the critical events of 1966 and 1967.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by Claire Nader and A. B. Zahlan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969, 588 p. $16.00.

Application of advanced scientific and technological methods to the development problems of the Middle East is discussed by a group of specialists, primarily American and Arab. The book contains, *inter alia,* a wealth of information on the place of science in Middle East universities. (Proceedings of a conference held at the American University, Beirut, in 1967.)

MY "WAR" WITH ISRAEL. By Hussein of Jordan; as told to and with additional material by Vick Vance and Pierre Lauer. New York: Morrow, 1969, 170 p. $5.95.

A curiously disorganized book which nevertheless deserves attention because of its frank exposition of the King's views, especially on relations with other Arab states.

THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL: THE TOUSLED DIPLOMATIC BED. By Herbert Feis. New York: Norton, 1969, 90 p. $3.95.

A rather thin historical essay enlivened by good writing and some interesting sidelights on Anglo-American controversies in the 1946–48 period.

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MILITARY AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL: NATION-BUILDING AND ROLE EXPANSION. By Amos Perlmutter. New York: Praeger, 1969, 161 p. $6.50.

A cool and informal look at civil-military relations in Israel in all their complexity. The extensive material on the pre-independence period is as valuable as the analysis of the army's position today, and essential to an understanding of it.

THE ARABS AND ISRAEL: A BACKGROUND BOOK. By Charles Douglas-Home. Chester Springs (Pa.): Dufour Editions, 1969, 121 p. $3.50.

This little book by a correspondent of *The Times* of London combines the bare bones of "background" with some arresting and well thought-out personal views.

PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: THE LETHAL DILEMMA. By Hisham Sharabi. New York: Pegasus, 1969, 224 p. $6.95.

This sharp and inevitably controversial book contains a strong critique of U.S. policy toward the Arab world since World War II, a sympathetic and penetrating examination of the roots of Arab attitudes, and the author's own conclusions on the main elements of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the phenomenon of the Palestinian liberation movements.

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY. By C. H. Dodd. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 335 p. $7.95.

The domestic political scene in the 1960s, competently and soberly viewed through the prism of constitutional law and practice, parties and elections, and public administration.

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An American economist's careful account of how political and economic differences have prevented economic integration among the Arab states despite the number of agreements concluded toward that end. The essential element, a sufficient community of interests to apply vast oil revenues to regional development, has been lacking.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES. By Husain M. Albaharna. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969, 351 p. $7.50.

The many and complex problems of the small Arab states of the Persian Gulf in their relations to Britain, to the world community and to each other. Of special interest as background to the impending changes in status required by Britain's military withdrawal from the Gulf.

South and Southeast Asia

ALTERNATIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Eugene R. Black. New York: Praeger, 1969, 180 p. $5.95.

The observations of the former President of the World Bank during his mission to encourage Southeast Asian nations to join in developing their potential resources.

UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Frank H. Golay and others. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 494 p. $15.00.

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A country-by-country study of the economic and industrial resources and enterprises of the Southeast Asian nations, with emphasis on the importance of increasing the role of nationals in the ownership and control of productive assets.

THE MYTH OF INDEPENDENCE. By Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 188 p. $7.00.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister from 1963–1966 expresses opinionated views on his achievements in office and makes proposals for remedying what he considers errors in dealing with the global powers.

VIETNAM: SOME BASIC ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES. Edited by Walter Isard. Cambridge: Schenkman, 1969, 213 p. $5.95.

Assuming that government policy-makers on both sides lack understanding of the dynamics of war and that their predictions are too often inaccurate, a wide variety of social scientists examine the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam and argue for their recommended solutions of key problems. (This is published jointly with Peace Research Society (International) as "Papers," Volume X.)

VIET NAM—THE UNHEARD VOICES. By Don Luce and John Sommer. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 336 p. $6.50.

Two International Voluntary Services members describe the feelings of their Vietnamese friends as expressed during their years of living and working there. They aim to correct what they view as unnecessary mistakes by the American Government.

THUD RIDGE. By Colonel Jack Broughton. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969, 254 p. $5.95.

The story of Thailand-based fighter pilots who flew against North Viet Nam; much of it as actually recorded during battle on the Colonel's cockpit tape recorder.

THE COMMUNIST COLLAPSE IN INDONESIA. By Arnold C. Brackman. New York: Norton, 1969, 264 p. $6.95.

Emphasizing that the 1965 collapse of the PKI was "not so much a coup as a purge from the top," the author details the downfall of the world's third largest communist party and its effects on the course of world events.

THE IMPACT OF CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES IN MALAYA: A HISTORICAL STUDY. By Wilfred Blythe. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1969, 566 p. $15.50.

The traditional role of secret societies in China, their importation into Malaya and their influence on Overseas Chinese, together with an account of the attempts made by the governments to deal with the ensuing problems. Excellent reading.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Norton, 1969, 224 p. $4.95.

The well-informed Assistant Managing Editor of *The New York Times* analyzes the causes of the Sino-Soviet differences (which, he believes, may well lead to war) and suggests how the United States can influence—and will be influenced by—the struggle.

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PACIFIC DESTINY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE U.S. IN THE FAR EAST: 1776–1968. By Richard O'Connor. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 505 p. $10.00.

A fascinating story of the evolution of the United States as a Pacific rather than an Atlantic power. The author pays proper attention to those Americans, from John Ledyard on, who have shaped and directed America's Pacific adventures.

PEOPLE'S WAR: CONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES IN CHINA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA. By J. L. S. Girling. New York: Praeger, 1969, 244 p. $6.50.

Factors creating insurgency, conditions necessary for its success and how it can be prevented or suppressed, especially in cases where peasants rebel against an existing system which supports landowners and city dwellers.

MODERN CHINA'S SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL FORM. Edited by Jack Gray. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1969, 379 p. $10.50.

Ten historical essays by academics, public servants, journalists and others examine the antecedents of Chinese Communism and some of the factors that have shaped China's political psychology.

CHINA IN CHANGE: AN APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING. Edited by M. Searle Bates. New York: Friendship Press, 1969, 191 p. $1.50 (Paper).

Papers selected by a reliable Christian scholar with long affiliations with China, who seeks to correct erroneous stereotyped views of the country.

UNDERSTANDING MODERN CHINA. Edited by Joseph M. Kitagawa. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969, 284 p. $7.95.

China's political behavior seen against its cultural background and its relation to modern society. The twelve essays cover geography, political leadership, economy, ideology, political and foreign policy, Overseas Chinese and American perceptions of China.

MAO. By Philippe Devillers. New York: Schocken, 1969, 317 p. $5.95.

Selections of Mao's writings "reduced to essentials" as they are currently being disseminated (not as originally presented) with elucidative running commentaries. (Translated from the French, "Ce que Mao a Vraiment Dit." Paris: Stock, 1968, 292 p. Fr. 17.)

INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By Barry M. Richman. New York: Random House, 1969, 968 p. $15.00.

Findings and observations of a Canadian expert made during his 1966 first-hand study of Communist China's management, industry, society and economic development.

JAPAN SURGES AHEAD: THE STORY OF AN ECONOMIC MIRACLE. By P. B. Stone. New York: Praeger, 1969, 206 p. $6.95.

A good popular survey by a British journalist who is strong on technology.

JAPAN: IMAGES AND REALITIES. By Richard Halloran. New York: Knopf, 1969, 281 p. $6.95.

A study of Japan's history and its political, social and economic order, with the conclusion that the national character of Japan will never, despite public illusion, become truly Western in essence.

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MODERN JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY. By Morinosuke Kajima. Rutland: Tuttle, 1969, 327 p. $5.50.

A condensed English version of "Nihon no Gaiko Seisaku," written in 1966 on the basis of the author's thirteen-year experience as chairman of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's Foreign Relations Research Committee and of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the parliament's upper house.

SOKA GAKKAI: JAPAN'S MILITANT BUDDHISTS. By Noah S. Brannen. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1968, 181 p. $5.50.

How the 16 million followers of this branch of Nichiren Buddhism, also Japan's third largest political force, threaten to take over Japan and aim to redeem the world, largely through aggressive mass-conversion tactics.

HOW THE CONSERVATIVES RULE JAPAN. By Nathaniel B. Thayer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 349 p. $10.00.

A discussion of the balance between personality and the framework of the Liberal Democratic Party (formed in 1955) and of the role of factions within the party.

KOREA: 1950–1953. By Edgar O'Ballance. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1969, 171 p. $6.50.

A sound military historian emphasizes events that have become historically important in a retrospective story of the strategic thinking that lay behind the various campaigns of the war.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NORTH KOREA. By Byung Chul Koh. New York: Praeger, 1969, 237 p. $12.50.

The evolving nature of the Pyŏngyang régime and its patterns of response to the stimuli of world policies. Heavy use of the North Korean party newspaper *Nodong Sinmum* and various communist documents.

PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT PLANNING: KOREA'S SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN. Edited by Irma Adelman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, 306 p. $12.00.

American and Korean technicians explain the underlying aspects of South Korea's 1967–1971 development plan and the role it has had in that country's economic and political development.

THE NEXT ASIA: PROBLEMS FOR U.S. POLICY. Edited by David S. Smith. New York: Columbia University, 1969, 316 p.

Political, economic, military and cultural problems facing the United States and major Asian nations as seen by ten participants of the 1967–1968 Seminar held by the International Fellows Program of Columbia University. Mostly on or involving China.

Africa

THE GREAT POWERS AND AFRICA. By Waldemar A. Nielsen. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1969, 431 p. $11.95.

Europe's partial withdrawal from Africa provides the background for a study of the Chinese and Russian involvement in that continent and a critical history of American policy there. Looking at recent crises, the President of the African-American Institute suggests the lines that American policy should follow in the future.

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AFRICA 69/70: A REFERENCE VOLUME ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT. Compiled and edited by the Editorial Staff of "Jeune Afrique." New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1969, 445 p. $9.50.

Students, businessmen, journalists and others will find this attractive volume of considerable value. Included are analytical essays, country profiles, some economic statistics and a variety of maps and charts; also useful information on development projects.

AFRICAN ARMIES AND CIVIL ORDER. By J. M. Lee. New York: Praeger (for the Institute for Strategic Studies), 1969, 198 p. $6.00.

A much-needed general comparative analysis of the reasons for military intervention in African politics, by a British political scientist. It is well written and unencumbered by needless professional jargon.

LIBYA. By John Wright. New York: Praeger, 1969, 304 p. $7.50.

A useful general history and introduction to Libya, with emphasis on the period of Italian rule and the later steps toward independence. Developments of the past decade, however, receive only sketchy treatment.

PARTY AND PEOPLE: A STUDY OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN TUNISIA. By Lars Rudebeck. New York: Praeger, 1969, 285 p. $9.50.

The theme of the book is the mobilization of mass support, through the Socialist Destour Party, for the development of Tunisia. (First published in Sweden, 1967.)

THE GOVERNMENT OF ETHIOPIA. By Margery Perham. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969, 531 p. $14.00.

A re-issue of the now classic 1948 study with an additional chapter on developments since 1947, a chapter on central government by Christopher Clapham and a new chronology of Ethiopian history.

HAILE-SELASSIE'S GOVERNMENT. By Christopher Clapham. New York: Praeger, 1969, 218 p. $7.50.

The author, a British scholar, argues that post-liberation Ethiopia has a dual structure of government in which traditional modes of politics are carried on behind a front of modern institutions. A good analytical work.

LIBERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE. By J. Gus Liebenow. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 247 p. $7.50.

A first-rate analysis of Liberia's political system and its historical development. The author is the Director of Indiana University's African Studies Program.

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The process of decolonization in black Africa is described chronologically by a British journalist currently in the Paris office of *The Times*.

LÉOPOLD SÉDAR SENGHOR ET LA NAISSANCE DE L'AFRIQUE MODERNE. By Ernest Milcent and Monique Sordet. Paris: Éditions Seghers, 1969, 271 p. Fr. 18.

The development of the Senegalese President's career and political thought is traced by two French journalists. A preface by Georges Pompidou is included.

NOTES FROM AFRICA. By H. S. Aynor. New York: Praeger, 1969, 163 p. $5.95.

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An Israeli diplomat, formerly chargé d'affaires in what was Leopoldville, and later Ambassador to Senegal and Gambia, gives a lively impression of his experiences, done in the guise of a fictitious ambassador.

THE CIVIL SERVICE IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA. By A. L. Adu. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 253 p. $6.00 (London: Allen and Unwin).

A detailed analysis of African public administration by the former head of the Ghana Civil Service.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. By Obafemi Awolowo. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 356 p. $7.35.

Currently Commissioner for Finance in Nigeria's military government, the well-known politician analyzes the effects of the colonial period upon his country, develops some general principles by which its constitutional crisis should be resolved and gives his own personal blueprint for a new constitution.

THE BIAFRA STORY. By Frederick Forsyth. Baltimore: Penguin, 1969, 236 p. $1.45 (Paper).

Generally sympathetic to the Biafran cause, this work describes the origins and analyzes the issues in the Nigerian civil war. The author, a British journalist with wide African experience, covers developments through early 1969.

MODERNIZATION IN GHANA AND THE U.S.S.R. By Robert E. Dowse. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 107 p. $3.00.

A British political scientist argues that Ghana and the U.S.S.R. dealt with the fundamental problem of economic development in remarkably similar manners despite differences in political ideology. A suggestive, if somewhat forced, comparative study.

THE LIBERATION OF GUINÉ: ASPECTS OF AN AFRICAN REVOLUTION. By Basil Davidson. Baltimore: Penguin, 1969, 166 p. $1.45 (Paper).

This work is concerned largely with the activities, strategies and ideology of the P.A.I.G.C. (African Independence Party of Guiné and the Cape Verde Islands) in the Portuguese enclave on the west coast of Africa. Part of the Penguin African Library, this is a useful addition to the English-language material on Portuguese Africa.

TUMBLED HOUSE: THE CONGO AT INDEPENDENCE. By Ian Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 142 p. $4.25.

An interesting account of the turbulent period from January 1960 to July 1961, by the senior British diplomat in what was then Leopoldville, who later became the first British Ambassador to the independent Congo.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE. By Eduardo Mondlane. Baltimore: Penguin, 1969, 221 p. $1.65 (Paper).

A first-hand account of the nationalist movement, its origins and its problems. Until his assassination in early 1969, the author was the President of the Mozambique Liberation Front and a leading spokesman for Africans generally.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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